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On September 21, 1976, the Chilean politician Orlando Letelier and his assistant, 
Ronni Moffitt, were killed in a car bombing in Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C. Ex-
minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to the United States under the socialist 
president Salvador Allende Gossens, Letelier was a staunch critic of Allende’s successor, 
the military general Augusto Pinochet. The diplomat’s premeditated assassination was a 
formidable demonstration of the international collaboration against Communism during 
the Cold War. The bombing was carried out by the Chilean secret police (Dirección de 
Inteligencia Nacional or DINA) with the assistance of the North American Michael 
Townley, and a group of exiled Cubans living in the United States.  
The assassination was one of the first large-scale manifestations of Operation 
Condor, a transnational intelligence-sharing operation created in the mid-1970s by six 
South American military regimes and the United States to inhibit the diffusion of leftist 
ideologies—and leftists themselves—in the Southern Cone, the United States, and 
Europe.1 This high-profile assassination, while one of the most infamous examples of 
Condor, was by no means the first of its kind or an isolated event. 
Operation Condor’s origins can be traced a full three years prior to Letelier’s 
assassination. On September 11, 1973, Pinochet ousted the democratically elected 
Allende in a bloody military coup d’état. From that day forward, the newly empowered 
military junta began to systematically arrest and detain thousands of Allende supporters. 
Pinochet and his military used a broad brush in identifying and targeting alleged 
Communist sympathizers who, they claimed, posed a threat to the new regime. In the 
                                                
1 South America’s southernmost countries, known collectively as the Southern Cone, include 
Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil.  
 2 
days and weeks following September 11, thousands of Chileans were taken from their 
homes, interrogated, detained, tortured, and massacred in the large sports stadiums of 
Santiago. By the end of the seventeen-year dictatorship, this systematic repression had 
affected more than 40,000 Chileans.2  
Immediately after September 11, thousands applied for political asylum at foreign 
embassies in Santiago. These hopeful asylum-seekers included Chilean natives as well as 
the many Brazilian, Argentine, Paraguayan, Uruguayan, Bolivian, and Ecuadoran 
nationals who, drawn to Allende’s socialist experiment, had immigrated to Chile between 
1970 and 1973. Demonstrative of the transnational character of the Cold War in South 
America, many of these refugees were leftists (or suspected leftists) who had either been 
forced into exile or who had voluntarily fled right-wing dictatorships in their home 
countries during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was especially true for Brazil, where an 
increasingly repressive military regime had seized power.3 Since the Argentine 
government remained (nominally) democratic until its “Dirty War” began in March 1976, 
a significant number of these militants sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy in the 
Chilean capital of Santiago. Between September 1973 and late 1975, tens of thousands of 
South Americans chose to migrate in this manner. Due to its proximity, Argentina 
                                                
2 The exact figure cited by the second Chilean truth commission, the National Commission on 
Political Imprisonment and Torture Report (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura), 
better known as the Valech Report, in 2011 is 40,018. This represents all documented cases of 
death, disappearance, kidnapping, torture, and abuse that occurred from September 1973 to 1989. 
Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Comisión sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (Informe 
Valech), Sergio Valech, et. al. (29 Nov. 2004, updated in Aug. 2011), 10 Dec. 2013, 
http://www.memoriaviva.com/Tortura/Informe_Valech.pdf. 
3 Democratically elected Brazilian president João Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed 
military coup in 1964; however, there was a noticeable increase in repression in 1968 that 
precipitated the emigration of 10,000 to 15,000 Brazilians. Leslie Bethell, “Politics in Brazil: 
From Elections without Democracy to Democracy without Citizenship,” Daedalus 129, no. 2 
(Spring 2000): 1-27, especially 2; and Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger, The Politics of Exile in 
Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), especially 196. 
 3 
received the highest number of Chilean asylees in the first two years after Allende’s fall. 
But the Chilean diaspora was broad as well as deep. Those taking flight found a safe 
haven in anywhere from 110 to 140 countries, including such distant and diverse places 
as Kenya, Bangladesh, the Cape Verde Islands, and Greenland.4 
Concurrent with these migrations, the six military governments of the Southern 
Cone (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay) created Operation 
Condor to confront the growth of leftist sympathizers in the region. Thanks to the release 
of once-classified files, we now know that the murders of several hundred South 
Americans were attributable to Condor. Even if only a small proportion of the total 
deaths, tortures, detentions and disappearances during the 1970s can be ascribed to this 
unusual military alliance, its significance in Southern Cone history is profound. It 
represented an unprecedented degree of cooperation among heretofore sworn enemies, as 
well as proof of how single-minded these regimes had become in their commitment to 
eliminating Marxism from the region. In addition, Condor would also jeopardize the 
possibility of a safe haven in exile. Following the Operation’s inception, political asylum, 
an international legal principle accepted by democracies and military regimes throughout 
Latin America ever since independence, was no longer a certainty for leftist refugees.  
   
Historiography 
Much of the scholarship on the Cold War views the Southern Cone, specifically, 
and Latin America, more generally, as proxies for the four decade long struggle between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Domestic factors are often given short shrift in 
                                                
4 Thomas Wright and Rody Oñate, eds., Flight from Chile: Voices of Exile (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1998), especially 91. 
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the scholarship. This is especially so for the limited secondary scholarship that treats 
Condor. Only recently, thanks to several archival discoveries, have scholars begun to 
give the Operation the closer attention it deserves. The discovery of 700,000 pages of 
materials in 1992 in the Paraguayan Archives of Terror, the National Security Archive’s 
Chile Documentation Project in 1998, and the subsequent release in 2002 of U.S. 
materials on the Argentine military of the 1970s—the last two caches byproducts of 
Pinochet’s 1998 arrest in London—have allowed scholars to better analyze Condor and 
its place within a global context.5  
While the earliest literature from the 1970s and 1980s was by and large unable to 
detect Condor’s transnational network, studies since the 1990s have utilized these new 
resources to illustrate the collaboration between the United States and Southern Cone 
military regimes. Unfortunately, much of the scholarship on Condor views the network 
through the prism of North American policy, and to a lesser extent, the Cuban 
Revolution. As such, it often ignores the importance of regional and local factors in its 
evolution. Moreover, the secondary scholarship barely mentions the impact that these 
operations had on leftist refugees in the Southern Cone—or the agency that exiles had in 
mediating Condor’s development.  
Scholars concur that the Chilean and Argentine states during the 1960s and 1970s 
were isolated geographically, economically, and politically, and that, as a result, pursued 
                                                
5 Philip Chrimes, review of The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability, by Peter Kornbluh, and The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought 
Terrorism to Three Continents, by John Dinges,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 576-77, 
especially 576; and Simon Watts, “How Paraguay’s ‘Archives of Terror’ Put Operation Condor in 
Focus,” BBC Online Magazine, 22 Dec. 2013, accessed 14 Jan. 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20774985. 
 5 
closer relations with Washington to combat their marginalization during the Cold War.6 
Heraldo Muñoz, a Chilean diplomat, cites Chile’s historic isolation as a result of its 
geographic separation from the rest of the continent and its frosty relations with the 
United States, western Europe and much of Latin America. This history of isolation, 
Muñoz posits, is what encouraged the Chilean military to pursue stronger economic and 
political ties with the United States after the coup.7 Efforts by the Pinochet regime to 
improve relations with the United States were made more difficult, however, by media 
reporting of the junta’s repressive tactics.8 In addition, a change in the White House did 
not help the junta in its efforts to strengthen ties with Washington. After the 1976 
presidential election, Jimmy Carter announced a new direction in foreign policy, stating 
that the U.S. would no longer support dictatorships because they were inconsistent with 
North American political values.   
In a clear indication of the limited documentation Muñoz and other scholars had 
access to during the 1970s and 1980s, the author cites the firestorm surrounding the 
Letelier assassination as further proof of the “significant decline” in U.S.-Chilean 
relations.9 In contrast, later scholarship points to that high-profile case as evidence of 
close, if covert, cooperation between the Ford administration and the Chilean junta. 
North American scholars writing in the 1970s and 1980s came to similar 
conclusions regarding the United States’ desire to distance itself from Southern Cone 
                                                
6 E.g., Heraldo Muñoz, “Chile's External Relations under the Military,” in Military Rule in Chile: 
Dictatorship and Oppositions, eds., J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 304-322; and Arthur Whitaker, The United States and the 
Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1976). 
7 Muñoz, “Chile’s External Relations,” 310. 
8 Ibid., 319. 
9 Ibid., 308-309. 
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politics. One North American historian agreed with Muñoz’s assessment that human 
rights abuses explained Washington’s determination to distance itself from the 
dictatorship.10 In fact, the first generation of scholarship, drawing on the sources 
available, essentially reiterated the positions of the U.S. government and Southern Cone 
military regimes that Communist encroachment had to be obstructed at all costs. In 
juxtaposition, more recent accounts, benefitting from access to new sources, 
acknowledge that the United States provided training and assistance to these regimes.  
Following Pinochet’s arrest in October 1998, pressure from scholars and human 
rights activists forced the Clinton administration to release classified records about the 
U.S. role in Chile during the Allende and Pinochet periods. To a lesser extent, this public 
pressure also led to the subsequent release in September 2002 of documents relating to 
Argentina’s Dirty War.11 Although “much sensitive material remains classified for the 
foreseeable future” and many of the documents made available are heavily redacted, it is 
clear that recent studies of Operation Condor have profited substantially from their 
release.12  
The most convincing accounts of Condor and Southern Cone relations during the 
1970s come from three North Americans writing in the early 2000s: J. Patrice McSherry, 
Peter Kornbluh, and John Dinges.13 McSherry, a political scientist, provides a 
comprehensive assessment of Condor’s multinational character, arguing that 
                                                
10 Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone. 
11 Chrimes, “Review,” 576. 
12 Ibid., 577. 
13 McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His 
Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004); and Kornbluh, The 
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 
2004). 
 7 
collaboration with right-wing militaries was consistent with earlier U.S. efforts to roll 
back Communism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the Cold War. Drawing on 
declassified North American government documents and testimonies from former 
Condor torturers, McSherry emphasizes the importance of the Cold War context in 
understanding the fear of Communist subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
She describes this concept as “hemispheric defense defined by ideological frontiers” 
(italics in the original).14 McSherry also provides a detailed description of the workings 
of Condor’s Phase III, the most notorious final stage that targeted leftists outside of Latin 
America. McSherry cites, for example, a 1976 Defense Intelligence report that one 
Condor unit “was structured much like a U.S. Special Forces Team,” and that Phase III 
tactics closely resembled Vietnam-era psychological warfare (PSYWAR or PSYOPS), 
“especially black propaganda, deception, and disinformation to control and manipulate 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population.”15 Although McSherry persuasively 
demonstrates parallels between military operations in multiple nations and shows how 
Condor has its roots in earlier episodes of Cold War conflict, the far-reaching scope of 
her project inhibits a wider discussion of regional factors that shaped Condor’s evolution. 
Moreover, the author’s emphasis on the similarities among North American covert 
operations across the globe deflects attention away from where Condor actually took 
place: the Southern Cone.  
Kornbluh studies the complicated role of the United States in the 1973 Pinochet 
coup and Condor’s subsequent development. Inaugural Director of the National Security 
Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, Kornbluh “led the campaign to declassify 
                                                
14 McSherry, Predatory States, 1.  
15 Ibid., 7 and 15. 
 8 
official documentation of the secret history of U.S. government history of the Pinochet 
dictatorship.”16 A staunch critic of U.S. foreign policy, Kornbluh examines the Nixon 
administration’s plotting to destabilize the Allende presidency by “making the economy 
scream.” He also documents Washington’s subsequent support for the junta, its 
participation in Condor and CIA training of DINA, the Letelier assassination and its 
reluctance to investigate the cases of its own “missing” leftist citizens.  
The National Security Archive’s ongoing filing of Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests has given Kornbluh access to a treasure trove of documentation on 
Condor. Like McSherry, his study emphasizes the targeted assassinations of moderate 
and leftists politicians during Phase III operations. Even more so than McSherry, 
Kornbluh’s goal is to reveal the hypocrisy of North American intervention in Chile. The 
book jacket blurb makes his agenda transparent: “The Pinochet File revisits all of the 
outstanding questions and controversies in this notorious chapter in the history of 
American foreign policy. It…will allow Americans to understand the full extent of what 
was done in their name—but without their knowledge—in Chile.”17 Indeed, his study 
highlights Washington’s culpability for Condor’s tragedies, particularly the United 
States’ willingness to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses. For instance, in his 
analysis of the September 1974 assassination of the moderate Chilean General Carlos 
Prats González and his wife Sofia in Buenos Aires—the first high-profile assassination 
traditionally attributed to Condor—the author minimizes the culpability of South 
American actors and emphasizes the CIA’s assistance and training of DINA. Southern 
                                                
16 As a result of the National Security Archive’s FOIA requests the “CIA [was] forced to release 
hundreds of records on covert operations” and “16,000 secret U.S. documents” were declassified. 
Kornbluh, “The National Security Archive: Chile Documentation Project.” gwu.edu; and idem, 
The Pinochet File, book jacket.  
17 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, book jacket. 
 9 
Cone military leaders are invariably cast as supporting actors in his narrative. Like 
McSherry, Kornbluh focuses exclusively on Operation Condor at the state level. He fails 
to consider how it influenced—or was influenced by—factors on the ground in the 
Southern Cone. 
In contrast to Kornbluh and McSherry, the investigative journalist John Dinges’ 
The Condor Years does address South American military and paramilitary. Dinges thus 
makes a monumental contribution to Condor scholarship, shedding light on hundreds of 
National Security Archive declassified CIA documents and the Paraguayan Archives of 
Terror, as well as interviews with over 200 individuals, one of whom was a key 
Uruguayan military officer present at the first meeting of Condor signatories. Thanks to 
that eyewitness testimony, we now are aware of the full scope of the Operation’s agenda, 
and which military representatives were in attendance in official and unofficial capacities. 
 Fascinatingly, although Dinges reveals that no North American delegation was 
present at this first meeting, he overlooks the significance of their absence.18 He does 
offer valuable information about the Operation’s key technological advances provided by 
Washington, such as the computer data bank and Condor telex communication system, 
which the South American militaries shared to track down subversives.19 As Dinges 
notes, international “[p]olice agencies had long been organized in Interpol, which often 
provided for effective exchange of information and action in the pursuit of international 
criminals.” Operation Condor, however, represented “a giant step beyond previous police 
coordination and intelligence exchange. Where Interpol had international warrants and 
extradition proceedings, Condor had political data banks and cross-border 
                                                
18 Dinges, The Condor Years, especially 10-17, 116-125, and 241.  
19 Ibid., especially 120-124. 
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kidnappings.”20 Dinges is careful to document each of the transnational actors that 
participated in Phase III assassinations—e.g., Cuban exiles, the ex-CIA official Townley, 
Italian henchmen sympathetic to the Pinochet regime, and South American military men 
themselves—as well as the strategies and methods employed in each assassination plot.  
Yet, like his contemporaries, Dinges’ principal concern is the relationship 
between South American military generals and North American officials, especially 
Henry Kissinger and the CIA. Making good use of CIA records obtained from FOIA 
requests, Dinges highlights the close working relationship that developed between DINA 
head Manuel Contreras and Kissinger. He documents numerous instances between 1974 
and 1976 when Contreras went to Washington to seek Kissinger’s counsel and request 
aid. As early as March 1974, Dinges contends, “Contreras knew he needed help,” and 
“traveled to the United States to get it.” As a result of this visit, Contreras secured CIA 
training of DINA operatives. Dinges describes that “within weeks,” of that training 
program, “DINA conducted its first international assassination” of Prats. Although 
Contreras later downplayed U.S. involvement in Condor—“they [the CIA] only acted on 
the theoretical part[;] [w]e didn’t get to the practical part. In other words, they only taught 
us, they didn’t participate in anything”—Dinges remains skeptical of a limited U.S. role. 
He adds, “such a scenario cannot be considered factual solely on Contreras’ word.” He 
then effectively disproves Contreras’ assertion throughout The Condor Years.21  
Although Dinges provides valuable information on Condor’s technological 
enhancements and the covert relationship between Contreras and the CIA, his 
conclusions and sources overemphasize the role of the United States. This preoccupation 
                                                
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 68-69. 
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with Washington’s hidden hand in Condor unfolds throughout the book, as Dinges 
emphasizes the North American role in the Chilean coup, the training of South American 
military officers in the Panama Canal Zone, and the United States’ willingness to provide 
South American military governments with what he terms a “shadow of impunity.”22 
Ultimately, Dinges’ study of Condor, like McSherry’s and Kornbluh’s, is U.S.-centric in 
terms of its references, sources, and conclusions. Acknowledging that he is writing for an 
audience preoccupied with the ramifications of 9/11 and the FBI and CIA’s “advance 
intelligence about the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center,” Dinges asks, “[H]ad 
the agencies connected the dots using the abundant information they had received, could 
they have detected and perhaps averted the worst act of international terrorism on U.S. 
soil?”23 In part, this explicit comparison can be understood as the journalist’s way of 
relating a more remote history to a general audience with a greater interest in current 
events. (Dinges also makes inflammatory comparisons between DINA and the Gestapo 
and the KGB.) But such a teleological approach displaces Condor from its regional 
context, and obscures the key role South American actors played. His focus invariably 
returns to the United States: “The political tragedy of this story is that the military leaders 
who carried out the assassinations and mass murders looked to the United States for 
technical assistance and strategic leadership…. The tragedy is that the United States acted 
not to promote and nurture democracy, but to encourage and justify its overthrow.”  
Leaving little doubt about his moral revulsion towards Condor, Dinges adds:  
                                                
22 Ibid., especially 9, 11, 21, and 157. For a list of the South American military leaders that 
received training in the Panama Canal Zone in the 1960s and 1970s, see Ariel C. Armony, 
“Producing and Exporting State Terror: The Case of Argentina,” in When States Kill: Latin 
America, the US, and Technologies of Terror, eds., Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 305-334, especially 313. 
23 Dinges, The Condor Years, 5. On comparisons of Chile’s 9/11 coup to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
see  2-3, 5, and 9. For allusions to Nazism and Stalinism, see 23 and 65. 
 12 
Even more tragic, and arguably criminal, were the cases in which U.S. officials 
were directly involved in plots and liaison relationships with those engaged in 
political assassination and mass murder…. How many of the thousands of 
murders committed by Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil 
could have been prevented if the United States had taken a strong forward public 
posture, [or] even a private posture against the killing, torture, and disappearances 
its allies in friendly intelligence agencies were carrying out?24   
 
Ultimately, Dinges’ interest in condemning Washington obscures why, where, and when 
Condor developed. Like McSherry and Kornbluh, his is an ahistorical account that fails 
to consider South American agency and context. In this light, Condor appears to have 
developed predominately under U.S. direction—the regional causal why is left 
untouched.  
There are, however, a number of secondary accounts that further explicate the 
regional context. The historically frosty relationship between Chile and Argentina, for 
example, has drawn a fair amount of scholarly attention. Territorial disagreements over 
Antarctica, boundary disputes over the shared 3,200 mile border, and controversies over 
economic issues between the two neighbors make the relatively sudden willingness to set 
aside long-standing historical tensions during the Condor years that much more 
intriguing.25 Diplomatic histories of Chilean-Argentine relations imply that Operation 
Condor represented a unique case of cooperation between two nations that traditionally 
have been enemies. 
                                                
24 Ibid., 9. 
25 Cameron Thies, “Territorial Nationalism in Spatial Rivalries: An Institutionalist Account of the 
Argentine-Chilean Rivalry,” International Interactions 27, no. 4 (01 Sept. 2001): 399-431; David 
Sheinin, review of Conflict in the Southern Cone: The Argentine Military and the Boundary 
Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902, by George V. Rauch, in Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (01 
July 2000): 854-855; Jorge Domínguez, David Mares, and the United States Institute of Peace, 
Boundary Disputes in Latin America. Peaceworks: No. 50 (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2003); Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone; Michael Morris, 
Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Antarctica (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); 
and Martin Mullins, In the Shadow of the Generals: Foreign Policy Making in Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006). 
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Similar to the impact that Pinochet’s London arrest had on the release of National 
Security Archive classified documents on Chile, that same year (1998) also saw an 
increase in the number of published memoirs and scholarly studies, both in the Southern 
Cone and the United States, about the exile experience during the 1970s. Although this 
body of literature is technically not Condor scholarship, it provides an invaluable 
portrayal of the uncertain and peripatetic character of exile for transnational leftists 
during the Condor period, a massive movement of peoples and ideas driven in part by 
Condor’s operations.  
Chilean journalist and political scientist Rody Oñate and North American 
historian Thomas Wright compiled one of the most comprehensive qualitative studies of 
the Chilean exile experience, relaying narratives given in the refugees’ own words. 
Growing out of “casual conversations” in Santiago with returning exiles about their 
experiences abroad, the authors published thirty-three testimonies. These oral histories, of 
predominately “ordinary people,” include “stories of their torture, of their loved ones’ 
deaths, of heart-stopping close calls with arrest or assassination.” At their core, these are 
emotional narratives that reflect how challenging circumstances affected the exiles’ 
individual and collective psyches. As the editors explain: 
While exile is a political phenomenon that unlocks key aspects of the dictatorship, 
it is, much more importantly, a moving human drama. This book…is the story of 
shattered dreams, broken families, and truncated careers; of psychological and 
physical trauma; of the struggle to adapt to strange cultures and climates.26 
 
Perhaps most importantly, by structuring the anthology around common themes that 
appear in the testimonials and by using the exiles’ own words to tell their stories, this set 
of oral histories contains an underlying political message: the dictatorship caused an 
                                                
26 Wright and Oñate, Flight from Chile, xi. 
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unquantifiable loss and survival abroad demanded strength and resilience. But the 
collection’s primary purpose is to allow a persecuted group to share its memories of a 
difficult moment of its past.27 Due to its nature, this account and others like it do not 
provide a systematic analysis of the exiles’ role, nor does it fully interrogate the historic 
evolution and ubiquity of political exile in the region during the Cold War.  
Several other scholars of the exile experience have published noteworthy accounts 
of South American migrations. Largely written by political scientists, these studies 
employ both qualitative analysis and quantitative data. Political scientist Mario Sznajder 
and political sociologist Luis Roniger, for example, offer a comparative survey of exile in 
Latin America, including Brazil and the Caribbean, from the colonial period through the 
1970s.28 The co-authors compare the role of exile in different Latin American nations and 
highlight how “all types of governments,” have utilized exile as a “regulatory 
mechanism” of institutional exclusion. Furthermore, Sznajder and Roniger note that these 
same governments have often welcomed other countries’ political refugees.29 This work 
provides excellent analysis of the political history of banishment in the region, the 
theoretical strategies behind forced relocation, sites of exile, and the long-term impacts of 
                                                
27 For similar autobiographies and memoirs of individual political exiles during the Condor years, 
see, for example, Iván Jakšić, “In Search of Safe Haven: Exile, Immigration, and Identity,” in 
Migration and Identity: Memory and Narrative, eds., Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotnes (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 19-34; Ariel Dorfman, Heading South, Looking 
North: A Bilingual Journey (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998); Marc Cooper, 
Pinochet and Me: A Chilean Anti-Memoir (New York: Verso, 2001); Julie Shayne, They Used to 
Call Us Witches: Chilean Exiles, Culture, and Feminism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); 
Marita Eastmond, The Dilemmas of Exile: Chilean Refugees in the USA (Göteborg, Sweden: Acta 
Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1997); Diana Kay, Chileans in Exile: Private Struggles, Public 
Lives (Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Academic, 1987); and Chilean Writers in Exile: Eight Short 
Novels, ed., Fernando Alegría (Trumansburg, NY: Crossing Press, 1981). 
28 Sznajder and Roniger, The Politics of Exile. 
29 Ibid., 1-2. 
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exile on societies. Although ambitiously broad in its timeframe and spatial reach, its 
comprehensive, transnational nature is impressive.  
In an anthology edited by Roniger and historians James Green and Pablo 
Yankelevich, a comparable comparative approach to the exile experience is employed.30 
Composed of essays by respected historians, political scientists, and sociologists, this 
collection highlights the impact of forced exodus and relocation on political ideologies 
and cultural identities. Drawing similar conclusions as Roniger and Sznajder’s work, the 
editors argue that the “phenomenon” of exile in Latin America—“this paradoxical 
combination of patterned exclusion and inclusion”—has profoundly altered social 
networks, notions of identity, power dynamics, culture, and citizenship.31 Both accounts 
accurately note that comparative studies of exile and transnational migrations are only 
recently becoming recognized as critical to an understanding of how the exile diaspora 
impacts host country politics.  
In a groundbreaking trilogy on the “memory box of Pinochet’s Chile,” historian 
Steve J. Stern has further added to the scholarship on exile, focusing on the psychological 
impact of displacement and trauma on individual and collective memory. Drawing on 
oral history research in Chile around the time of Pinochet’s 1998 arrest, a watershed 
moment in the nation’s recent history, Stern studies how the perpetrators and victims of 
the dictatorship remember this period in retrospect. Although Stern’s work centers on 
how Chileans experienced the dictatorship at home, his theoretical framework for 
understanding memory and trauma is applicable to the study of exile communities as 
well. He argues that “the history of ‘memory’ enables us to see an additional aspect of 
                                                
30 Roniger, Green, and Yankelevich, eds., Exile and the Politics of Exclusion in the Americas 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012). 
31 Ibid., 3-7. 
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Chilean life that is subtle yet central: the making and unmaking of political and cultural 
legitimacy, notwithstanding violent rule by terror.”32 Contesting two prevailing 
approaches to memory—of olvido (literally, “forgetting,” or a “struggle against 
oblivion”) and the habit of the middle class and wealthy beneficiaries of the dictatorship 
to deny state violence—Stern instead problematizes memory “as a process of competing 
selective remembrance,” that offers “a way of giving meaning to and drawing legitimacy 
from human experience.”33 By focusing on the very flaws and inaccuracies of memory, 
he offers insights about how people internalize, rationalize, and process intense trauma.34 
Most relevant to this study, Stern reminds us of the intense psychological impact of exile 
on individuals and of the distinct ways in which people process and respond to these 
traumas.  
Since Condor and the exile experience have only recently been the subject of 
scholarly studies, and because these topics are so sensitive and politically explosive, it is 
unclear what direction future scholarship will take. Given how politically freighted this 
subject remains in the Southern Cone, it is not surprising that it took Pinochet’s arrest in 
London to encourage some exiles to publish their stories. Still, this subfield by and large 
fails to explain how exiles shaped the political context in their new homes. In fact, they 
tend to reinforce a common trope of the exile as a victim. Of course, Condor’s impact on 
the exiles was devastating and unjustifiable, but such treatment obscures the reality that 
many refugees did not acquiesce to their predicament and remained politically active in 
                                                
32 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), xx. See also idem, Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's 
Chile, 1973-1988 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); and idem, Reckoning with Pinochet: 
The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989-2006 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
33 Idem, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, xxvii. 
34 Ibid., xxvi-xxvii. 
 17 
their new surroundings, just as they had not been quiescent in Chile before the coup. As 
my research will illustrate, while some exiles refrained from politics and sought to live 
out the dictatorship abroad quietly, others took to the streets and showed solidarity with 
“native” militants who shared their ideological beliefs. In addition, due to this body of 
scholarship’s largely apolitical character, it fails to connect the migration patterns and the 
exile community's political activism to Operation Condor, and it does not address the 
collaborative efforts of regional militaries to harass and conduct surveillance operations 
against these political refugees within and outside their borders. 
 
Primary Sources 
This thesis has benefitted from a wealth of unique and untapped primary sources, 
most of which are housed in Santiago’s Museum of Memory and Human Rights (Museo 
de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos or MMDH). The museum was established in 
2010 by then-President Michelle Bachelet to commemorate the human rights abuses 
committed by the Pinochet dictatorship. That Bachelet made the creation of the museum 
such a high priority is not surprising given her family’s history. Her father, an army 
officer who directed Allende’s food distribution center, was detained, interrogated, and 
tortured by the military, subsequently dying of cardiac arrest. A medical student at the 
time, Bachelet and her mother also were detained and taken to Villa Grimaldi, one of the 
most notorious detention centers. In a further demonstration of the dictatorship’s 
enduring legacy in contemporary politics, Bachelet recently revealed that DINA chief 
Contreras interrogated her. Fortunately, owing to her family’s connections, she and her 
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mother were eventually released from detention. She later sought exile in Australia and 
East Germany.    
While studying abroad in Chile in 2013, I conducted an independent study at the 
museum’s Archival Center (Centro de Documentación or CEDOC). I was given access to 
a digitized file of documents (approximately 1,000 pages in total) from the Argentine 
Embassy in Santiago and the Argentine secret police, the Servicio de Informaciones de la 
Policía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (Police Information Services of Buenos Aires 
Province or SIPBA), between 1973 and 1975, which document the movement of political 
asylum-seekers from Chile to Argentina after the coup.35 (All English translations of 
CEDOC documents, originally composed in Spanish, are my own.) 
The documents from the Argentine Embassy provide profiles as well as a 
description of the “ideological crimes” of approximately one thousand leftists seeking 
asylum in Argentina in late 1973 and 1974. SIPBA records primarily describe the 
formation of COMACHI, a thousand-strong organization of Argentine leftists and South 
American refugees living in Argentina who sympathized with the deposed Allende 
regime.36 The SIPBA materials also contain a goldmine of reprinted COMACHI 
publications, including newsletters, fliers, cartoons and block prints composed by the 
                                                
35 Since these materials have yet to be catalogued, for the present I have labeled the SIPBA 
documents as the “Archivos del SIPBA” (SIPBA Archive) and the Argentine Embassy 
documents as the “Archivos de la Embajada Argentina” (Argentine Embassy Archive). Each file 
has a separate name, stamped on the original documents by its author. An important side note: 
although SIPBA is rarely recognized in the scholarship, it was an important player in Argentine 
politics for over three decades under a different name: DIPBA (Dirección de Inteligencia de la 
Policía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires—Intelligence Directorate of the Buenos Aires Province 
Police). Infamous for its surveillance and repression, especially during the Dirty War, DIPBA 
functioned from 1956 to 1988. “La DIPBA: antecedentes, denominaciones y jerarquías,” (La 
Plata, Argentina: Comisión por la Memoria: Centro de Documentación y Archivo, 2008), 
accessed 12 June 2013, http://www.comisionporlamemoria.org/archivo/?page_id=82. 
36 In SIPBA documents, the organization is identified as both the “Comité Argentino-Chileno” 
(Argentine-Chilean Committee) and the “Coordinación de Movimiento de Ayuda a Chile” 
(Coordination of Movement to Help Chile). 
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leftist organization’s leaders that boast the organization’s underdog achievements and 
showcase their vitality during 1974 and 1975. These materials also provide tangible 
evidence of the solidarity among the transnational left and their Argentine compatriots. 
Other SIPBA files describe in detail the surveillance of these migrants in several Buenos 
Aires suburbs. Finding COMACHI publications hidden within SIPBA records was 
especially fortunate, because they reveal how much interest the Argentine police took in 
the political activities of this relatively small, but active, group of exiles.  
These materials are not without their limitations. First, although my three main 
primary sources (the SIPBA Archives, Argentine Embassy Archives, and COMACHI 
publications) represent the views of ideologically distinct groups, record-keepers with 
distinct goals can still alter the historical record in similar ways. For example, my 
information on COMACHI’s strength (in numbers, international diversity, and activity) 
comes from a comparison of its publications and SIPBA’s internal memos. However, just 
as COMACHI perhaps might have been compelled to inflate its successes, so too could 
SIPBA officers have had ample motivation to exaggerate the success of the left in order 
to justify its own repressive “counteroffensive.”  
One of the most challenging aspects of this research has been determining not just 
which raids and assassinations the joint militaries planned and carried out, but also how 
military leaders and their subordinates conceived of their role. These sources, especially 
the primary records, clearly show the militaries’ justification for taking action against the 
left. But how much of this was purely propaganda to explain the repression and how 
much of this polemic represents the militaries’ legitimate fear of a successful leftist 
revolt? At times, even the Argentine police’s private documents read like propaganda. As 
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one SIPBA officer wrote in a September 1974 report, “The Junta Militar is the only 
solution to that problem called Marxism” (emphasis in the original). The officer 
continued, “JUNTA MILITAR = THERAPEUTIC FACTOR = WELL-BEING = 
SOLUTION TO [ALL] PROBLEMS = PROGRESS = PATRIA” (capitalized in the 
original).37 On the one hand, it would make sense that unpublished intra-military 
documents would reliably represent the military’s mentalité. Yet most of this 
correspondence is highly polemical, precisely because every official felt the need to 
formally record and justify his or her allegiance to the regime.  
The Argentine Embassy records are just as contingent. I repeatedly found 
contradictory information about individuals’ identity, exile activities, and leftist 
gatherings, depending on which military officer created the file. For example, the 
Embassy archives documented five official flights that carried exiles from Santiago to 
Buenos Aires in the last months of 1973, immediately after the coup. However, different 
officers’ records reveal little congruence about the dates, flight numbers, and number of 
passengers on each flight. Some recorded all of the flights taking place in October; others 
all in November; and others distributed the flights between October and December. One 
bureaucrat documented all of the flights in September 1973, which would have been 
virtually unfeasible given that the Argentine-Chilean border was closed for official transit 
between September 11 and September 22.38  
Considering these issues, whenever possible I compared the data I found in the 
respective archives with individual testimonies or the conclusions drawn by other 
                                                
37 “Referencia 16698 Tomo 1,” Sept. 1973-1974. Archivos del SIPBA, MMDH: CEDOC, 2-3. 
38 Wright and Oñate, “Chilean Political Exile,” in Exile and the Politics of Exclusion, 145-162, 
especially 147, documents the difficulty of crossing the Chilean-Argentine border in the first 
eleven days after the coup due to its closure. 
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scholars. But I am aware of the limitations of these materials, written in times of chaos 
and under great pressure, and shaped by often-conflicting motivations. Still, these 
materials provide an extraordinary window into the environment in which this 
surveillance and repression occurred.  
In January 2014, I returned to the MMDH and gathered additional materials from 
Chilean, Brazilian, and Argentine newspapers and journals. I also located addendums to 
the two Chilean truth commissions that were not included in their final published 
versions, including invaluable detention records of nationals and foreigners, and 
individual testimonies. In addition, I significantly benefitted from the museum’s 
testimony documentation project, which creates records (audiovisual or transcribed) of 
the stories of Chileans who survived the dictatorship, either at home or in exile abroad. I 
also found a wealth of posters, stickers, and other forms of artwork designed and 
published by European, Middle Eastern, North American, and Latin American embassies, 
artists, museums, political parties, and solidarity groups, some of which is included in 
Chapter Three. Available on the museum’s Biblioteca Digital (Digital Library), these 
images visually capture the exile experience, especially its political activism. In addition 
to providing aesthetically haunting visuals of the dictatorships and exile, these images 
also testify to the resilience of the transnational leftist movement abroad after its effective 
dissolution in South America. 
A second category of primary sources that I draw from is oral histories. The vast 
majority of these materials were diligently collected by other scholars, many of whom are 
discussed above. In addition, while in Santiago in January 2014, I conducted an interview 
with the Chilean Iván Jakšić, a historian born in southern Chile who sought safe haven in 
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Argentina for a year and a half following the September 11 coup, and who then 
immigrated to the United States in the late 1970s after Argentina became increasingly 
unsafe for foreigners. Jakšić’s perceptiveness, memory, and willingness to talk about the 
past helped put emotions and a personal face to this history. Taken together, these oral 
histories are not just memories of the past; rather, they are recollections shaped by the 
past and present. Stern’s insight of memory as “competing selective remembrance” 
resonates throughout all these oral histories. As Jakšić acknowledges, human memory is 
kind to its owner in that it can allow one to gradually soften, or even forget entirely, the 
intense pain and fear of the past.39 In a short story that reflects on the Dirty War’s 
scarring psychological impact on a woman who had been tortured and sexually abused by 
the military, the Argentine writer Luisa Valenzuela describes human memory’s defensive 
quality: “It’s impossible to have access to that corner of her brain where memory 
crouches, so she finds nothing: memory locked in itself as a defense.”40 As Stern notes, in 
response to trauma, some individuals’ memories can fade or disappear entirely as a self-
protecting mechanism. But memory can also do the opposite: it can continue to shape a 
present life wholly around past events, because individuals are often unable to let go of 
haunting tragedies.  
The exile testimonies that I have included in this project are the best resources I 
have to shed light on this unwritten chapter of Condor’s history, yet they too are not 
without their own limitations. I have analyzed these testimonies, but I have also tried to 
read them as a compilation of individual memories that are very distinct from the 
evidentiary records I encountered in the archives. 
                                                
39 Jakšić, Interview with author. Santiago, Chile, 14 Jan. 2014. 
40 Valenzuela, Other Weapons, trans., Deborah Bonner (Hanover, NH: Ediciones del Norte, 
1988), 107. 
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Argument   
Though the existing secondary literature regards the development of Operation 
Condor and the migration of political asylum-seekers within the Southern Cone following 
Augusto Pinochet’s rise to power as isolated events, I contend that these movements were 
not at all discrete. My reading of the SIPBA, COMACHI, and Argentine Embassy 
records documents a push-and-pull relationship between the transnational migration of 
political militants and the impetus for Condor. While I agree with Dinges’ contention that 
Condor’s roots began prior to November 1975 and, in fact, can be traced back to several 
weeks before the Chilean coup, I contend that the initial motivation for the type of 
collaboration that Condor would later formalize was driven not by the United States, but 
by the Southern Cone militaries’ perception that Marxism had to be excised from the 
entire region.  
While Condor scholars have either ignored or minimized the role of the left as 
political actors and placed the blame for violence exclusively on the militaries and the 
United States, I argue that it is essential to broaden our understanding of what both sides 
in this ideological confrontation were attempting to accomplish. The transnational left, 
never a homogenous group, evolved to meet a variety of objectives. Many militants 
continued to be politically active while they were in exile, and many acted in solidarity 
with like-minded leftists in their midst. This was as true in Buenos Aires as it was in 
Stockholm or Mexico City. But solidarity had its limits. Indeed, one of the Latin 
American left’s historic weaknesses was its self-defeating factionalism. There is ample 
evidence of such divisiveness in the materials I consulted.  
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This thesis also complicates the notion that military operations during Condor 
were determined entirely by state actors. While existing Condor studies confer agency 
solely on military leaders, by including the narratives of exiles and members of the 
transnational left, my thesis underscores the contentious relationship that existed among 
and between grassroots activists and political authorities.  
I also challenge the traditional chronology of Condor, the Argentine Dirty War, 
and the Pinochet dictatorship. Most Condor accounts begin their analysis with the 
November 1975 inaugural meeting, while many accounts of the Dirty War start with the 
March 1976 military coup, and nearly all studies of Pinochet’s dictadura begin on 
September 11, 1973. Although these histories may present a “cleaner” story, they also 
obscure more than they reveal because they absent actors whose ideologies and actions 
instigated conflict. Even if these individuals and groups did not ultimately “win” these 
wars, they did play an instrumental role in their inception and trajectory. 
I have chosen to start my story with the September 1970 election of Salvador 
Allende in Chile. By widening the time frame, I reveal that Argentine civil society was at 
war well before March 1976, that collaboration between the Chilean, Brazilian, Bolivian, 
and Uruguayan militaries began prior to Pinochet’s official ascent to power, and that, 
informal Condor collaboration began as early as August 1973, a full two years before the 
traditionally recognized date. It is instructive that neighboring militaries sent troops to 
Chile within days of the coup; some of those soldiers and advisors were directly involved 
in the repression.   
Above all, this project is unconventional in its emphasis on the transnational left 
in exile. While existing Condor accounts ignore the role of exiles after the start of the 
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Dirty War, I track how political refugees fled and then reconstituted themselves 
throughout Latin America, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. Exile was not 
a death sentence, and it is important to study how many individuals courageously 
continued the fight after they were forced to flee the Southern Cone.   
Chapter One examines the transnational leftist community in Chile prior to the 
1973 coup. It profiles the leftists who fled their home countries due to political 
persecution and who sought safe haven in Chile. It considers the political work they 
threw themselves into after they arrived, and how cohesive this heterogeneous 
community of militants was, especially as the coup appeared imminent. This chapter also 
analyzes Pinochet’s harsh response to these leftists prior to and immediately after the 
coup. My research illustrates that the coalescence of the transnational left in Allende’s 
Chile prompted joint military collaboration against this exile community.  
Chapter Two studies the political left in Argentina after the Chilean coup. It 
focuses on the Argentine Embassy’s political asylum policy, and includes an assessment 
of why some refugees were granted asylum and why many more were denied. I then turn 
my attention to Buenos Aires and examine the range of roles that these migrants assumed 
following resettlement, and their political activities in their new environs. This chapter 
also illustrates that, at the same time as the left was gaining strength in Argentina the 
military began to increase its surveillance and interrogation efforts of domestic and 
foreign leftists. I argue that the July 1974 death of President Juan Domingo Perón, who 
had originally welcomed the refugees from Chile, and the September 1974 assassination 
of General Prats in Buenos Aires were two major turning points in Argentina’s gradual 
evolution from a safe haven to a surveillance state.   
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Chapter Three examines the rise of the right in South America and the military 
roots of Operation Condor. I contend that high-profile assassinations of the left’s leaders 
preceded Condor’s official inception, and that the real significance of its creation was the 
fear it instilled among grassroots leftists—ideologues and militants alike—as their 
governments targeted them with impunity across the world. This chapter also considers 
how the increase in overt repression contributed to a fracturing of the exile community 
during 1975-1976. While several Argentine guerrilla groups actually gained strength in 
1975, other leftists fled or went underground in search of safety. Ultimately, Southern 
Cone militaries accomplished their overarching objectives: guerrilla organizations were 
decimated and many exiles were forced to flee, first to Chile and then to Argentina, and 
eventually leave the region entirely.  
The Epilogue tracks Condor’s final operations during the late 1970s and the 
demise of military rule throughout the Southern Cone. In the conclusions, I address the 
role of the United States in Condor and consider how this thesis’ emphasis on the role 
Southern Cone militaries and the transnational left played during this period changes the 
way we should think about the Cold War in Latin America.  
The roots of Condor lie in a deeply fractured Chilean society, as Allende’s victory 
at the polls in 1970 became a lightning rod for those on the left and the right. As leftists 
from all over Latin America gravitated to Chile to help construct a peaceful democratic 
socialist revolution, conservatives, members of the middle class and elements of the 
Chilean military looked at the arrival of this heterogeneous collection of leftist refugees 
with deep concern. I now turn to an examination of how the Allende experiment helped 




From Safe Haven to Surveillance State 
Sweet Fatherland accept the vows 
With which Chile swore at your altars 
Either the tomb of the free you will be 
Or the refuge against oppression 
Either the tomb of the free you will be 
Or the refuge against oppression… 
Or the refuge against oppression 
Or the refuge against oppression.41 
  
Chilean national anthem 
 
 
As the lyrics of the himno nacional make clear, Chile has historically been a 
refuge for political exiles. Since the late nineteenth century, immigrants, whatever their 
political affiliations, have been drawn to the nation’s democratic tradition and its 
economic stability. That would abruptly change on September 11, 1973. At 7:55 AM, the 
four leaders of the Chilean military junta broadcast a statement on the armed forces radio 
network. According to Marc Cooper, a young North American who served as Allende’s 
translator and who sought asylum in Argentina after the coup, the junta signaled that 
foreigners were no longer welcome:  
The population is hereby warned not to let themselves be carried away by 
incitements to violence from either foreign or national activists. And let the 
foreign ones know that in this country we do not accept violent attitudes or any 
extreme positions. This should be remembered as means are adopted for their 
rapid deportation from the country. Any resistance will be met with the full rigor 
of military justice.42 
 
                                                
41 Translated from the Spanish original, these lyrics make up the chorus of Chile’s second 
national anthem. The anthem was primarily written by Eusebio Lillo and incorporates several 
phrases from the first anthem, written by Bernardo de Vera in 1847. Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, 
“Primer Himno Nacional,” Memoria chilena, accessed 14 Dec. 2013, 
<http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-94806.html>. 
42 Cooper, Pinochet and Me, 36. 
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In this chapter, I study the diverse roles played by exiles inside Chilean borders 
during Allende’s rule, as well as the ways in which Junta leader Augusto Pinochet 
capitalized on this foreign leftist activity to justify the overthrow of Allende. I argue that 
leftist activism—on the part of Chileans and non-Chileans—aggravated the already 
precarious Allende presidency in both real and imagined ways. Although not all exiles 
were militants or highly politicized, I contend that the conservative elements of the 
military utilized and at times exaggerated this visible, active foreign leftist presence as 
justification for its violent overthrow of the “Socialist experiment.”43 The Junta employed 
a host of formal and informal methods to fight dissidents—surveillance, threats, raids, 
interrogation, detention, and expulsion—all of which constituted an overreaction well out 
of proportion to the actual threat that these leftists posed to the new regime.  
Ultimately, two aggressive strategies would define Chilean and later Argentine 
military rule: first, the externalization of the foreign subversive “other,” as a 
rationalization for the need for repression and regime change; and second, close cross-
border collaboration among Southern Cone dictatorships against its own citizens and 
foreigners alike. Within days of the overthrow and a full two years before Operation 
Condor was established, neighboring militaries were providing intelligence and troops to 
the Chilean junta in its crackdown against dissidents.   
I first discuss Chile’s history as a safe haven for political refugees as well as the 
tumultuous Allende period from 1970-1973. I consider how his presidency opened up 
Chile to foreign influence to a greater degree than in the past as Latin American leftists 
fleeing oppressive regimes became entangled in domestic politics, thus becoming 
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conspicuous targets of the right. I next describe the diverse spectrum of exile identity and 
activity, and then examine how the military capitalized on this foreign leftist presence—
both before and after September 1973—to justify the coup d’état. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the larger issues at stake for the history and historiography of the 
transnational left, Argentine-Chilean relations, and Operation Condor. 
 
Chile’s Socialist Experiment 
Historically, Chile has been one of Latin America’s most democratic, 
economically stable, and politically peaceful nations—yet a country nonetheless affected 
by extreme inequality. In the 1960s, land was concentrated in the hands of a privileged 
rural elite: a half-million peasants were without land, endemic unemployment plagued the 
countryside, and 70 percent of peasant families earned less than U.S. $100 annually.44 In 
spite of this, until the 1970s Chile had by and large managed to escape the violent 
political unrest that afflicted many of its neighbors. As political scientist Paul Sigmund 
noted in 1973, “Chile, as demonstrated by the astounding survival of its constitution and 
political structure in the midst of intense ideological polarization and social conflict, has 
the most institutionalized political system of all [nations].”45 The narrow 1970 electoral 
victory and presidency of Salvador Allende Gossens best demonstrate the strength of—
and limits to—Chilean exceptionalism.  
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A member of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS), a “veteran politician,” 
and a medical doctor, Allende was committed to carrying out “the transition to socialism” 
in Chile through la vía chilena.46 Allende had helped to found the PS in the early 1930s, 
served as minister of health in the Popular Front government in the early 1940s, was a 
long-time senator and then president of the Senate during the Eduardo Frei administration 
(1964-70), and a three-time presidential candidate prior to his victory in 1970.47 In his 
final presidential race, Allende’s platform was based on three main objectives: extending 
the area of public ownership by expropriating domestic and many U.S.-owned 
enterprises; redistributing income to the lowest-paid 60 percent of the population; and 
providing opportunities for rank-and-file worker participation in management and 
community affairs. Although this platform was comparable to western European socialist 
parties, what made Allende’s Socialist program distinctive is that, unlike other leftist 
revolutions, such sweeping change would be brought about gradually, peacefully, and 
under the law.48 As then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted, Chile was “more 
dangerous,” than Castro’s Cuba because “it posed an ‘insidious’ model that Latin 
American, Italian, or French communists could follow.”49 Not surprisingly, Allende’s 
reforms met a mixed reception, both domestically and internationally. 
On September 4, 1970, Allende narrowly won the popular vote with 36.6 percent. 
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, the conservative National Party (Partido Nacional—PN) 
candidate, secured 35.3 percent, and Radomiro Tomic, the moderate Christian Democrat 
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(Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC), gathered 28.1 percent. Under the 1925 
Constitution, the failure of any candidate to win a majority of votes gave Congress 
authority to determine the outcome, the case in all but two of the previous eight 
presidential races. Allende’s plurality surprised the electorate across the spectrum, and a 
powerful faction of the political elite—and the United States—sought to swing the 
election to Alessandri by forging a majority coalition of PN and PDC representatives in 
Congress.50 The Nixon administration spent millions of dollars trying to thwart Allende’s 
election, and there were multiple terrorist attacks intended to provoke a coup d’état, 
including the assassination of an outspoken critic of coup plotting, the constitutionalist 
general, René Schneider, in late October 1970.51 In spite of this last minute attempt by 
reactionaries and the CIA to precipitate a takeover, institutional and democratic 
precedents prevailed and the PDC opened negotiations with Allende’s Unidad Popular 
(Popular Unity—UP) coalition, ultimately agreeing to support his presidency.52  
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Despite this initial bipartisan commitment, the Allende administration faced an 
uphill battle from the start. The type of party cooperation and bargaining that had 
underpinned politics for the previous four decades “was almost completely absent,” from 
1970-1973 as political institutions became “increasingly divided and rigid in their 
inability to reach any accords in the exercise of their shared power.”53 The young 
government also faced significant economic difficulties: Allende’s election triggered 
“financial panic” and a $90 million drop in bank deposits, a sixty percent decline in the 
Santiago stock exchange’s volume of trade, and a rush to buy North American dollars.54  
Despite these early challenges, the first year of Allende’s presidency by and large 
succeeded in accomplishing his promise of “a revolution a la chilena with red wine and 
empanadas,” a reference to a traditional celebratory Chilean meal. Allende redistributed 
income to the working and middle class and made “significant progress” in agrarian 
reforms and nationalizing the economy.55 He nationalized North American copper 
companies, extractors of one of Chile’s most valuable exports, ninety percent of the 
banking system, and “virtually all” large and medium-sized farms. By 1973, thirty-five 
percent of all agricultural land and 300 factories were in the state social sector. In 
addition, Allende recognized workers’ control of several key industries. In a country 
where state economic activity had traditionally supported, rather than competed with, 
private capital, Allende’s policy decisions represented “huge departures” from the past.56 
If these reforms sparked resistance and opposition from foreign and domestic 
business interests, they also strengthened Allende’s political base among socially 
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marginalized workers and peasants. As the president’s support on the left grew, the pace 
of the public sector’s expansion was increasingly determined by politically mobilized 
workers and campesinos who seized factories and estates. According to a June 1972 El 
Mercurio article, there were as many as 1,700 of these tomas (take-overs) during the first 
year and a half of Allende’s presidency.57 While the UP officially opposed the tomas 
because they strengthened the right’s allegations of “illegality” and “anarchy,” the PS—
Allende’s own party—and the radical leftist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(Revolutionary Left Movement—MIR) encouraged the seizures.58 In retrospect, the 
tomas reflected leftist militants’ push for a more rapid revolution, and the schisms that 
were already forming within Popular Unity in 1971. 
As the March 1973 Congressional elections approached, the economy was in 
shambles: the deficit increased nearly fifteen-fold between 1970 and 1971, and again 
doubled by 1972. Contrary to predictions that Allende’s opposition would gain seats in 
the midterm elections due to mounting economic chaos and voter disenchantment, the UP 
actually increased its constituent support, from thirty-six percent in the 1970 presidential 
election to forty-four percent in March 1973.59 Despite Popular Unity’s strong showing at 
the polls and the inability of the opposition to gain sufficient seats in Congress to 
impeach the president, by early 1973 it had become apparent that the president’s 
authority was in increasing jeopardy.60 As Allende attempted to put the brakes on the 
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expropriations and the peasant-led tomas, he faced criticism from both the left, who 
wanted him to speed up the process, and the right, who wanted him to roll back the 
takeovers.61  
Since Allende’s opponents had failed to remove his UP coalition from power at 
the polls, they sought less democratic methods in an effort to undermine his presidency. 
In the months following the March 1973 election and leading up to the coup, the 
collective efforts of opposition parties, the army, business and professional elites, small 
businessmen, factory workers, peasants, UP affiliates, the United States government and 
the CIA all “effective[ly]…plunge[d] the society into near civil war.” In retaliation for 
the nationalization of the U.S.-owned, highly lucrative Anaconda and Kennecott copper 
mines in June 1971, the United States vetoed Chilean applications for loans from the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
effectively instituting a credit blockade.62 Widespread hoarding not only invigorated the 
black market, but also contributed to shortages of many basic goods. As a January 1973 
North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) report described, the economic 
impacts were disastrous: 
People found it hard to get certain food stuffs (like chicken, beef, pork, and 
potatoes); some consumer items like yarn, textiles, and medicine; and more 
expensive items like radios, tires, cameras, film, and photo lab chemicals.... A 
source in Chile estimated that around 30 percent of the privately owned 
“microbuses,” 21 percent of the taxi[-]buses and 33 percent of the state-owned 
buses are immobilized because of lack of parts or tires [due to the credit 
blockade]. The truck owners who precipitated the October [1972] “walkouts” 
cited as a reason for striking their inability to obtain needed replacements for their 
trucks.63 
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As the NACLA report noted, the October 1972 Confederation of Truck Owner-
Operators’ strike—aided by the CIA—further complicated matters. After 26 days the 
paro stopped, but only with the incorporation of military officers into Allende’s 
cabinet—“a turning point which marked the beginning of the armed forces’ overt 
politicization.”64 Despite these substantial concessions, the strike resumed in July 1973; 
by September, the truckers’ actions “had strangled Chile’s flow of supplies to the 
breaking point,” and were a “major contribut[or] to the crisis atmosphere in which the 
coup took place.”65 
Adding to destabilization efforts, pre-existing divisions within the military were 
aggravated and made more public in August 1973. Opposition to constitutionalist General 
Carlos Prats González, the army Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Interior, had only 
increased since the midterm elections. As Prats continued to declare his loyalty to the 
Constitution and deny support to the coup plotters, dissenting sectors of the military 
became more convinced that “there was no way out but through force.”66 On August 7, 
disloyal officers in the Chilean navy rounded up a group of sailors and lower-ranked 
officers known for sympathizing with the UP, and subjected them to torture and 
imprisonment.67 In the same month, the right-wing paramilitary group Patria y Libertad 
(Fatherland and Liberty—PYL) launched 316 “terrorist attacks” throughout the country. 
On May 18, June 29 and August 18, civilian and military groups attempted to overthrow 
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the president, but each effort was obstructed by forces loyal to Prats and Allende. But by 
mid-August, Prats “had exhausted his political resources, was isolated, and was forced to 
resign” from both positions.68 Although he remained in Chile until September 15, when 
he was expelled from the country and sought exile in Argentina, Pinochet replaced him as 
Commander-in-Chief in late August.69 The loyalist head of the navy, Admiral Raúl 
Montero Cornejo, also resigned several weeks later.70 With Prats and Montero gone, the 
high command of the military was composed entirely of officers committed to a coup. “It 
then became a matter of time before the military made its move.”71 
In the early hours of September 11, the coup that Chileans had anticipated for 
months occurred. Led by Pinochet, a military junta of four generals bombed La Moneda, 
the presidential palace, with Allende and his remaining loyal advisors inside. Despite the 
coup’s forecast, “the brutality with which it was executed was shocking even to its 
advocates.”72 Soldiers quickly moved to round up thousands of suspected UP militants 
and sympathizers, conduct mass executions in soccer stadiums, burn books, and raid 
homes.73 As Dinges describes, “For days [after the coup], it was common to see bodies 
along roadsides or floating in the Mapocho River, which traverses Santiago. City morgue 
workers filled all available refrigeration units and began to stack bodies in corridors, 
allowing families to walk through to identify relatives.”74 Chile, in effect, “became a 
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huge concentration camp” after September 11.75 Expectations for a short-term interim 
government followed by new elections quickly dissipated as the junta dissolved 
Congress, banned political parties and labor unions, implemented strict censorship, and 
established a curfew and a state of siege.76 
The conservative estimate for the number of people killed in the coup and its 
immediate aftermath is 2,000, including Allende.77 The updated Valech Report cites the 
total number of deaths, disappearances, kidnappings, torture and abuse that occurred 
between September 11, 1973 and 1990 at 40,018.78 Although the majority of these deaths 
were Chilean, the nation’s history as a safe haven for exiles meant that foreigners who 
entered Chile during the Frei and Allende years also became casualties of the repression. 
 
A Safe Haven 
To understand the diverse roles played by political refugees during and 
immediately after the Allende years, it is important to appreciate how deeply embedded 
the concept of political asylum is in Latin American political culture. Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, exile became a “major mechanism in regulating 
political conflict.”79 Appropriated by both the left and the right, asylum became a 
common form of refuge that was well established in international law and codified in 
Latin American multilateral agreements.80  
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Such an open door policy would be severely tested during the last decades of the 
Cold War. Beginning with the Cuban Revolution in 1959, over the last four decades of 
the twentieth century over two million Latin Americans went into political exile. In 
particular, the military governments of Brazil (1964-1985), Uruguay (1973-1984), Chile 
(1973-1990), and Argentina (1976-1983) all “severely repressed” leftist subversives and 
added significantly to this displacement.81 After the 1964 U.S.-supported military coup 
that deposed Brazilian president João Goulart and an upsurge in repression that began in 
1968, between 10-15,000 Brazilians fled their country.82 In addition, 8,000 refugees fled 
Bolivia after 1971, an estimated half a million refugees (twenty percent of the population) 
fled Uruguay, and over one million (ten percent of the population) left Chile following 
each country’s respective 1973 coup. Half a million more fled Argentina after the 1976 
start to the Dirty War.83 In each case, military dictatorships were “a catalyst for mass 
exile from South America.”84 By the 1980s, massive exiles were induced by repressive 
regimes in Peru, Colombia and throughout the Central America isthmus. As the 
renowned Colombian journalist and novelist Gabriel García Márquez noted in his 1982 
Nobel Prize acceptance speech, “The country that could be formed of all the exiles and 
forced emigrants of Latin America would have a population larger than that of 
Norway.”85 
Given the number of military regimes that had seized power throughout the 
region, it might appear surprising or even counterintuitive for one dictatorship to admit 
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leftist militants from another country. Yet the precedent for political asylum and an open 
door policy regarding exiles was well established and accepted, in part because changes 
in government were so frequent that activists across the political spectrum understood 
that they might need to avail themselves of asylum at some point in the future. Indeed, 
the exile had become an established figure in the Latin American imagination.86 As 
Roniger and Sznajder note, “During the military repression of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
phenomenon of Latin American exile became massive. Typically among the exiles 
fleeing repression were prominent figures of the political and intellectual Leftist 
milieu.”87 
Indeed, Chile’s longstanding democratic tradition and relative economic stability 
had made it an attractive site for political refugees dating back to the mid-nineteenth 
century. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, only Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina admitted more refugees than Chile.88 The immigration of foreign exiles into 
Chile significantly increased between 1970-1973, when the Allende experiment “became 
a pole of attraction for Left forces.”89 The Marxist president’s democratic road to 
socialism was viewed as a watershed moment across the region. As right-wing 
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes came to power throughout the Southern Cone, 
Chile appeared to be the only safe haven left. 
Scholarship on the Allende period has focused primarily on domestic factors that 
precipitated the coup and the United States’ heavy hand in ousting the Marxist president. 
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Little attention, however, has been given to the role these refugees played during the 
Allende years and how their presence exacerbated tensions and served as a justification 
for his overthrow. Historians of Chile invariably trumpet the nation’s historic 
isolationism and exceptionalism, but I contend that in Chile’s treatment of its exiles, both 
before and after 1973, there are more similarities than differences. 
Who were these Latin American exiles and how did the Chilean left and right 
respond to them? In which ways and to what extent did they influence the Allende 
presidency and how did they precipitate its overthrow? It is to these questions that I now 
turn. 
 
Four Traits of Exile Identity 
People left their home countries—and later, Chile—for many reasons: economics, 
family, politics. I would say that people left for the political situation without 
necessarily being political themselves…. The explanations for the transition to 
exile existed on a spectrum.90 
 
As Chilean historian and political refugee Iván Jakšić describes above, exile was 
almost always rooted in politics—a changing political climate or context—but it was not 
necessarily motivated by an individual’s own ideology or motivations. Moreover, there 
could be a number of ways in which politics underpinned the diversity of exile 
experiences. Although the rise of a military regime or dictatorship was the most obvious 
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“push factor” sparking emigration in the 1960s and 1970s, a change in government often 
persuaded individuals to reassess their economic, social, and personal situations. Not 
infrequently, decisions were made for purely personal or economic reasons, especially 
when, for instance, someone’s political orientation made it difficult to keep his or her job 
after a coup had taken place; or an individual chose to migrate after a regime change 
forced a loved one to flee.  
With that said, the vast majority of people who immigrated to Chile between 
1970-1973 were leftists. Some of these refugees had been banished for their involvement 
with militant or guerrilla groups in their home countries, such as Brazil’s Partido 
Comunista (Communist Party) and Partido Trabalhista (Brazilian Labor Party), the 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (Leftist Revolutionary Movement) of 
Venezuela, Uruguay’s Tupamaros, Argentina’s Montoneros, and Bolivia’s Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army). Despite the outsized visibility of these 
radicals in the press and in the secondary literature, many exiles were professors, students 
and union members who, although they were in solidarity with the Chilean left, opted to 
keep a low profile.    
A second broad characteristic that defines the exile community is age: many were 
young (between the ages of twenty and thirty), often involved in the student movement, 
and single. Professors, most between the ages of forty and fifty, also had strong 
representation in the exile community. As will be discussed in the next section, this 
characteristic facilitated exile participation in the national university movement.   
A third identifier is gender. Interestingly, although some female refugees had 
played important roles in their home countries, only a handful continued their political 
 42 
work in Chile.91 My research indicates that men comprised the vast majority of the exile 
community in Chile during the late 1960s and early 1970s.92 
Nationality is a fourth overarching trait that defined the exile experience.  
Brazilians composed the largest of these groups, but a significant number of Bolivians, 
Argentines, Cubans and Ecuadorians also sought asylum in Chile. Although the right 
focused on the presence of radical Cuban leftists, the actual number of cubanos was quite 
low relative to other nationalities. On the eve of the coup, political scientist Tanya 
Harmer documents that there were only 250 Cubans remaining in Santiago.93 Indeed, the 
issue of Cuban influence on Allende’s Chile is a fraught one: after Che Guevara’s death 
in Bolivia in 1967, Castro became more cautious and more realistic in his campaign to 
inspire communist revolution in Latin America.94 Although several hundred Cubans 
migrated to Chile during Allende’s presidency, hoping to provoke an armed revolution 
led by the Castro-inspired MIR, “many of the young Cubans…were often rather 
frustrated and culturally bemused by Chilean ‘formality’ and the ‘strictness’ of legalistic 
strategies for revolution. And Havana’s leaders were also deeply skeptical of the concept 
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of a peaceful democratic road to revolution.”95 Ultimately, the junta’s gross inflation of 
the Cuban presence speaks more to the right’s fear of Cuban extremists within its borders 
and its need to externalize justification for the coup than to the actual impact they left on 
Chilean politics.  
Many of these leftist exiles (with the possible exception of the Cubans) had 
experienced repression in their homelands. María Fiani Savagei, a correspondent at the 
Jornal de Brasil, reported at the Argentine Embassy in Chile (where she applied for 
asylum immediately after the coup) that she and two friends had been “the object of 
diverse acts of torture,” while they were detained on September 2, 1969 in Río de Janeiro 
for being “involved in the investigation of the Acción Popular [Popular Action] Party.”96 
Similarly, the Brazilian engineer Ricardo Zaratini Filho was exiled on August 2, 1969 
because he was suspected of being the author of a press article against the then-Minister 
of War, Artur Da Costa e Silva.97 As both of these cases suggest, the majority fleeing 
Brazil after the Goulart coup were young—in their twenties or thirties—and often 
connected with a local student movement, a labor union, or a university or department 
that was known to be politically active.  
Perhaps most importantly, these cases explain how appealing Allende’s Chile 
would have appeared to many left-wing exiles. Prior to Allende’s overthrow, these 
refugees influenced, diversified and strengthened the Chilean leftist movement, but, as 
we shall see, their presence also encouraged Southern Cone military cooperation.  
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While many refugees shared a leftist political persuasion, the exile population that 
Allende’s Chile attracted ran the gamut: while some were apolitical or marginally 
politicized before they came to Chile, others were politically active in their home 
countries and remained so afterwards. Still others chose to remain on the sidelines during 
the Allende period.    
 
The Spectrum of Exile Activity in Chile 
Truth commissions, human rights advocates and scholars interested in the 
transition to democracy following military rule have contributed to the “exile as victim” 
narrative. Accounts that adopt this paradigm tend to focus on the exiles’ “disorientation,” 
and “alienation” as they were forced to adapt to new languages, cultures, and political 
systems.98 A self-critical Reinaldo Guarany, a Brazilian exiled to Chile, explained in an 
interview that his refugee status and political activity were not at all reciprocal:  
I clung to the past, to the “glories” I had lived through, practically demanding 
reverent respect for the hero I must have been. Refusing to accept the mediocrity 
of the present, I re-created a reality known only to myself and my ghosts, a reality 
that we alone relived through the delusions I was dragged back to each night. 
There, on a bench in the city square, in the still of the night, I began to recover my 
identity. I stopped being just some dupe…who had to put up with the vulgar 
language of the thieves…and hookers of the Mapocho [a Chilean indigenous 
group].99 
 
As this testimony reveals, Guarany’s sense of alienation from the political process he 
witnessed in Chile caused him to “revert to his past as a guerrilla, rejecting his new 
identity as a refugee.”100 The story of Zé, a Brazilian who had been “brutally beaten” by 
the military before being exiled to Cuba for treatment and who later moved to Chile, 
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further documents how the personal trauma of exile inhibited the ability to act politically. 
Daniel Aarão Reis Filho describes an unsettling encounter with Zé, an old friend, in 
Chile, which suggests how disorienting exile could be: 
[Zé] was very troubled and had a long story to tell backed up by notes that he 
showed me. The story was complicated, and supposedly he had discovered, 
invented, and designed a special weapon that could be of great use to the militant 
left in Brazil. The weapon was a self-propelled rocket…. I mean, these self-
propelled rockets were meant to cause mass destruction in our fight in the cities 
and in urban guerrilla warfare. At this point I really came to believe that Zé had 
“crossed the line,” “gone over the edge”…. I…tell this story…to point out one 
expression of the delusion and deviation that militants and leftist organizations 
had begun to suffer from.101 
 
Furthermore, while Chilean hosts welcomed many leftist exiles, this was not 
always the case. As political scientist Denise Rollemberg notes about asylum, “even 
solidarity involved contradictions and ambiguities. If some segments of society mobilized 
to receive political exiles, others identified them as ‘terrorists’ whose stay should be 
interdicted.”102 Though such harsh treatment was much more common in Europe, the 
United States, and Canada than it was in Chile, it is clear that the exile experience varied 
on both a national and personal basis. 
Indeed, although many scholars have propagated this “exile as victim” narrative 
in recent years, it is important to acknowledge that not all exiles experienced or 
conceived of banishment in the same way. While some were overcome with a sense of 
personal loss and uprooted identity, others saw resettlement as an opportunity to maintain 
a connection to homeland politics and loved ones. But in Allende’s Chile in particular, it 
is clear that exiles played significant and diverse roles in the years and months leading up 
to the September 11, 1973 coup. In large part, this was due to the solidarity that exiles, 
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who had fought for leftist revolution at home, shared with their Chilean compatriots who 
were fighting to keep the same dream alive. Argentine political scientist Marina Franco 
explains the origins of this solidarity:  
It is…essential to remember the importance of international mobilization, 
particularly among the Left, against the coups in Latin America and specifically 
the 1973 coup in Chile…This situation was repeated in all host countries that 
[later] received Argentinean exiles. Thus, there was a favorable reception for 
these exiles and empathy with Latin Americans in general, especially as they were 
seen as politically committed men and women who became persecuted by 
murderous regimes because of their political ideas.103 
 
Harmer lends credence to this argument when she addresses the importance of 
transnational actors in Chile: 
As the country [Chile] had become a theater of an inter-American struggle over 
these ideas [socialism and revolution], an array of hemispheric actors had joined 
in the struggle for and against revolutionary change. Partly this was because 
Chileans of different political persuasions had asked them to, but it was also 
because their own ambitions had drawn them into the conflict. The question of 
where Chile fit in the world was also of key importance in the battle to define 
what Chile was going to be: a socialist democracy, a bourgeois democracy, a 
dictatorship of the proletariat, or a military dictatorship patterned on Brazil.104 
 
For those who were politically engaged, the student movement, at both the secondary and 




Universities in Chile and elsewhere throughout Latin America had been seedbeds 
for political activity since the 1910s.105 This site provided for the basis of an 
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internationalist movement, grounded in domestic and local politics but with common 
aims that transcended national boundaries.106  
A significant number of Latin American exiles who resettled in Chile (and then 
subsequently sought refuge in Argentina after the coup) participated in student protests in 
their home country, in Chile, and in Argentina. By September 1972, a “collective group 
of far left Chilean, Uruguayan, Argentine, and Bolivian revolutionaries” were acting in 
concert with Chilean student leaders and the MIR. One year later, this international group 
(based in Chile) established the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (Revolutionary 
Coordinating Junta) “aimed at launching armed revolution throughout the Southern 
Cone.”107 Similar groups, both formal and informal, were established during this period 
across the Southern Cone.  
The story of José Gómez Rodríguez is indicative of the ability of transnational 
exiles to not only adapt to new surroundings, but also become increasingly politicized 
upon resettlement. Born in Spain on May 18, 1950, José moved with his mother to 
Argentina when he was one and a half years old. He grew up in Santa Fe and studied at 
the Escuela Industrial Superior (Higher School of Industry) until 1968, when he moved to 
Brazil to “dedicate himself to art.” Several months later, he moved to Uruguay (most 
likely after experiencing the effects of the Brazilian military’s increasing repression of 
students), where he stayed until early 1973. On March 11, he arrived in Santiago, “where 
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he found other Argentine citizens, several of whom he knew before…who worked in a 
bookstore and with the postal service.” Although José was “not political” in Argentina, 
the Argentine friends that he reconnected with in Santiago, Elzo Valiz and Raúl Moure, 
introduced him to several of their Chilean friends who were studying at the radical 
Universidad de Chile. Through these connections, José “became involved in politics,” as 
“a sympathizer with the Allende government.” On the day of the coup, he was 
“kidnapped,” alongside Moure, who was apparently more active in the movement than 
he, and was detained until September 29 for selling books “in favor of the Salvador 
Allende administration,” and “being involved with the Universidad de Chile.” Upon 
release, he sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and arrived in La Plata in late 
November 1973.108 
Whereas Gómez Rodríguez represents the process of politicization that many 
foreign youth underwent in Allende’s Chile, often through the higher education system, 
the profiles of two Argentine professors, Pedro Francisco Paz and Ariel Dorfman, 
demonstrate the transnational character of the university movement and the ability of 
foreigners to maintain and strengthen their activism after resettlement. Both Paz and 
Dorfman settled in Chile for “political and occupational reasons.” Born in 1936, Paz 
taught at a Buenos Aires university until he was offered at job at the Universidad de Chile 
in early 1973. Argentine Embassy records indicate that he was a “Peronist” and had been 
an activist in his Buenos Aires university and that he held a “similar position” at the 
Universidad de Chile. In September 1973, he was detained in the National Stadium, then 
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exiled and repatriated on October 4, 1973 as the Junta began to purge the universities of 
socialist thought.109  
Dorfman was born in Argentina in 1942 and briefly immigrated with his family to 
the United States before settling in Chile at the age of two. Despite his Argentine roots, 
Dorfman was a product of the Chilean educational system and ultimately taught literature 
and history at the Universidad de Chile. Argentine Embassy records note that he was 
politically active in efforts to reform the university and was a sympathizer of UP. He was 
forced to flee Chile for Argentina for fear of being detained by DINA after the Junta 
leaders ordered that several of his books be “banned and burned.” He arrived in 
Argentina on November 20, 1973, two months after the coup.110  
Both of these stories demonstrate the impact of foreigners on Chilean university 
politics, as well as the Junta’s harsh response to them after the coup. Argentine Embassy 
records contain similar stories of other Argentine students and professors whose 
involvement in the Chilean student movement was foreshadowed by previous 
participation in various Argentine counterparts, such as the Agrupación Reformista de 
Medicina (Medical Reform Group), Juventud Radical (Radical Youth), Encuentro 
Nacional de los Argentinos (National Conference of Argentines), Juventud Peronista 
(Peronist Youth), Juventud Sindical Peronista (Peronist Youth Association), Juventud 
Trabajadores Peronistas (Peronist Youth Workers), Frente de Izquierda Popular (Popular 
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Left Front), Centro Estudiantes Facultades Universidades (University Faculty Student 
Center), and the Agrupación de Juventudes Políticos (Association of Political Youth).111  
The case of two Brazilian students, Sergio da Faria Finho and José Batista Rita 
Pereda, also illustrates the impact that young refugees had on the Chilean student 
movement. After participating in the Brazilian university movement against its military 
regime and receiving threats, both men left Brazil in September 1971 with student visas 
and the intent to study at the Universidad de Chile. While Sergio did not have a prior 
criminal record, José Batista was forced to leave his home country because he was being 
persecuted for his involvement in its university movement. He was detained in Brazil in 
1970 and 1971 “for student problems and for belonging to the terrorist organization M3G 
[Marx-Mao-Marighella-Guevara].”112 Brazilian authorities arrested and then detained 
him in Río Grande do Sul state, along with 70 others for their participation in a bank 
robbery. José Batista was set free in January 1971, thanks to the intervention of the Swiss 
ambassador, and departed for Chile in the same month. He studied in Santiago until 
September 1973, after which he was forced to migrate to Argentina “for fear of his 
safety…due to his past participation in the [Chilean] JJCC [Juventud Comunista—
Communist Youth].”113 Argentine Embassy records contain fichas (files) for 
approximately 200 other students with similar profiles, whose involvement in various 
Chilean leftist student groups was preceded by activity in the Brazilian student 
movement.   
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María Teresa Gamou Soliño, a Uruguayan medical student who arrived in Chile 
on March 10, 1970, further demonstrates the transnational nature of higher education 
politics, as well as its impact on Chilean national politics in the early 1970s. María Teresa 
was an active “militant” with the Uruguayan branch of the Frente Estudiantil 
Revolucionario (Revolutionary Student Front) as well as the Movimiento de Liberación 
Nacional-Tupamaros (Movement of National Liberation-Tupamaros—MLN-T). When 
the Uruguayan military seized power in late June 1973, she was forced to flee and seek 
asylum in Chile. In Santiago, María Teresa enrolled at the Universidad de Chile and 
joined the university’s Communist Youth chapter. After the September 1973 coup, her 
foreign status and JJCC involvement forced her to relocate to Argentina.114 The same 
embassy document that contains María Teresa’s record contains similar stories for 
approximately fifty other Uruguayan students. 
Records examined from the Argentine Embassy in Santiago and SIPBA document 
dozens of instances of transnational student involvement in Chilean protests in the 
months leading up to the coup, as many of the participants in these movements 
immigrated to Argentina afterwards. A case in point was a demonstration protesting the 
Chilean military’s “influence” in politics on August 5, organized by the Chilean 
Communist Party. Over 750 activists participated in this march, in collaboration with 
students of the Humanities, Engineering, and Architecture departments of the 
Universidad de Chile. Students raised the flags of Chile, Argentina, Cuba and Russia and 
marched through the streets of the capital, carrying signs denouncing the Chilean military 
as well as “all the military governments of Latin America.”115 The same SIPBA memo 
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contains a list of twenty-two Chilean, Argentine and Brazilian student leaders—all of 
whom later immigrated to Buenos Aires or La Plata following Allende’s overthrow and 
whom SIPBA suspected of supporting the Argentine leftist movement—and includes 
detailed information about their parents’ names, education history, date of birth, political 
affiliation, and previous political activities. For the non-Chilean protest leaders, the 
document contains additional information regarding their immigration history.116  
 As these cases indicate, while some foreigners were moderately or highly political 
following resettlement in Chile, others struggled to overcome the dislocation that 
accompanies life in exile, language barriers, and potential family separation. One 
limitation of the sources I draw from to describe these stories, however, is that their 
authors—the Chilean and Argentine governments and police forces—paid greater 
attention to those individuals who were politically active than those who were not; 
although lamentable, this shortcoming is largely unavoidable given the nature of the 
documents and their authors’ biases. As a result, we know more about militant refugees 
than their more apolitical or less politically inclined counterparts.  
Yet it is important to underline that even those individuals who were ostensibly 
uninvolved in leftist politics were not free of suspicion. Jakšić, someone who had 
removed himself from political activism at the university to pursue academics, could 
never rest easy: “You could never be sure you were a target [of DINA]. I fit the profile—
college student, political past, studying at a radical department in a known radical 
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university in Chile. This [profile] was more important than who you actually were.”117 
The military and DINA painted with a broad brush when it came to leftists—both 
Chileans and foreigners alike—in the weeks preceding and following the coup.  
 
Pre-Coup Harassment of Chilean Nationals and Foreign Leftists 
Although the Pinochet government’s harsh use of detention, torture, and 
expulsion upon seizing power is now well known, the military’s wariness of and actions 
against foreign political leftists in fact began prior to the coup d’état. One week prior to 
the coup, General Manuel Torres de la Cruz openly warned, “the armed forces will be 
untiring in their determination to search out and punish unworthy Chileans and 
undesirable foreigners” (emphasis added).118  
Indeed, due to the transnational left’s openly political activism in the universities, 
labor unions, and alongside students in the streets, they became easy targets. Unofficially, 
Chileans were also rounded up, threatened, and interrogated in large numbers in the 
weeks preceding the coup. But rather than publically questioning the loyalty of its own 
citizens, the military found it convenient to blame foreign exiles for the political unrest 
sweeping the country during the summer of 1973. In this way, the military could blame 
subversion on foreign agitators. As the following case studies will show, the military 
utilized surveillance, raids, detentions, and interrogation against immigrants in the weeks 
leading up to Allende’s overthrow. Equally as important, the records also reveal that 
these military officers at times collaborated with sympathetic right-wing regimes from 
Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay in order to do so. This evidence reveals the very early roots 
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of the type of cross-border collaboration that would become officially known as 
Operation Condor two years later. 
Argentine Embassy records reveal that on August 3, Venezuelan Liliana Visser 
Fennen “was detained” in Santiago by the Servicios de Seguridad de las FFAA (Security 
Services of the Armed Forces) alongside the guerrilla leader Moíses Moleiro, a known 
leader of the leftist MIR de Venezuela. Liliana and her husband Roberto Frenkel Aissin, a 
professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, had been in Chile since late August 
1969, when the Venezuelan government had forcibly deported them.  The couple applied 
for asylum in Argentina on September 19, and arrived in Buenos Aires on one of the first 
refugee flights after the border opened eleven days after the coup.119 
The case of Carlos Fernando Núñez del Prado, a Bolivian exile in Chile, further 
supports this history of early, unsanctioned action taken against the transnational left 
community. Before arriving in Chile, Núñez del Prado had been detained in Bolivia in the 
first months of 1970 for his leftist activities and for “wielding fire arms.” He was 
expelled from Bolivia on March 20, 1970, travelled to Cuba for several months, and then 
immigrated to Chile in November of the same year on a tourist visa that the Chilean 
Consulate in Havana had granted him. Immediately after arriving in Santiago, Argentine 
Embassy records document that the police detained Carlos Fernando “for reasons 
unknown.” He was soon released, but was arrested again on May 29, 1973 and on 
September 12. The Junta Militar expelled him from Chile several days later.120 Although 
exile had historically been respected for both the left and right in Latin America, these 
cases demonstrate asylum was no longer a promise of safety and protection—before or 
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after the coup. These profiles reveal that although expulsion became official policy 
towards subversives and immigrants after September 11, the military was already 
preparing for the coup in the prior weeks by harassing vulnerable targets—foreign 
leftists.  
But the Chilean military did not confront these transnational leftists alone. Prior to 
September 1973, elements of the FFAA had already begun to develop the right-wing 
transnational network that would eventually become Operation Condor. Indeed, at the 
same time as a cross-border leftist coalition developed, so too did joint military 
collaboration converge in response. 
One example of this early cross-border military collaboration is the treatment of 
Luciano Alves Dufflayer, a Brazilian who moved to Chile in mid-August 1969 after 
being detained by authorities for “participating in several activities…in opposition to the 
[Brazilian] government.”121 After arriving in Chile with a tourist visa, Luciano traveled to 
Mendoza, Argentina in August 1973, where the local Policía Federal detained him. The 
Mendoza police had received information from a Chilean military officer alerting them 
that Dufflayer had “sequestered abundant communist propaganda material, acting as a 
Castroist postal service.”122 Although Dufflayer was released after several days and 
returned to Chile, where he remained until the coup, this case shows that the Chilean and 
Argentine military’s early joint cooperation against leftists began before either country 
was officially under military rule.  
Further evidence of this transnational teamwork, this time of Brazilian-Chilean 
military collaboration prior to Pinochet’s rise to power, is documented in the surveillance 
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of a group of resettled Brazilian exiles. The managers of an early 1970s created a “slush 
fund,” a financial instrument allegedly created by Brazilians to provide higher education 
scholarships for their exiles in Chile. They were discovered to be working simultaneously 
for the Brazilian government and the Chilean military. The fund’s two principal 
managers later were accused of embezzlement and supplying information to both the 
Brazilian and Chilean dictatorships.123  
Considered together, these files suggest a range of experiences that exiles 
encountered in Chile. On the one hand, exiles upon resettlement generally demonstrated 
their support for the Allende revolution. On the other hand, they were not granted a carte 
blanche; they had to cope with the movement’s internal divisions and were harassed by 
the military. Not surprisingly, such surveillance and repression only increased after the 
military gained power on September 11. 
 
The First Weeks After the Coup 
External forces influenced both the Chilean left and the right in the months 
leading up to the coup. At the same time as leftists forged links with exiles within and 
beyond their borders, “coup plotters looked abroad for reassurance and inspiration while 
fantastically warning of a forthcoming battle with ‘15,000 armed [Cuban] extremists’ 
allied with the Chilean Left.”124 Due to the profundity of the Cuban Revolution and the 
MIR’s known connection with Fidel Castro’s barbudos (bearded rebels), the Cuban 
presence in Chile was viewed by the military as a threatening indicator of the slippery 
slope the Allende administration was heading down. As Harmer explains:  
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[R]ather than dissuading the coup leaders from acting, the growing possibility of a 
left-wing combative force, the specter of Cuban involvement in preparing it, and 
the prospect of an impending showdown radicalized Chilean society and 
propelled the armed forces to act…the military’s targeting of the Cuban Embassy 
and all foreigners, factories, and poor neighborhoods, together with the 
ruthlessness with which it did so, clearly illustrates the power of wildly 
exaggerated fears regarding what the Cubans and left-wing revolutionaries from 
the Southern Cone could achieve.125 
 
Indeed, to justify their claim that a Marxist cancer was eating away at the body politic, 
military leaders deliberately exaggerated the number of Cubans concentrated in Santiago, 
and, on the day of the coup, expelled all Cubans from the country. “Their fears reflected 
the impact that non-Chileans and international concerns had on the escalating struggle 
within the country.”126 Once again blaming outside agitators—in this case, Cubans—
enabled the military to present itself as defenders of the fatherland, while condemning 
Allende for permitting the infiltration of leftist subversion.  
Administrative exile was an essential tool the junta employed to confront these 
external enemies, who, ironically, had sought safe haven in Chile. While the military 
harassed and even detained exiles prior to September 1973, after the coup they moved 
quickly to expel the refugees. According to one Bolivian newspaper, the junta repatriated 
315 “Bolivian leftists” a week after the coup.127 U.S. diplomats also reported that there 
were “more than 300” Uruguayans in Chile—many current or former members of the 
Tupamaros guerrilla group—and that “a group of hardline military leaders in Montevideo 
were hoping the Chileans would ‘take care of’” these subversives.128 All Chilean-born 
children of Brazilian parentage, who had previously been granted citizenship by 
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Allende’s administration, were stripped of their citizenship after the coup.129 This, of 
course, exacerbated an already tenuous situation: following the junta’s banishment of 
these exiles, those who tried to return to Brazil after fleeing often encountered 
unsympathetic authorities, and lack of proper documentation only complicated matters 
for them.130 
Testimony provided in 2006 by the Chilean leftist Fernando Alarcón illustrates 
the military’s repression of foreigners and Chileans in the weeks after the coup. Alarcón, 
who joined the MIR in 1969 following the completion of his secondary studies at the 
Instituto de Humanidades Luís Campino, describes how “a pair of Uruguayan Tupamaros 
militants” who he had met in school, subsequently moved in with him and several other 
MIRistas—two Chileans, one North American—in a Santiago apartment during the early 
1970s.131 Although he frequently traveled to Cuba, Alarcón was at home at the time of 
the coup. He described how on September 11, he, three other Chilean MIRistas, and the 
two Tupamaros “tried to listen to the radio,” and then “abandoned the house…after 
burning all of the documents that we could in the patio, [including information about] 
each one of the contact houses that we had been in previously.”132 He remembers how 
their apartment was raided on the day of the coup: all of his roommates—the North 
American, the Chileans, and the Uruguayans—were captured and taken to the National 
Stadium, where suspected leftists were being sequestered and interrogated by the 
thousands. Although the North American David Horman survived his detention, 
Alarcón’s two Chilean housemates were killed. He remains unsure of the fate of the two 
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Uruguayans. After being detained for a year and a half, in early 1975 Alarcón escaped 
from a DINA torture center, went into hiding, and finally obtained asylum at the Costa 
Rican embassy. In March 1975, with the help of the Red Cross, Alarcón left Chile for 
San José, where he stayed for several years until ultimately moving to live with a 
Bolivian artist friend in the United States.133  
A significant number of foreigners—from nearly every continent—were arrested 
and detained by the Junta Militar in the days, weeks, and months after the coup. A 2004 
Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (Corporation of 
Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People) report states that 791 foreigners of 
thirty-nine distinct nationalities were arrested on September 11 alone.134 Of these, 714 
were men and 77 were women. Among these were 154 Uruguayans, 163 Bolivians, 103 
Brazilians, eighty Argentines, thirty-nine Venezuelans, thirty-three Colombians, thirty-
three Peruvians, and twenty-six Nicaraguans.135 (See Appendix 1.1 for a full list of 
nationalities.) The breadth of these foreign prisoners is impressive: they represent nearly 
every Latin American nation. The list also includes detainees from Europe, North 
America, and Asia. This speaks to both the diversity of exiles that had resettled in 
Allende’s Chile, and to the military’s awareness of this transnational group and its 
solidarity with the Chilean left. According to the International Red Cross, on September 
22, 1973 the Junta Militar captured another 7,000 prisoners; 200 to 300 of these were 
foreigners “of diverse nationalities.”136  
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An Argentine secret police document from January 1974 also reveals twenty-five 
documented cases of Argentines who were kidnapped and tortured at Santiago’s National 
Stadium in the first week after the September 11 coup.137 It is impossible to know how 
many other unsuspecting foreign exiles were detained and victimized in the weeks 
surrounding the coup. 
These early arrest and detention records reveal another crucial component of the 
period: the military’s haphazard treatment of foreigners as “the other,” independent of an 
individuals’ ideology, politicization, or level of activity. Although the exile population 
was not treated uniformly—some were detained, others arrested, while still others were 
interrogated and harassed—they were all regarded as a threat. In the noted list of 
prisoners captured on September 11, the 791 foreigners encompassed a wide spectrum of 
occupations and political involvement (see Appendix 1.2). Although the majority of 
detainees representing each national group were students or professors—forty-three of 
the 156 Bolivians detained were enrolled in university or secondary schools, for 
example—the list is diverse and includes, among others: chauffeurs, tourists, artists, 
journalists, electricians, painters, sociologists, engineers, vendors, doctors, economists, 
lawyers, fashion models, architects, writers, dentists, mechanics, waiters, and two 
ballerinas. More specifically, of the 103 Brazilian exiles rounded up on the day of the 
coup, there were seventeen students, seven university professors, four tourists, three 
domestics, one agronomist, one ballerina, three photographers, three businessmen, two 
engineers, two doctors, one waiter, one filmmaker, two economists, one salesman, one 
secretary, one computer programmer, and fifty-four others “without information.”138  
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Although it is challenging, if not impossible, to identify with absolute certainty 
the reasons why the regime targeted foreigners in such disproportionate numbers, the 
wide range of non-Chileans detained on September 11 suggests several key 
characteristics of the Junta Militar’s modus operandi. First and foremost, foreigners were 
an easy scapegoat that allowed the nationalist Pinochet regime to focus its early efforts on 
an external enemy. Although Chileans were by no means spared in the Junta’s roundups, 
by disproportionately targeting the (predominantly leftist) exile population, the regime 
distracted attention away from its systematic roundup of Chilean leftists.   
Though the border was closed for the first eleven days following the coup, 
thousands of people from across the country immediately descended upon the embassies 
and churches in Santiago seeking safe haven while they waited for the border to 
reopen.139 UP officials, militants, and sympathizers living in smaller, sparsely populated 
towns and cities, “where they were known and vulnerable,” were especially at risk. 
Although the single north-south highway and rail line made reaching the capital difficult, 
Santiago, with its population of three million, its embassies, and its sprawl became the 
best option for many people.140 Accessing embassies, however, also proved challenging: 
as Jakšić described, military guards stationed themselves around all of Santiago’s 
embassies, waiting to catch hopeful asylees.141 Yet even those who did manage to enter 
an embassy were not necessarily safe or guaranteed a way out. After apartment and 
university raids began, Jakšić describes how he and a friend, who was later imprisoned, 
went to the Italian Embassy in search of refuge, but were denied asylum because that 
government had not yet recognized the new Chilean regime:  
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141 Jakšić, Interview by author. 
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People waited there [at the Italian Embassy] for months, sometimes as many as 
six. After several days, my friend and I left the embassy because nothing was 
happening. But the [Chilean] government soon came after us, so I went into 
hiding. After several months, I decided I could not take it—the fear—anymore. I 
had to get out. The French Embassy ultimately helped me get a student visa to 
study at the Sorbonne.142 
 
Many of those who did not seek refuge at an embassy went underground to hide, like 
Jakšić, or tried to participate in resistance efforts.143  
While the Junta initially prioritized detaining subversives, Pinochet soon changed 
his focus to embassies to “cut…off this source of refuge.”144 In the first months after the 
coup in particular, the junta often enlisted military officials to block access to embassies 
so that they could catch the subversives who had evaded Pinochet’s early raids and arrest 
warrants. Though Pinochet continued to utilize administrative exile throughout the 
dictatorship to minimize internal resistance, his varying approach to administrative versus 
elective exile suggests he wanted to know who was leaving, where they were going, and 
when they were departing. These were variables that the dictator could control via 
administrative exile, but not in the case of those seeking voluntary asylum or refuge.  
For those who were not immediately rounded up, in November 1973 the military 
government issued Law Decree 81, which legalized administrative exile as an executive 
procedure to be used “at the discretion of the rulers.” During the seventeen-year 
dictatorship, approximately 4,000 Chileans were expelled under this law.145 (The total 
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number of Chileans who elected or were coerced to flee is much higher, in the hundreds 
of thousands.146) In addition to exile, Law Decree 81 also required citizens who had left 
the country after the coup to obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior in order 
to re-enter their home country. Exile, in this way, was not merely intended to punish 
Chileans, but was a way of permanently altering the political landscape. When exiliados 
renewed their passports at Chilean consulates abroad, Pinochet ordered officials to stamp 
the letter “L” (for “Lista nacional”) on their papers, which indicated that the holder was 
prohibited from returning to Chile. Although the Junta characterized exile as “a humane 
alternative to prison for enemies of the nation,” this ultimately meant “no exile 
considered dangerous was allowed to return.”147  
Government oversight was extended even further in August 1974 through Law 
Decree 604, which precluded the re-entrance of Chileans who had left the country for any 
reason (not just political) after September 1973. In addition, the regime created “black 
lists” of former citizens and residents who had voluntarily left, were banished, or were 
not permitted to return to Chile.148 Interestingly, this use of administrative exile “is no 
political novelty” in Chilean history, and had been used by governments following 
periods of political conflict in 1851, 1859, 1891 and 1927-1931. The key difference 
during the Pinochet years was his staunch refusal to grant amnesty to exiles.149 When the 
Chilean constitution was rewritten in 1980 and Pinochet was asked whether exiles would 
be allowed to return, he replied, “I have only one answer: No.”150 
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It is difficult to determine precisely how many people applied for asylum from 
foreign embassies after the coup, but a November 7, 1973 list of applications from 
Argentine, Brazilian, Bolivian, and Ecuadorian exiles and Chilean nationals is 
instructive: of the approximately 250 hopefuls on the list, only 36 were not denied 
asylum.151 What this suggests is that although the regime was committed in principle to 
administrative exile, there was not always a legal way for refugees to enter another 
country. This not only applied to Chile at this time, but to the massive movement of 
political refugees during the Cold War. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights states that “Every person has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and return to his country;” yet this declaration does not provide for the right to enter 
another country, thereby “stopping halfway in asserting a right to mobility.”152 This is the 
legal paradox that many exiles confronted when they were forced out of their own 
country, but denied asylum at another nation’s embassy. This is exactly the roadblock 
that Jakšić had encountered at the Italian Embassy in 1973. 
Due to the difficulty of escaping the dictatorship through legal pathways, tens of 
thousands of people living in Chile at the time of the coup fled illegally to neighboring 
countries.153 By early 1974 there was an estimated 15,000 Chilean refugees living in 
Argentina and an additional 1,500 in Peru.154 As political scientists Alan Angell and 
Susan Carstairs note, “the [Chilean exile] numbers for Argentina are especially difficult 
to establish,” due to the “continuous migratory flow from Chile to Argentina and [the] 
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many people [who] undoubtedly fled across the border, particularly from country areas 
where repression is less documented, and have never registered themselves formally with 
any official body.”155  
In the first two years after the coup, over 14,000 Chileans received diplomatic 
asylum, were expelled from prison, or moved abroad for fear of persecution. By 1979, 
this figure had doubled.156 Following the 1982 economic crisis, an additional 800,000 
Chileans left for Argentina in search of work.157 Even after the return to democracy in 
1990, the National Office of Return in Chile estimated that of the 700,000 Chileans living 
abroad, 200,000 had left the country for political reasons.158 Estimates of the number of 
Chileans who fled their home country between 1973 and 1990 by both legal and illegal 
means range from several hundred thousand to nearly two million. It was—and 
remains—the largest mass emigration in Chilean history.159 
Although the majority of Chilean exiles stayed in Latin America, in smaller 
numbers, the diaspora constituted a “worldwide dissemination.”160 Following the coup, 
Chileans settled in anywhere between 110 and 140 countries—including such far away 
and varied countries as Kenya, Sweden, Bangladesh, the Cape Verde Islands, and 
Greenland.161 One exile noted that, as a result of the diaspora, “There is no important city 
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in the world where you will not find a Chilean, nor a city that is not familiar with 
empanadas [meat pies] and peñas [informal cafés with folk and protest music].”162  
It is noteworthy that at the same time as transnational leftist forces worked within 
and outside of Chile to assist refugees in obtaining exile, the military also enjoyed 
regional support for its crackdown. As García Márquez noted in March 1974, “There 
is…evidence that numerous members of secret police forces from neighboring countries 
were infiltrated across the Bolivian border [into Chile] and remained in hiding until the 
day of the coup, when they unleashed their bloody persecution of political refugees from 
other countries of Latin America.”163 Indeed, Harmer agrees that, “without any apparent 
U.S. coordination, planes from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Ecuador had 
arrived with provisions for the new regime days after the coup.”164 Former DINA 
prisoners detained in the National Stadium in the first weeks after the coup also reported, 
decades later, that they were questioned and tortured by both Chilean DINA and “people 
with foreign accents.”165 Specifically, CIA records document that Uruguayan and 
Bolivian police were also present in the Estadio Nacional right after the coup, assisting 
the Junta in interrogation and keeping order, and by “teaching torture tactics to the 
Chilean police.”166  
Although the Pinochet government would be condemned by many international 
human rights organizations and foreign governments in the first years after the coup, as 
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far as neighboring Latin American nations and the United States were concerned, the 
junta was setting Chile back on course. Just as the presence of pro-Allende transnationals 
within Chile encouraged the coup plotters of the need to act, multinational support for the 
socialist president also signaled a regional problem, one that required a regional solution. 
Not surprisingly, the Brazilian military government was one of the most supportive of the 
Junta. In addition to Brazil’s material support for the new regime, a Chilean exile and 
scholar, quoted by Harmer, noted in the mid-1980s the way in which the Pinochet 
dictatorship “was patterned off of Brazil, Nixon’s most favored ally in Latin America. 
Chile’s military junta has not only utilized the experience of Brazil but leapfrogged the 
early experimental stages of the Brazilian process.” Indeed, Washington had tried to 
cultivate this relationship “even before the Chilean coup took place.”167  
 
Conclusions 
Studies of the Cold War focus on the conflict’s two superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the collateral impact of their proxy wars. Latin America 
was undeniably affected by the policies of both the U.S. and the USSR, but the regional 
conflict was also complex and resulted from the conjuncture of global, national, and local 
factors. In Latin America, the Cold War was characterized by cycles of political unrest, 
coups, guerrilla insurgencies and authoritarian military dictatorships.  
In this context Salvador Allende’s democratic election must be seen as a 
watershed, not just for Chileans, but also for the rest of Latin America. His victory at the 
polls, paired with the rise of authoritarian military regimes in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, among others, precipitated the 
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wholesale movement of political refugees throughout the hemisphere. Activists, who 
would have naturally gravitated to a democratically elected socialist leader, were 
encouraged to act on their ideological principles when they were driven into exile by 
repressive regimes. In some respects, the timing of the Allende experiment meshed with 
efforts by authoritarian regimes to expel their homegrown leftist militants. 
Until the last weeks preceding the coup, Allende’s Chile had provided a safe 
haven for leftists from across the region, and a space where multiple nationalities with 
similar political beliefs could meet and, at times, even collaborate. Although migrations 
and political exile have been commonplace over the last two centuries, this brief interlude 
was unique in that it brought together like-minded, politically motivated individuals of 
diverse nationalities who were undergoing a comparable experience. As this chapter has 
shown, some exiles, traumatized by the circumstances that forced them to emigrate, 
prioritized their safety and sought to live quietly on the margins of Chilean society. But 
others conceived of their time in exile as an opportunity to forge links with other leftists, 
to work for political change in their home countries from abroad, and to openly assert 
their political voice in a new context. Such political mobilization, of course, made them a 
prime target for the junta even before September 11.   
A larger issue addressed in this chapter is the trope of the externalization of an 
enemy. Although Pinochet would have no qualms about imprisoning, torturing, and 
disappearing his own citizens, it is telling that one of his first targets was the country’s 
foreign population, who were never as threatening as the regime portrayed them. As 
military officials verbally cast aspersions on the exiles, they directed attention to an ill-
defined enemy that all Chileans could unite against. The Junta’s takeover, therefore, 
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sought to justify its actions, claiming that it was acting in defense of the nation as a 
whole. That meant rooting out cancerous subversives whether they were domestic or 
foreign.   
Despite recent democratic Chilean governments’ efforts to come to terms with the 
repression and human rights abuses of the dictatorship through the creation of such truth 
commissions as the Rettig Report (1991) and the Valech Report (2004-2005, reopened 
for eighteen months in 2010-2011), a telling if little-recognized fact is that violence 
committed against foreigners was excluded from the two truth commission reports.168 As 
a team of Chilean scholars explain: 
Nothing of the Supreme Decree that established the [Chilean] Commission [of 
National Political Prisoners and Torture—Comisión Nacional Prisión Política y 
Tortura] excludes foreigners…. although it does not exclude [foreign] victims 
because of their nationality, it is evident that neither the Decree nor the 
Commission took special care to consider them. This topic should have been 
reflected in a special, separate procedure...[but] the Commission was not amply 
extensive in manners of national communication, let alone international. Based on 
this, we suspect that no special action was performed to register foreigners who 
were political prisoners. In Chile, there was no special reference in the report 
regarding the general situation of foreign.169   
 
While the respective Valech and Rettig commissions collected hundreds of thousands of 
testimonies from victimized Chilean citizens and military officers, the exclusion of 
foreign victims from these reports is likely one of the main reasons why there remains so 
little documentation of the exile community in Chile during the 1970s.  
Indeed, it is remarkable how little scholarly attention this exile community within 
Chile has garnered, despite its numbers. In contrast, there are over a dozen 
comprehensive accounts documenting the Chilean exile community abroad—from 
Mexico to Sweden to the United States. A comparable body of literature does not exist 
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for any other Latin American exile group during this period, even though Chileans were 
by no means the only nationality forced out of their homeland.170 I have attempted to 
begin to fill this lacuna by showing how leftist exiles of multiple Latin American 
nationalities adapted to life in Allende’s Chile. However, much more archival research 
remains to be done on the varying experiences of different nationalities in exile. 
In addition, this chapter reveals the early signs of collaboration among right-wing 
military regimes to track and target their citizens across borders.  While there are no 
records of attempted or successful transnational murder plots from these early years—it is 
unclear whether they never transpired or that the records have been successfully 
destroyed—the early communications and cooperation among the Brazilian, Chilean, 
Bolivian, and Argentine militaries reveal how the methods and tactics associated with 
Operation Condor were evident as early as the summer of 1973.  
In the next chapter, I discuss how this transnational left that first formed in Chile 
resettled in Argentina between late 1973 and Prats’ assassination in late 1974. During that 
time, Chilean leftists who had collaborated with South American exiles seeking refuge 
within their own borders were now exiles themselves. I also consider the influence of the 
transnational left on Argentine politics and its military’s response to this exile 
community.  
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Nationalities of Foreign Prisoners Arrested by the Chilean Dictatorship  
on September 11, 1973171 
 
Nationality Men Women Total 
East German 4 1 5 
Argentina 70 10 80 
Bolivia 151 12 163 
Brazil 86 17 103 
Canada 3 -- 3 
Colombia 31 2 33 
Cuba 4 1 5 
Dominican Republic 9 -- 9 
Ecuador 10 1 11 
El Salvador 1 -- 1 
England 6 -- 6 
France 15 3 18 
Guatemala 1 1 2 
Haiti 9 1 10 
Holland 6 -- 6 
Italy 5 2 7 
Jordan 1 -- 1 
Japan 2 1 3 
Kuwait 1 -- 1 
Luxembourg 1 -- 1 
Mexico 7 1 8 
New Zealand 1 -- 1 
Nicaragua 25 1 26 
Panama 8 1 9 
Pakistan 2 -- 2 
Paraguay 1 -- 1 
Peru 33 -- 33 
Puerto Rico 1 -- 1 
Romania 1 -- 1 
Spain 12 -- 12 
Switzerland 6 -- 6 
United States 10 1 11 
Uruguay 135 19 154 
Venezuela 39 -- 39 
Yugoslavia 5 -- 5 
Without information 1 1 2 
Total 714 77 791 
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Appendix 1.2  
Foreigners Detained in Chile, September-December 1973172 
 











Carlos Jesús Argentina Chauffeur Z.N. 
Valparaíso 
Detained in the 
Plaza de la 
Justicia 




















































Bazán Call Calixto 
Hermelindo 

















Osvaldo Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Castello Omar Raúl 
Aníbal 

















Matilde Argentina Domestic Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
                                                







































































































Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
López Tome Nora 
Beatriz 





Juana Fanny Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 




































O’Connell Arturo Argentina Professor Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Olsina Vidal Sergio 
Rogelio 

















Pasquali Juan Carlos Argentina Musician Llanquihue -- 
Paz Raúl José Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Paz Snopek Pedro 
Francisco 

































Heltos Félix Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 




















Ariel Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 







































Argentino Argentina Stonemason La Serena -- 
Sulbert 
Oyarce 
Ricardo Argentina -- Estadio 
Nacional 
















Argentina -- Antofagasta -- 
























André Belgium -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Raúl Bolivia Architect Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
















































Estanislao Bolivia -- Antofagasta -- 
Arratia 
Olmos 





Jaime Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Arredondo Justo Bolivia Chauffeur Estadio 
Nacional 








Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 









Juan Pablo Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Barriga Soto Edgardo 
Fernando 

























Homero Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
















Julio Bolivia University 




















































Nain Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 







Elías M. Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Cuiza Vela Samuel Bolivia Doctor Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Del Carpio Guillermo Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Del Castillo José 
Enrique 
Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 








































Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Guevara Luis Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 







Bolivia -- Antofagasta -- 
Gutiérrez 
Quispe 















Joaquín Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Higueras René Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





























Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Jiménez Fernando Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Gualberto Bolivia University 


































Ángel Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 















































Reinaldo Bolivia University 







José A. Bolivia University 







Bolivia Columnist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Nava Ortiz Raúl Bolivia University 







José Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Nina Sarzuri Edmundo Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Olmedo Armando Bolivia -- Estadio -- 
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Armando Villamil Nacional 
Ortega Vaca Carlos 
Alberto 
















Bolivia Lawyer Iquique -- 
Palizza 
Terrazas 








































Portugal Pedro Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 






















Simón Bolivia Employee Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 






Augusto Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
Household raid 
Rodríguez Juan Pablo Bolivia -- Estadio -- 
 81 
Chagana Nacional 










Cimar Bolivia University 



























































Jesús Bolivia University 






Tapia Justo R. 
Orlando 




Toro y Toro Antonio Bolivia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 



























Carlos Bolivia University 













Jorge Bolivia -- Reg. Guardia 
Vieja 
-- 








































Ruddy Bolivia Journalist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 












Bolivia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 








































Brazil Agronomist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 











Brazil Professor Z.N. 
Valparaíso 
-- 






























Pedro Brazil Businessman Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Duarte Netz Clayton 
Rogelio 

























Das Dores Romanido 
Maria 
Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Davet Sergio Brazil Tourist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
De Acedevo Ricardo Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 














































Nielsen Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





De Souza Pablo 
Rouberto 

















Filho José Brazil University 






Duarte Netz Cayton 
Rogelio 







Luis Carlos Brazil Doctor Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 

















Silverio Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
































































































Luís Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Messias José Luís Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 























Luis Brazil Filmmaker Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 










Roberto Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Adolfo Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Sanseda Luís Carlos Brazil Tourist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





José Brazil Economist Estadio 
Nacional 























Telles Franc Pablo 
Roberto 
Brazil -- Rancagua -- 
Timoteo 
Ferreira 

























Woist Kahn Tomás 
David 
















Brazil -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 







Canada -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 


















Raúl Colombia -- Estadio 
Nacional 



























Armando Colombia University 







Gerardo Colombia University 












Ramón Colombia Mechanic Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
García Ruiz León 
Guillermo 

















Fernando Colombia -- Llanquihue -- 
Maldonado Fabio Colombia -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Ochoa Luis Carlos Colombia Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Perea Chala Rafael Colombia University 

























Omar Colombia University 







Rafael C. Colombia University 






















Israel Colombia University 







Edwin N. Colombia University 







H. Colombia  Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
























Sergio Costa Rica Employee Punta Arenas -- 
Arguelles 
Mendez 
Héctor Cuba -- Iquique -- 
León 
Morales 






































































































-- Campo de 
Pisagua 
-- 







































































































Ecuador -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Rueda Luciano Ecuador -- Estadio -- 
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Portéz Osvaldo Nacional 
Toro 
Cepeda 

















































France Priest Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Joly Alain France -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 


























France Priest Llanquihue -- 










Michel Haiti University 


















Joly Lubin Ulrick Haiti -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 














































Paolo Italy Student Estadio 
Nacional 
“Suspicious” 


















Carlos Jordan -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Kobayashi Osamu Japan -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
























































Urania Nicaragua University 







Mary Nicaragua University 















José A. Nicaragua -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 

















Mario Nicaragua -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 




















Octavio Nicaragua -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Ortiz Dávila Enoc de 
Jesús 




























Víctor Nicaragua -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Torres Denis Nicaragua -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 



































Arsenio Panama -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 


























Peru -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 










































































Peru -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Lara Ramos Cesar 
Guillermo 
Peru Student Antofagasta -- 












Saturnino Peru University 










































Luis Peru University 













Peru -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 













Díaz Ramos Sergio 
Ernesto 
Puerto Rico -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Pérez Dunc Kley 
Erasmo 















Enrique Spain -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





















Spain Professor Puente Alto -- 
Lobete 
Pastor 











Ernesto Spain Journalist Z.N. 
Talcahuano-
Tomé 
Raid at the U. 
Técnica del 
Estado 
Orta Gómez Hernán 
Eduardo 
 -- Estadio 
Nacional 
“Accused of 




Spain Electrician Calama “Suspicious” 
Sánchez 
Sánchez 
Luis Spain Technician Puente Alto -- 















Niels Bo Switzerland Journalist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 







Uruguay Shoemaker Llanquihue “Voluntary” 
Almeal 
Pérez 













Uruguay Chauffeur La Serena Tourist 
Alvarino 
Sanzón 







Uruguay -- Llanquihue -- 
Baraibas 
Figuerido 






























Carlos Uruguay Textile artist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Carvalmo F. Pablo Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 






























Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 

































Pablo Uruguay Civil engineer Estadio 
Nacional 
Household raid 








Uruguay -- La Serena -- 
Fleitas 
Izquierdo 












José Luis Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 

















Juan A. Uruguay Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Gómez Julio Baldomero 
Pitamiglio 




















































Carlos R. Uruguay Artist Estadio 
Nacional 
Detained by the 
Carabineros 







Uruguay Employee Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Walter Uruguay Sociologist 






Julio Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Luisi Pinto Romulo 
Fernando 















Hugo Uruguay Artist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Ortiz Suarez Miguel 
Ángel 





Guarani Uruguay Employee Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Previtali Alfredo Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 










Jorge Uruguay Student Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Carlos Uruguay University 






















































Heber  Uruguay Businessman Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Vallejo R. Julio C. Uruguay -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 







































USA -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Fish Rand Charles 
Taylor 











































































Lesmes Venezuela Student -- -- 
Castro 
Muller 







Venezuela -- Punta Arenas -- 
Escalona 
Cifuentes 




























Venezuela -- Guardia Vieja -- 
León 
Luzardo 
Jesús E. Venezuela Tourist Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Maza Omar Venezuela -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
Mendoza Douglas Venezuela -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





























Venezuela -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 





Pérez López Miguel 
Ángel 
Venezuela -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 















Angel Venezuela University 







Juan Jacob Venezuela Businessman Puente Alto -- 
Zambrano 
Sulbaran 
Nabon Venezuela -- Estadio 
Nacional 
-- 
















Chapter Two:  
Rebuilding Across Borders 
Most Chilean refugees who immigrated [to Argentina] after September 11, 1973 are 
guerrillas and/or members of related subversive organizations, primarily challenging the 
typical ‘political refugees’ that our country has traditionally received throughout its 
history…this demonstrates, among other things, the proliferation of organizations, some 
of recent creation, which have mobilized in support of these subversive elements, a high 
percentage of which have strengthened local subversive groups.173 
 
     SIPBA, February 1974 
I had the impression that we [Chilean exiles] were being watched, in spite of our efforts 
to mix with Argentines. I remember that one time I was detained because I made a 
statement in defense of the Chilean journalists who were imprisoned…they took us to the 
police station and they explained to us that this was interference in Argentine politics and 
was not allowed.174 
 
     Gabriel Sanhueza, reflecting on late 1974 
Exactly one week after the death of Salvador Allende and the subsequent end to 
Chile’s three-year “Socialist experiment,” a crowd of 20,000 gathered in the Plaza Dos 
Congresos in Buenos Aires at five o’clock on September 18, 1973 to honor the memory 
of the recently deceased Chilean leader and protest the Junta Militar’s rise to power.175 
As a block print from a 1973 COMACHI publication makes clear, the plaza was packed 
with individuals, political groups, and international human rights organizations 
representing nearly every Latin American nation (see Figure 2:1). An Argentine police 
account of the event, which includes this image in its report, documents how “the streets 
and buildings were full of people…and protest chants emanated from the balconies, 
                                                
173 “Referencia 16698 Tomo 1,” 15. 
174 From an interview with Sanhueza, a Chilean MIRista who sought exile in Mendoza and then 
Buenos Aires in late 1974. Sanhueza, “Paths to Exile: Gabriel Sanhueza,” eds., Wright and Oñate, 
in Flight from Chile, 65-67, especially 67. 
175 This quoted phrase comes from Ayres, “Political History,” 507. 
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windows, and doorways surrounding the plaza.”176 Though the first hour of the memorial 
was generally peaceful, at seven o’clock the streets quickly filled with police cars and 
“hundreds of carabineros [policemen]” who arrested over fifty protestors, of both 
Argentine and Chilean nationality.177  
Despite the admonitions of Argentine provisional president Raúl Alberto Lastiri 
to “remain neutral” towards recent events in Chile, this well-attended civic memorial 
revealed the considerable support for Allende that existed in Argentina as well as the 
significant presence of political refugees from other countries.178 But policemen 
monitoring the event also suggest that authorities were concerned that these foreign 




“We Will Overcome!” 
Buenos Aires, 1973179 
                                                
176 “Referencia 16698 Tomo 1,” 407. 
177 Ibid., 408. 
178 Edward Milenky, Argentina's Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 206. 
179 COMACHI, “¡Venceremos!,” in “Referencia 16698 Tomo 1,” 139. 
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In reality, Argentina was deeply divided over the neighboring coup. For militant 
leftist groups, this march was an opportunity to publically demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with Allende’s violent overthrow and their solidarity with leftist chilenos. 
For the right, this event signaled further evidence of the dangerous spread of 
Communism: exiles crossing the Andes, first by the hundreds, and then the thousands 
after September 11 were viewed as an undesirable addition to an already polarized body 
politic. 
Although Chile had historically served as a safe haven for leftist political 
dissidents, when Pinochet overthrew Allende, the new regime utilized administrative 
exile as a conscious “low-cost” strategy to eliminate the opposition.180 As a result, both 
Chilean dissidents and leftist South American nationals who had previously immigrated 
to Chile had to seek refuge elsewhere.181 Although the Pinochet government believed that 
the expulsion of Allende supporters would weaken internal opposition to the Junta, the 
ramifications of exile proved much more complex.  
When exiles are uprooted from their homeland, they are often politically 
quiescent and unable or unwilling to form meaningful bonds with citizens in their 
countries of resettlement.182 To varying degrees, Chilean and other leftist exiles in 
Argentina from September 1973 to November 1975—following the Chilean coup and 
prior to the formal institutionalization of Operation Condor—proved to be exceptions to 
this rule. In this chapter, I examine the unintended consequences of Pinochet’s policy of 
                                                
180 Sznajder and Roniger, The Politics of Exile, 229. 
181 Silvina Jensen, “Representations of Exile and Those Exiled in Argentine History,” in Exile 
and the Politics of Exclusion, 52-69, especially 53. 
182 Jensen, “Representation,” 62; and William Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the 
International Police of Aliens,” in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom 
of Movement, eds., Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010), 69-100. 
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exporting agitators to Chile’s neighbor and historic rival during the first twelve months of 
this two-year period.183 I argue that exile served as a “double-edged sword” for the 
Pinochet regime: while it helped mitigate internal opposition to the military government, 
it also exported the problem and enabled the transnational left to re-form outside its 
borders.184 That Argentina in late 1973 was already deeply divided along ideological 
lines explains why its security forces perceived leftist exiles in collaboration with like-
minded Argentines to be a combustible mix.  
The political refugees’ presence in Buenos Aires had significant consequences for 
both the Argentine left and the right, drawing attention to an ideological and logistical 
war without borders that threatened to destabilize the entire Southern Cone. Proof of the 
Argentine state’s concern over the problem posed by the exiles’ activities in Buenos 
Aires was a multifaceted system of clandestine political surveillance implemented during 
this period—tactics that would become increasingly more sophisticated and violent when 
Operation Condor was formalized two years later.  
To better understand the milieu that the exiles encountered upon their arrival in 
Buenos Aires, I first discuss the mounting political unrest that culminated in open 
violence from late 1973 until late 1974. In contrast to the decimation of leftist forces 
across the Southern Cone during this period, the Argentine left gained unprecedented 
strength and mobility between the Chilean coup and the assassination of General Prats 
exactly one year later. Utilizing unpublished records of the Argentine secret police, 
COMACHI publications, and several exile memoirs, I analyze how transnational leftists 
adapted to life in Argentina, and the different ways in which this regional coalition of 
                                                
183 The following chapter, which focuses on the rise of the right, will address the second year. 
184 Wright and Oñate, “Chilean Political Exile” (2012), 152. 
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exiles mobilized upon resettlement. I then turn to an examination of the Argentine state’s 
response to these immigrants. This chapter concludes with the September 1974 
assassination of Prats, generally recognized as the first Condor attack, and then discusses 
the implications of this high-profile killing for the newly configured transnational leftist 
community, Operation Condor, Argentina, and Chile.  
The state of affairs that exiliados experienced upon resettling in Argentina after 
September 1973 can best be described as political chaos. Various short-lived military and 
civilian governments ruled the country between 1955, when Juan Domingo Perón was 
first overthrown in a military coup d’état, and March 1973, when the exiled leader 
returned to Argentina.185 Political violence, assassinations, guerrilla insurgency, 
bombings, and political instability characterized these eighteen years as ten different 
civilian and military heads of state proved unable to quell the unrest.   
From exile, Perón had remained an influential actor in national politics, plotting 
his return and working to destabilize the country with the help of his loyal supporters. 
After the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, Perón’s rhetoric turned increasingly leftist 
as he sought to present himself as a revolutionary in order to pander to a younger 
generation of Argentines enamored with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.186 The Argentine 
left, however, was divided between groups loyal to Perón and others who remained 
autonomous, such as the PRT-ERP (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores-Ejército 
Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Workers’ Party-Revolutionary People’s 
Army), who were committed to a Cuban style insurgency. Further complicating matters, 
Peronism was itself divided between armed leftist groups such as the Movimiento 
                                                
185 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 87. 
186 Antonius C. G. M. Robben, Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), especially 137. 
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Peronista Montonero (Peronist Montonero Movement, known as the Montoneros) and the 
Juventud Peronista (JP—Peronist Youth), and the Peronist Right, composed of rank and 
file trade unionists who had been long-time supporters of the General dating back to his 
first presidency.  
Ultimately, extremists on the right and the left undermined what remained of the 
legitimacy of the Argentine state. As political anthropologist Antonius Robben notes, 
between Perón’s return and his successor’s overthrow in early 1976, the “left and right 
harassed each other with the bombing of offices and neighborhood chapters, 
assassinations, inflammatory editorials, and even hit lists in their periodicals.”187 The 
number of politically motivated bombings rose from 141 in 1969 to 434 in 1970; by 
1971, the figure had increased to 654.188 As historian Paul Lewis documents, in the 
second half of 1974, death squads under the direction of the Alianza Anticomunista 
Argentina (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance-AAA), a paramilitary force composed of 
off-duty military and police to crack down on the left, killed over 70 “prominent 
leftists.”189 In addition, from February to September 1974, the ERP lost more than 160 
people in Tucumán, compared to fifty-three for the army, police and gendarmerie.190 
Over 100 ERP members died in combat the following year. In 1975 alone, the 
Montoneros suffered over 500 deaths and disappearances.191 As testament to the overt 
nature of military and paramilitary repression even before the coup, as early as 1974 the 
AAA began to “sen[d] its victims notification in advance that they were on its ‘hit list’ 
                                                
187 Ibid., 136. 
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and warned them to leave the country.” Some sought safety in exile, while others held 
their ground and fought back against the repression.192 
Although accounts of the Dirty War tend to emphasize right-wing violence, it is 
important to recognize that both the right and the left bear responsibility—albeit to 
different degrees—for the deaths preceding (and during) the 1976-1983 conflict. 
Guerrillas carried out 114 “armed operations” in 1969, 434 in 1970, reaching 654 in 
1971. Leftist attacks dropped temporarily in 1972 to 352, but rose again in 1973 to 413. 
That figure almost doubled to 807 in 1974 and remained high at 723 in 1975.193 
Militant guerrilla groups were not the only sector of society becoming more 
politically active during this period. Indeed, Lewis documents the growth and 
politicization of Argentine universities during the 1970s, as Peronists and Marxists came 
together “to control the national universities’ self-governing institutions and agitate for 
increasing the size of the student body to incorporate more lower and middle-class and 
working-class students.” Whereas in 1950 the total enrollment at national universities 
was 82,500, this figure had more than tripled by 1970 to 274,000 students.194 In stark 
contrast to the underground activity of the guerrillas, during 1971 Montoneros and ERP-
PRT “militants,” were “openly recruiting on the [university] campuses.”195 Future 
guerrilla leader Mario Roberto Santucho first got involved in politics at the Universidad 
de Tucumán, where he was president of the student body of the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences. As president, Santucho was elected to serve as a delegate to the national 
congress of the Federación Universitaria Argentina (Argentine University Federation), 
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where he proposed a “formal declaration of support for Castro’s Cuba.”196 In part, this 
youth movement paralleled its contemporaries in Chile, Brazil, the United States and 
Europe during the 1960s and 1970s; however, the situation was exacerbated in Argentina, 
where “the political vacuum created by de-Peronization and military rule intensified this 
youth radicalization.”197 As we shall see, the Argentine student movement, composed of 
students, Peronist workers, and labor unions, would reach out to recent Chilean arrivals. 
Argentine relations with the Chilean state during this period were no less 
contentious. Two tempestuous rivals—to this day the two nations continue to dispute 
their 3,200-mile border—had historically fought over everything from national identities, 
the territorial division of Antarctica, boundaries and natural resources in Patagonia, and 
economic policy.198 One early SIPBA memo from November 9, 1965, discussing the 
foreigners in Argentina at the time, espouses an especially negative attitude towards 
resettled Chileans living in Buenos Aires and La Plata. “Chileans: We will never again 
permit that our sovereignty be defied. The flag of our country does not permit outrages of 
any nation on earth. Chileans should know that no Argentine will budge even one 
millimeter if it means to cloud the grandness of la patria.”199 To make sure that the 
report’s meaning was not lost on those it was intended for, multiple pages of that same 
memo were covered with large, handwritten notes that read, “Chileans! Out of our 
country!” and “Chileans! Off our soil!”200 
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Not surprisingly, Argentine military leaders during Perón’s political absence 
largely minimized their contact with Chile. This began to change when Allende came to 
power in 1970. A dialogue between Allende and the Argentine General Alejandro 
Agustín Lanusse  “brought a major change in relations with Chile.”201 Conscious of the 
long border between the two countries, the need for a more flexible international position, 
and the value of joint infrastructural projects, Lanusse and Allende held a “breakthrough” 
summit conference in Salta, Argentina in July 1971 to broker a long-standing boundary 
dispute over control of the Beagle Channel and several islands south of Tierra del 
Fuego.202 Three months later, in October 1971, the two heads of state again met in 
Antofagasta, Chile to endorse ideological pluralism in Latin America and to express 
concern over the rising cost of U.S. imports. The most recent literature, however tends to 
dismiss this unusual agreement, as little more than rhetoric, intended to pave the way for 
a forthcoming economic agreement.203  
Lanusse announced that he intended to restore constitutional democracy—though, 
he insisted, without Peronist participation—by 1973. However, Perón and his supporters 
rejected the proposal and formed the FRECILINA (Frente Cívico de Liberación 
Nacional—Civic Front of National Liberation) alliance. Under the leadership of Peronist 
Héctor José Cámpora, FRECLINA called for free and unrestricted elections, which 
ultimately were held in March 1973. Because Perón initially was banned from running, 
Cámpora campaigned as his stand-in and won the election, taking office in late May. 
However, rather than maintaining the uneasy peace between the right and the left that 
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Perón had spent decades cultivating, in his inaugural address Cámpora publically lauded 
the Montoneros and Peronist Youth as “marvelous youth” and ceded to their demand for 
amnesty for over 800 jailed guerrillas. Still the violence continued unabated. The 
Argentine newspaper La Prensa noted that in the first twenty days of Cámpora’s 
administration, eighteen Peronists died in violent confrontations between the Left and 
Right.204 As chaos grew alongside mounting guerrilla insurgency, impunity for political 
criminals on the right and the left, and severe budget cuts and shortfalls, it soon became 
clear to both sides that Cámpora was not the answer.205 The military, which had fought to 
keep Perón out of Argentina for the better part of two decades, now conceded its inability 
to keep the peace and asked him to return to lead the country.206 
When he returned on June 20, 1973, his shrewd politicking with both the Peronist 
Left and the Right finally caught up with him, culminating in a bloody encounter between 
both at Buenos Aires’ airport, known as the Ezeiza Massacre. More than three million 
people participated in marches to welcome Perón back to Argentina, but instead of a 
celebration, intense fighting and “uncontrolled violence” soon broke out near the airport 
as the military guards stood by and “satisfactorily” watched the intra-Peronist conflict 
unfold.207 The massacre left at least thirteen Peronists dead and 365 more injured “and 
hundreds of thousands of Peronists who became too intimidated to attend any future 
mobilizations.”208 Ezeiza marked the culmination of an intense schism that had developed 
between right-wing and left-wing Peronists while their leader was in exile. More than just 
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a culmination of an uneasy peace that had developed within the ranks of Peronism during 
the leader’s time in exile, Robben asserts that the massacre “was carried out with the 
approval, if not direction” of José López Rega, a Machiavellian Peronist operative who 
would come to play a much greater role after Perón’s death a year later.209 
Despite this factionalism, when Cámpora resigned in July 1973 and paved the 
way for new elections, Perón and María Estela Martínez Carta de Perón, his vice 
presidential candidate and third wife known as Isabel, won “in a landslide” with sixty-
two percent of the vote.210 Though Perón had encouraged the Peronist left while in exile, 
he quickly turned against these groups after the election: in late January 1974, the leader 
cajoled eight left-wing Peronist congressmen to step down from office, orchestrated the 
bombing of a dozen Peronist Youth chapters one day later, arrested “prominent leaders” 
on the Peronist left, and repressed public demonstrations.  
After years of encouragement, “Revolutionary Peronists felt betrayed.”211 At a 
massive May Day rally at the Plaza de Mayo, the president “humiliate[d],” the ERP, 
Montoneros, and Peronist Youth, “calling them immature, while he embrace[d] the 
orthodox labor unions that had been harassing the Peronist left with increasing intensity.” 
With disillusioned leftist Peronists storming out of the Plaza de Mayo, what Robben has 
described as “the most dramatic crowd rupture in Argentine history,” Perón’s break with 
the left was complete.212   
Two months later Perón was dead of prostate cancer. In contrast to the wild 
popularity of Perón’s second wife “Evita,” who died of cancer in 1952, “Isabelita,” as his 
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third wife was less fondly known, did not garner the same level of public support. As one 
account glibly notes, “Isabel…was not really prepared for the job, having previously been 
a nightclub dancer in Panama.”213 Isabel’s three year presidency was characterized by 
increasing military operations to curtail leftist insurgency, right-wing death squads, a lack 
of confidence, and mounting economic chaos, which was reflected in hyperinflation of 
seventy-four percent in May 1974, 100 percent in June 1975, and over 900 percent in 
March 1976.214 In the first year of her administration, 504 political killings were 
recorded: of them, fifty-four were police, twenty-two were military officers, and the 
remaining 427 were leftists.215  
López Rega—a “virulent anti-communist,” old guard Peronist with “long-
standing ties with right-wing nationalist circles in Argentina,” and the founder of the 
AAA—had been Isabel’s personal secretary and principal advisor since 1965. A mystic 
who dabbled in the occult, López Rega ruled Argentina through Isabel. The Triple A, 
under López Rega’s leadership, is held responsible for at least 425 political killings 
between May 1973 and March 1976, slightly under one-half of the total estimated deaths 
(1,165) committed by all right-wing death squads during the same period.216 Adding to 
the unrest, the ERP embarked on an armed guerrilla insurgency in Tucumán.217 Although 
the Guerra Sucia (Dirty War) did not begin until March 24, 1976, destabilization, 
political violence and repression were an ever-present reality for Argentines and their 
exile guests.  
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It is difficult to determine precisely what compelled Lastiri, Cámpora and Perón 
to accept Chile’s leftist refugees, especially given the thorny history of Chilean-Argentine 
relations. The political crisis unfolding at that moment must have been paramount in 
contributing to this decision. In addition, Peronist diplomacy towards Allende and 
Pinochet in the early 1970s  “reveal[s] the pragmatic, hardnosed side” of Peronist 
politics. Political scientist Edward Milenky, argues that Perón was “undoubtedly aware” 
of Allende’s deteriorating domestic position and was worried about maintaining relations 
with his potential successors or, if Allende stayed in power, of “deal[ing] with the 
security threat of a revolutionary, Marxist Chile sharing a long land frontier and 
providing sanctuary to leftist Peronist and indigenous Marxist guerrilla movements.”218 
As Jakšić notes, after having spent part of his exile in Chile towards the end of Allende’s 
presidency, “Perón…was not interested in accepting Chileans into Argentina, but wanted 
to help people get out because he understood how bad the situation was.”219 Although 
this is an overly idealistic reading of Perón’s politics, it reveals the initial optimism with 
which Chilean exiles entered Argentina in 1973 and 1974. Many did believe they had 
found a safe haven. 
But Perón’s decision to accept Chileans was likely more calculated. For his 
domestic image, accepting Chileans was a pragmatic choice, especially before his break 
with the Peronist left in May 1974: “Perón was probably trying to show his leftist 
credentials by letting people in.”220 Argentine historian Alberto Medina posits that 
Peronist leaders’ concern with their international image compelled them to welcome 
Chilean exiles: he argues that it would have appeared hypocritical if the Peronist party 
                                                
218 Milenky, Argentina's Foreign Policies, 205. 
219 Jakšić, Interview by author. 
220 Ibid. 
 115 
turned a cold shoulder to political exiliados after their own leader had benefited from 
exile in Venezuela and Spain—and briefly, Chile—for nearly two decades.221 
When Allende was overthrown, Lastiri stood by Argentina’s traditional 
nonintervention policy, On September 11, he declared a national day of mourning, but 
sealed the border, expelled journalists and network television crews from a fifty-
kilometer zone, and recalled three diplomats who had assisted Chileans seeking asylum at 
the Argentine Embassy in Santiago. Perón not only was opposed to the coup, publically 
calling it “a continental catastrophe,” but his government would grant asylum to 600 
Chileans at its Santiago Embassy, 500 of whom were permitted to come to Buenos Aires 
after the borders were reopened.222 Jakšić, who gained asylum in La Plata via the French 
Embassy, describes his experience: “Argentina, at that point, was very generous. They 
weren’t requiring visas. I arrived in Buenos Aires in March 1974, and absolutely no 
questions were asked.” He adds, “After the coup and until March or May 1974, there 
was…an open door [into Argentina].”223 As a leader who had been in the political 
wilderness for almost two decades thanks to a coup and whose party had been harassed 
and banned by successive military governments, it is perhaps understandable why Perón, 
no matter his ideological affinities, would be concerned about what impact a coup in a 
neighboring country might have on the political dynamic in Argentina. Battling a divided 
state at home, Perón took a “cautious approach” to Chile. His pragmatic desire to “remain 
neutral” perhaps explains his willingness to allow a relatively small, but soon-to-be 
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influential, number of Chileans (and other resettled Latin Americans coming from Chile) 
to gain formal refugee status.224  
When Pinochet came to power and Chilean leftists began to flee their home 
country by the thousands, many chose Argentina as their destination. In part, this decision 
was due to geographic proximity. Although the Andes were covered in deep snow at the 
time of the coup, thousands illegally crossed into Mendoza, Argentina on foot between 
1973 and 1976: one Argentine professor’s 2007 study of Santiago-to-Mendoza migration 
in the early 1970s asserts that the number of Chilean exiles—both documented and 
undocumented, as the majority were—in this border city was close to 400,000 between 
the coup and Argentina’s own military uprising in 1976.225 Chileans also chose to seek 
refugee status (through legal means) in Argentina because many believed that Pinochet’s 
military junta would not last long; Argentina, therefore, would logically be the most 
convenient nation to return home from when the junta returned power to civilians.226 In 
addition to physical proximity, it is also likely that some Chileans chose Argentina 
because they believed that the Peronist government would be sympathetic to their plight. 
A September 13, 1973 article published in El Día, an Argentine paper, publicized 
“Perón’s condemnation of the events in Chile,” and quoted the president as describing the 
coup as “a fatality for the continent.”227 One MIR publication from early September 1973 
lauded Perón’s relationship with workers, a central tenet of the MIR’s platform as well. It 
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declared: “President Perón with the workers, not with the patrones or traitors as usual, 
delaying the aspirations of workers is against the people, in defense of popular triumphs 
and our achievements.”228 Although this was an outdated interpretation of Perón’s 
politics—by this point he had turned against leftist unions in favor of rank and file 
conservative loyalists—this publication is nonetheless significant in that it demonstrates 
the Chilean left’s perception of Perón as a sympathetic and progressive leader. 
Although many Chilean exiles in late 1973 did not conceive of Argentina as more 
than a temporary home because the Junta Militar was only expected to serve as a 
transitional government, Pinochet’s enduring seventeen-year dictatorship and its harsh 
laws banning exile reentry meant that those Chileans who had resettled in Argentina 
impacted the country’s politics in unpredicted but extremely important ways. Argentina 
(especially before 1976, when the military overthrew Isabel) along with Venezuela, 
Brazil and Mexico accepted the highest number of Chilean exiles following the Chilean 
coup.229 Who were these exiles? What was exile like for these recent arrivals? How did 
they adjust to their new surroundings? How did they respond to the increasingly chaotic 
political climate? It is to these questions I now turn. 
 
Exile Identity, the Formation of a Transnational Left, and Activism 
Both the identity and activities of exiles after they resettled in Argentina was 
complex. Despite this, due to the global awareness of the “UP experiment,” the respect 
that Allende garnered, and the brutality of the Pinochet regime, more often than not 
Chilean exiles were often welcomed by “receptive audiences” in the places they 
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resettled.230 They reciprocated that welcome, organizing solidarity committees with 
Argentines—some general, others built around schools, labor, leftist political parties, and 
humanitarian activists—that “were often quite effective in lobbying their governments to 
condemn Chile in international forums and to support high-profile campaigns for the 
release of selected political prisoners in Chile.”231  
The majority of refugees who resettled in Argentina following the Chilean coup 
were members of the Socialist Party.232 Although the Communist Party also played a 
major role in the UP coalition, Angell and Carstairs note that the PC “was probably 
underrepresented among exiles,” due to “its former experiences with underground 
operations” when it had been banned from 1948-58. Of the smaller UP parties, the MIR 
and MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario or Popular Unitary Action 
Movement) “were probably overrepresented among exiles:” the MAPU because of its 
upper middle-class intellectual membership, which had easier access to friends abroad, 
and the MIR due to the Junta’s brutal targeting of their organization.233 A vast number of 
refugees were from these political groups’ youth counterparts, many of which were based 
in universities.234 The profile of Manuel Florentino Pinto Sánchez represents the 
prototypical Chilean youth exile well: the Santiago-born twenty-four year old was single 
and a university student. Pinto Sánchez studied electrical engineering at the Universidad 
Técnica Federico Santamaría (Federico Santamaría Technical University) in Valparaíso, 
where he first joined the student movement alongside the Movimiento Universitario de 
                                                
230 Wright and Oñate, Flight from Chile, 150. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Angell and Carstairs, “The Exile Question,” 154. 
233 Ibid. 
234 The Argentine Embassy’s immigration records, especially “Mesa de Varios 1171,” 
“Referencia 16684,” and “Referencia 16600,” document the high number of university-educated, 
leftist youth that sought asylum after the coup. 
 119 
Izquierda (University Leftist Movement). According to Argentine Embassy records, he 
“was not affiliated with any political party, but he sympathized with the party of the 
Salvador Allende government.”235 “Aware that some students would be exiled and 
detained, in particular those students who had participated directly in political parties or 
student groups with leftist tendencies, like he had,” Manuel Florentino sought asylum in 
the Argentine Embassy in Santiago in late September and was granted refuge in 
Argentina on November 29.236 Although certainly not all Chileans and Latin American 
refugees sought asylum for political reasons, like Manuel Florentino many were 
affiliated, either officially or unofficially, with the UP coalition or one of its parties.  
In addition, according to a 1984 study conducted by two Santiago sociologists on 
the occupational status of the exile community, slightly over fifty-three percent of exiles 
were university educated, nearly twelve percent were professionals, and nearly ten 
percent were teachers.237 In addition, a representative group of fifty asilados that arrived 
in La Plata from the Argentine Embassy in Santiago on January 18, 1974 accentuates the 
exile population’s transnational character: of the fifty, there were forty Chileans, four 
Uruguayans, three Bolivians, one Spaniard, and one native Argentine.238 This cohort 
included nine women (six Chileans, one Uruguayan, one Bolivian, and one Argentine) 
and eleven minors (nine Chileans, one Uruguayan and one Bolivian).239 According to 
Argentine Embassy records, the vast majority of people to leave Chile during this period 
were young males, born in the late 1940s or early 1950s—making most approximately 
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20-25 years of age at the time of the coup—who had some history of participation in the 
student movement or the UP “due to the political persecution existing in his home 
country [Chile]” or “for sympathizing with the Allende government.”240 Although the 
exile group was composed of predominately young, single males, families also sought 
refuge abroad. For example, Luís Alberto Guzmán Robinson, born July 27, 1945 in 
Santiago, was a mechanic, a Socialist, a leader of the Central Única de Trabajadores, and 
a father of four. His wife, Olga Robinson and four daughters, María Eugénica (eleven 
years of age), Marcela (nine), Maritsa (seven), and Claudia Guzmán Soto (three) all 
moved into exile with him.241 
Although Pinochet’s first priority after seizing power was removing the internal 
threat posed by dissidents, it is important to note that the decision to exile leftist 
individuals, organizations, and political parties did not eliminate or dissolve these groups: 
it simply moved them abroad. Just as Latin Americans persecuted by their home country 
governments had sought refuge and remained politically active in Allende’s Chile, the 
same occurred for Chilean exiles in the Southern Cone and, to a lesser extent later on, in 
Canada, the United States, and Europe.242 As political scientists Pamela Constable and 
Arturo Valenzuela note, in spite of the dangerous nature of political work abroad, “For 
dedicated leftists, exile became a full-time political activity.” Particularly in Argentina, 
Chilean exiles formed “núcleos de chilenidad,” that were “aimed at giving international 
projection to the plight of Chile.”243 While exiles are commonly conceived of as 
victimized, stateless individuals—democratization and the respective Chilean and 
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Argentine truth commissions have helped to develop this image after the fact—in reality, 
this was not always the case. As sociologist Silvia Pedraza recognizes regarding the 
Cuban exile community in the United States and exiles from Communist nations more 
generally, there is a crucial difference in the political activity of “always alienated” and 
“recently alienated” groups in exile. While individuals and groups that have faced long 
histories of marginalization in their home countries tend to maintain their political 
inactivity in exile, “recently alienated” people coming from a nation that just experienced 
a coup d’état or government overthrow often see exile as a new opportunity to reassert 
their political visions in a different context that may be more receptive.244  
Due to their political profile, it is not surprising that Chilean exile communities, 
which often banded together in solidarity, not only remained politically engaged, but also 
expanded their political circle following resettlement. Sznajder notes: 
Many Chilean exiles, looking back at their country with a political vision, adopted 
voluntarist attitudes that stressed the need for political activism, the organization 
of committees of solidarity, and the dissemination of information about the 
Chilean cause, in order to confront the dictatorship while abroad. This attitude, 
seen as closely related to the struggle against dictatorship being led by different 
political actors inside Chile at different levels during different periods, resulted in 
a view of exile as a transitional phenomenon, which could be activated to 
accelerate the fall of military rule.245   
 
After Pinochet banned the political left in Chile, individuals, political parties, committees 
of solidarity, NGOs, and local and international organizations all demonstrated the ability 
to migrate, relocate, and assert their message within a new context. The MIR, MAPU, PS, 
and PCCh all reestablished themselves in Argentina.246 As the testimony of Jakšić makes 
clear, although Chileans may have clandestinely left their home country as individuals, 
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resettlement often allowed opportunities—sometimes predicted, others unforeseen—to 
regroup. As Professor Jakšić recounts, his friend John “had jumped the walls of the 
Ecuadorean embassy in Santiago,” was then granted asylum, but decided to cross the 
border into Peru and Bolivia after being harassed by the military government in Quito. 
He ultimately “settled uneasily” in Argentina. Years later, Jakšić encountered his friend 
in the streets of Buenos Aires, where “it was only natural that many refugees would hang 
around…where there was so much light, so much life, and…hotels were cheap.”247 Jakšić 
recalls meeting John—whose story epitomizes the transnational migrant during this 
period—in Buenos Aires on a weekend visit from La Plata, where he worked, in 1974: 
One day we ran into each other on Avenida Corrientes in downtown Buenos 
Aires. We looked at one another in disbelief, and at that moment we realized that 
we were not alone, that we could probably start all over again, that we might soon 
find others. And we did. One by one, our friends and classmates arrived in 
Buenos Aires. We established a place for meetings…we exchanged news.248 
 
Iván Jakšić’s personal story of meeting his friend demonstrates the ability of exiled 
migrants to reestablish bonds and persevere while in exile. Although Jakšić 
acknowledges the profound personal hardship of being separated from his family and 
home country, he also shows that, in spite of such personal and emotional challenges, 
émigrés created new lives for themselves abroad and move forward politically. 
Equally important as the ability to migrate and regroup was the new membership 
that leftist groups gained upon resettlement; the left not only relocated, but mobilized and 
expanded in exile. For example, following resettlement, the Chilean MIR formed strong 
ties with the Argentine PRT-ERP, Uruguay’s Tupamaros, and a fragment of the Bolivian 
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Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army—ELN).249 As Wright and 
Oñate attest, “One of the most important tasks [for Chilean exiles] was to mobilize 
support among the citizens of the host countries for the campaign against Pinochet.”250 
Gabriel Sanhueza, a Chilean and former MIR member who sought informal refuge in 
Mendoza after the coup, supports this: in an interview with Wright and Oñate, he 
explains: 
There was a great solidarity in the Peronist sectors regarding the Chilean 
situation, and they treated us very well, they helped us…We made contacts with 
old friends from Concepción…There was a great solidarity among the exiles who 
knew each other, among friends; the ones who had work helped the others, and 
there was really a fraternal spirit.251 
 
Richard Núñez, a Chilean Socialist exiled by the Junta Militar, recalled his time in 
Buenos Aires: “We worked fourteen hours a day, maintaining contact with Chile, 
checking on the fate of prisoners, building links with human rights groups, denouncing 
the crimes of the junta.”252 Diplomatic historian Arthur Whitaker writing a few years 
after the coup adds that “the subversive [transnational] organizations were not only still 
going strong at the end of the year [1974] in Argentina itself, but also were slipping men 
and weapons across the frontiers into Chile and Uruguay for the revival of the guerrilla 
movements in those countries.”253 Although exiling dissidents allowed the Pinochet 
regime to consolidate its hold on Chile in the short term, it only exacerbated political 
unrest in Argentina. 
When these leftist political parties and individuals resettled, their support of 
Allende, now a martyr, their stories of exile and migration, and their history of fighting 
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for socialist ideologies in Chile resonated with similarly minded Argentines, as well as 
exiles of other South American regimes that had relocated to Argentina prior to 1973. 
Public awareness of the “UP experiment,” the brutality of that coup, and the repression 
that followed all “created receptive audiences in many countries whom the exiles sought 
to organize in mixed committees of Chileans and sympathetic nationals.”254 Although it 
is important to recognize that there were crucial differences between the political 
histories of Argentina and Chile—first and foremost, Argentina had numerous military 
and dictatorial regimes since the 1930s, whereas Chile had been under predominately 
democratic leadership—many progressive Argentines empathized with the plight of these 
transnational exiles.255 Indeed, as historian Donald C. Hodges notes, “The influence of 
the Unidad Popular, the popular-front experiment in Chile (1970-1973) hegemonized by 
the Communist and Socialist parties, encouraged the socialist Left [in Argentina] to 
emulate the Chilean experience.”256Allende was a powerful symbol for Argentine leftists, 
and his support base only grew after his death. Solidarity committees were built around 
existing organizations of students, labor unions, left-wing political parties, human rights 
advocacy, and they were “often quite effective in lobbying their governments to condemn 
Chile in international forums.”257 
An additional reason why many Argentines supported and joined the exiles’ cause 
comes from their history of political mobility and activism, dating back to the 1940s. The 
transnational left, many having recently fled the Pinochet regime, was partially 
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responsible for transplanting the type of university-based, urban demonstrations to 
Argentina, but it is critical to recognize that Argentine leftists had been fighting a similar 
battle at home for decades. Citing worker revolts in the mid-1940s as the start to the 
nation’s long, devolving “spiral into violence,” Robben argues that political violence 
during the 1970s issues were a result of “the accumulation of the traumatic sequels of 
many acts of violence…inflicted on several levels of social complexity, namely crowds, 
politico-military organizations, families, and the self.”258  
In the 1960s in particular, universities became “prime targets for ‘liberation’…the 
halls became scenes of permanent meetings and rallies,” armed guerrillas stood guard at 
the doors to keep out potential opponents,” and schools were burned to the ground to 
protest the military regime and the “old order.”259 In short, even before the Allende coup 
and the migration of the transnational left to Argentina, Argentine activists had already 
spent decades developing tactics that would come to define transnational protests 
throughout the Southern Cone. Understanding this aspect of Argentine history both helps 
explain the profound historical investment that multiple nationalities had in transnational 
leftist groups, as well as the Argentine military’s determination to condemn and suppress 
that activity, which they viewed as a continuation of decades of chaos and subversive 
upheaval.   
An embodiment of this multinational collaboration was COMACHI, an 
impressive and little-studied Chilean-Argentine solidarity group. It demonstrates the 
ability of exiles to regroup abroad, assert political vocality, and challenge national and 
ideological frontiers. According to a September 1974 intra-departmental memo by 
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SIPBA, a branch of the Argentine secret police that would soon become deeply 
implicated in Dirty War atrocities, the COMACHI alliance was founded in December 
1973 in Bahía Blanca, a suburb in southwest Buenos Aires province.  Soon COMACHI 
“had branches throughout the country.”260 Its founding motto was “solidarity with the 
Chilean people following the overthrow of Dr. Salvador Allende.”261 Its mission 
statement also declares that COMACHI “will not disappear…until the Chilean pueblo 
hermano is reinstalled in office. Hence, the support [that we give them] must be generous 
and ongoing.”262 
Although the intention of administrative exile was to separate and marginalize the 
refugees, COMACHI brought together leftist Argentine groups with an impressive array 
of transnational exiles from across the Americas and beyond: Chileans, Brazilians, 
Uruguayans, Peruvians, Bolivians, Ecuadorians, Venezuelans, Colombians, Guatemalans, 
Mexicans, Panamanians, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Costa Ricans, 
Hondurans, Cubans, Haitians, North Americans, Canadians, Spaniards, French, Swiss, 
and Polish, among others.263 Under the leadership of Dr. Oscar Alende, the Buenos Aires 
governor of the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (Intransigent Radical Civic Union—
UCRI), COMACHI boasted over two hundred member groups from nearly every Latin 
American nation.264 According to the umbrella group’s mission statement, one of the 
Comité’s main goals was to “grant broad asylum to all the political refugees, Chileans 
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and non-Chileans, that have come to Argentina as fugitives of a regime of terror 
instituted by the Chilean military junta.”265  
In addition to the ability of the left to establish local and transnational ties in exile, 
COMACHI also disproves the traditional narrative of the victimized, voiceless, fearful 
asilado. One of the organization’s first founding acts was to hold the previously 
referenced civic memorial in honor of Allende in Buenos Aires in September 1973 that 
over 20,000 individuals attended.266 In demonstration of the wide range of transnational, 
institutional support that COMACHI had, the list of organizations in attendance was over 
two pages long, including the ERP, Unión de Trabajadores y Estudiantes Bolivianos, 
Fuerzas Argentinas de Liberación 22 de Agosto, Grupos Revolucionarios de Base, 
Movimiento Argentino Anti-imperialista de Solidaridad Latinoamericana, Encuentro 
Nacional de los Argentinas, Vanguardia Comunista, Partido Socialista de los 
Trabajadores, Consejo Integral Asociación Argentina de Actores, Juventud Socialista 
Argentina, Republicanos y Españoles Antifascitas en la Argentina, Juventud Trabajadora 
Peronista, Comité de Defensa Presos Políticos Uruguayos, Partido Popular Cristiano, 
Unión de Mujeres de la Argentina, Sociedad Argentina de Artistas Plásticos, and the Liga 
Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre.267 Cooper, who had worked in Chile and 
received UN refugee status in Argentina from September 1973-1975, recalled on the 
same night that he arrived in country that he participated in a massive solidarity march 
alongside “100,000 Argentines to protest the Chilean military dictatorship.”268  
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According to COMACHI’s first anniversary publication, their strength in 
Argentine society and institutions only grew after their founding in December 1973. By 
December of the following year, they had forged connections with resistance groups in 
schools, universities, churches, theaters, factories, neighborhoods; “little by little, the 
Resistance Committees that bring together distinct organizations of the Chilean Left are 
achieving the centralization of this irrevocable decision to fight alongside the Chilean 
pueblo hermano.”269 Throughout 1974, COMACHI’s publications document the group’s 
wide ranging activities in Argentina: Pablo Neruda readings and a civic memorial similar 
(although smaller in size) to the one for Allende after Pinochet had banned a public 
funeral for the poet who had recently past away in Chile, get togethers to read the poetry 
of the Chilean Nobel prize winner Gabriela Mistral, public readings of Allende’s 
speeches in various plazas in Buenos Aires, organizing rallies to protest Pinochet’s visit 
to Argentina in late May 1974, and artisanal fairs to raise money to send to Chileans left 
homeless after the coup. COMACHI’s linkages with Argentine organizations were an 
important part of their raison d’être, and that in spite of the organization’s Chilean roots, 
it had moved quickly to establish linkages with their peers in Argentina—a reality that 
unnerved the Argentine military. 
The majority of COMACHI’s activities were based in Argentine universities. Just 
as universities were a hotbed of leftist political protest in Chile prior to (and, to a lesser 
extent, after) the coup, they held a comparable function for transnational solidarity groups 
in Argentina.270 Universities in La Plata, Buenos Aires, and Bahía Blanca in particular are 
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documented as sites for hundreds of COMACHI protests and political meetings 
organized by sympathetic professors and students throughout 1974 and 1975. One article 
in the Argentine press in January 1974, for example, documents the “several thousand 
manifestantes—students, workers, employees and professionals” who met in the Facultad 
de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales of an undisclosed Buenos Aires university to attend a 
meeting organized by COMACHI and the Unión Internacional de Estudiantes 
(International Union of Students). Thirty delegates from both organizations attended and 
discussed the need for “unity to impede the [Chilean] military junta.” The article includes 
a photograph that pictures a group of five men of different ages sitting on a panel in front 
of a large banner reading “University decade dedicated to helping Chile.”271 
In further demonstration of Argentine university groups’ sympathy for the cause 
of the Chilean left, a pamphlet from the Grupo Universitario Socialista (University 
Socialist Group-GUS) published in November 1974 states the coalition’s mission as: 
To construct a more just society, without exploiters or exploited, a socialist 
society based on a platform that is against the crimes of the fascist Chilean 
government; against sending patrol boats and weapons to the murderous Junta on 
the behalf of the Argentine government; against the exploitative and murderous 
Policy of Incorporation; long live the heroic resistance of the Chilean people; long 
live the Argentine workers; global solidarity with socialist groups.272  
 
As this polemic illustrates, GUS conceived of their purpose as a transnational one that 
could best be accomplished through Chilean-Argentine solidarity. In the same month, 
GUS also collaborated with other leftist university groups—the Juventud Universitaria 
Socialista (Socialist University Youth), Movimiento de Orientación Reformista 
(Movement of Reformist Orientation), Partido Comunista Revolucionario (Revolutionary 
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Communist Party)—to organize a first anniversary wake for Allende’s death and to 
protest “the position of our government in closing the borders and sending assistance to 
the murderers of the Chilean people.”273 1,500 people were in attendance. Whereas the 
20,000-strong September 1973 march in Buenos Aires was focused principally on 
honoring Allende, the smaller 1974 demonstration was expanded to directly incorporate 
Argentines’ domestic demands as well. Ultimately, as COMACHI grew throughout 1974 
and 1975, its purpose went beyond reinstating a socialist civilian government in Chile: 
the group envisioned itself as taking up a universal cause “against imperialism,” and “in 
solidarity with all of the people that fight for national liberation and socialism across 
Latin America.”274 COMACHI publication images from 1974 visualize the group’s 
outright condemnation of Pinochet and support of Allende as a heroic martyr (see Figures 
2:2, 2:3, and 2:4). In demonstration of its anti-imperialist message, one of COMACHI’s 
mid-1974 publications included a block print of a large hand labelled “CIA” maneuvering 
a Pinocchio-nosed marionette wearing a soldier’s hat that reads “Pinocho,” a common 
anti-Pinochet jab still used in Chile today (see Figure 2:5).275 Another graphic reads, 
“Stop the fascist escalation in Latin America!” (a COMACHI slogan used frequently in 
their publications) and pictures a large hand, backed by guns, creeping over a brick wall 
(see Figure 2:6). One side is labelled “Chile: yesterday and today” and the other, we 
suppose, represents Argentina and the rest of Latin America.276 As much as the Argentine 
government feared a transplanted Chilean socialist revolution, so too were Argentine 
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leftists wary of a Pinochet-style regime and the return to pre-Peronist politics.277 Indeed, 
as a COMACHI publication from late September 1973 stated: 
Until yesterday, there were honest Chileans, honest Argentines that believed that 
the armies of their countries were impartial,…[and] democratic. Today Chileans 
do not think the same…even the most fervent believers!!! We Argentines should 
gain a valuable experience from this sad episode. Yesterday, the Chilean 
military…spoke of democracy, AS TODAY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY IS 
DOING. Just a few months ago, the Armed Forces of our country were torturing, 
jailing, and killing with impunity, to defend the criminal violence and imperial 
interests, AS TODAY THE CHILEAN MILITARY IS DOING. No one can 
dismiss the presence of the gendarmes of exploitation…in our country and speak 
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Figure 2:2 
“They have the strength, they can dominate us, but they cannot stop the function of 
society with crime or force. Salvador Allende, 11 September 1973.” 
Buenos Aires, 1974279  
                                                




“Salvador Allende, Martyr Victim of the Reaction and Imperialism” 
Buenos Aires, 1974280 
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Figure 2:6 
Stop the Fascist Escalation in Latin America! 
Buenos Aires, 1974283  
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Although this chapter focuses on politically motivated exiles, it should be 
emphasized that not all émigrés were agitators. As Chilean psychologist Liliana Muñoz 
reminds us, “The exile lives in a world of the past, in a permanent state of 
bereavement.”284 In this vein, Constable and Valenzuela add that, “the experience of most 
exiles…was neither thrilling nor glamorous. Crusaders torn from lives of intense activity 
and purpose were cast into anonymity and dependence.”285 Life in exile for many was 
personally devastating, disorienting, and strange, and often meant that ideological goals 
took a backseat to personal recovery. Moreover, activist exiles were not exempt from 
these personal struggles of life abroad. 
Personal challenge notwithstanding, the growth and mobilization of the 
transnational left in Argentina during 1973 and 1974 is significant, if only for the fact that 
it stands in such stark contrast to the left’s repression and dissolution in the following 
years. Indeed, during the first two years after the Chilean coup, the transnational left was 
a politically active, thousand-strong, multi-national presence in the Argentine capital. 
Although groups under COMACHI’s leadership were initially formed in solidarity with 
Chilean exiles, they became increasingly involved in national politics following Perón’s 
death. COMACHI is proof of the existence of expansive ideological frontiers.  
As transnational groups grew their numbers and influence while Argentina’s 
domestic political situation continued to deteriorate, the military and police forces 
(nominally separate actors) began to crack down on both citizens and resettled foreign 
dissidents. Although exiles had managed to escape the repressive political regimes of 
their home countries, many continued to experience persecution, fear, and violence upon 
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relocation. It was a war without national borders, but one that was increasingly 
dominated by “ideological frontiers”—a Cold War-era concept that suggested that 
traditional national boundaries were giving way to more fluid solidarities on the right and 
the left.286 Similar to when Pinochet gained power in Chile, the subversive threat to the 
Argentine state was not just an internal one, so the military response could not be either. 
The government perceived the exile community as a potential threat to both its domestic 
security and regional stability within the Southern Cone, and it acted accordingly. 
 
Setting the Stage for Condor: Military Surveillance  
 
Though the existing scholarship on Operation Condor focuses on high profile, 
targeted political assassinations, Southern Cone militaries also employed a variety of less 
visible counter-insurgency strategies in the years leading up to November 1975. Although 
the left in Argentina was gaining strength and visibility during this period, the military 
did not stand idly by while groups like COMACHI took to the streets. Relative to the 
open violence and impunity with which the militaries would act following Condor’s 
inception, the 1973 to late 1974 period can be best understood as less invasive and 
probing. DINA, SIPBA, and their regional allies gathered intelligence—mostly through 
undercover surveillance—on the exile community that would lay the groundwork for 
more overt repression during Operation Condor and the Dirty War. In this section, I 
analyze Argentine police documents as well as COMACHI records and exile publications 
to characterize the right’s increasing monitoring of the transnational left, and the left’s 
response to such surveillance.  
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Even before hopeful exiles left Chile, the Argentine military monitored their 
activity and policed their movement. Indeed, one declassified U.S. State Department 
document reveals that Perón, who publically welcomed the exile community, actually 
harbored reservations about these refugees as early as late March 1974:  
Perón authorized the Argentine Federal Police and the Argentine intelligence to 
cooperate with Chilean intelligence in apprehending Chilean left-wing extremists 
in exile in Argentine [sic]. Similar arrangements had also been made with the 
security services of Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil. This cooperation among security 
forces apparently includes permission for foreign officials to operate within 
Argentina, against their exiled nationals using that country as a base for insurgent 
operations. This authority allegedly includes arrest of such exiles and transfer to 
the home country without recourse to legal procedures.287 
 
Argentine secret police documents corroborate this unofficial position. One SIPBA 
memo sent on February 4, 1974 warned the Argentine Embassy in Santiago against 
accepting three Uruguayans, Mercedes Rosa Pimas Basillorens, Felipe Pedocchi Falco, 
and Graciela Taddey Henestrosa, who had immigrated to Chile before the coup and had 
participated in resistance efforts afterwards. The memo reads, “on the request of the 
National Directorate [DINA], it should be made known that this agency ‘believes that it 
should not grant the request [for asylum] being filed.’”288 Indeed, this early fear explains 
why the Argentine government only permitted the legal entry of 500-600 Chileans after 
the coup.  
But in spite of this initial wariness, in general the Argentine military and 
government limited their infiltration of the exile community to surveillance and internal 
correspondence in 1973 and 1974 Unpublished memos and reports kept by SIPBA 
between late 1973 and 1974 regarding the transnational left speak volumes about the 
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secret police’s anxiety about the exiles. One example of the military’s exaggerated fears 
was that the Argentine state adopted DINA’s inflated estimate of “over 40,000 exile 
guerrillas” in Argentina.289 Several internal, classified SIPBA documents from late 1973 
and early 1974 document this growing apprehension: “As of September 1973 there was a 
considerable increase in the number of Chilean refugees in our country, giving rise to 
pro-Chilean organizations with the support of local insurgency groups.”290 A SIPBA 
officer’s description of COMACHI in an unpublished internal memo from February 1, 
1974 documents a similar concern: 
Most Chilean refugees who immigrated [to Argentina] after September 11, 1973 
are guerrillas and/or members of related subversive organizations, primarily 
challenging the typical ‘political refugees’ that our country has traditionally 
received throughout its history…this demonstrates, among other things, the 
proliferation of organizations, some of recent creation, which have mobilized in 
support of these subversive elements, a high percentage of which have 
strengthened local subversive groups.291 
 
Later in the memo, the same officer goes on to describe COMACHI as responsible for 
diffusing “considerable propagandist activity and information across communities…all 
denouncing the military regime implanted in Chile.”292 
That SIPBA was interested in COMACHI and other leftist exiles from late 1973 
is apparent from its documentation of the group’s activities and individuals who it 
suspected to be members.293  A secondary source corroborates this activity:  “Instead of 
roughing up bearded young men with long hair as suspected terrorists, the police now 
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[during the early 1970s] concentrated on compiling data about kidnappings and guerrilla 
attacks in order to establish patterns…They scoured the records on real estate transactions 
and bank transfers to locate safe houses, ‘people’s prisons,’ and staging grounds for 
attacks.”294 SIPBA painstakingly created fichas that included such data as an individual’s 
identification number, birthplace, last known address, and a brief history of his or her 
entry into Argentina. They also document the Argentines who collaborated with key 
leftist Chilean groups that had re-formed in Argentina. This memo notes that, “with the 
support of COMACHI,” by February 1974 the MIR, MAPU, PS and PC of Chile had all 
established new headquarters in Argentina and were eliciting support, not only among 
Chilean exiles, but from Argentines as well.295  
SIPBA’s intense surveillance of COMACHI meetings began in November 1973, 
though the police’s actions taken in the September 1973 civic funeral in Buenos Aires to 
honor Allende show that COMACHI was on SIPBA’s radar several months earlier. Over 
fifty pages of this record are devoted to the orders of “Jefe Superior del SIPBA” for his 
officers to “observe” and “take note of the individuals present” at COMACHI meetings. 
Though several hundred meetings were surveyed from late 1973 to early 1974, several 
assemblies in particular exemplify their detailed record-keeping: first, a November 25, 
1973 funeral service in the Lomas de Zamora home of Chilean exiles Teodoro Konoba 
and Miguel Angel Lacorte, at which the SIPBA officer documented the “suspicious 
attendance” of representatives of the Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre, 
Federación Juvenil Comunista, Partido Comunista Revolucionario, Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria, Frente Antiimperialista para el Socialismo, Vanguardias Obreras 
                                                
294 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 72. 
295 “Referencia 16698 Tomo 1,” 8-10. 
 142 
Revolucionarias, and the Partido Comunista de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.296 Second, 
a February 28, 1974 meeting in the Salón de la Asociación Empleados de Comercio in 
Bahía Blanca, where Dr. Pablo Lejarraga, José Golberg and Roberto Rustoy presided 
over a meeting that “called for the unity of all political refugees who have arrived in 
Argentina from Chile.”297 Third, they monitored a gathering was called by the Cámara de 
Diputados of La Plata (La Plata House of Representatives) and the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria (Popular Revolutionary Alliance) on November 9, 1973 that paid 
“homage to the constitutional President of Chile, in solidarity with the Chilean 
people.”298 Lawyers groups, human rights organizations, labor unions, political 
associations, theater and art companies were all listed as having offered support to 
COMACHI. These records do not document what actions—if any—were taken against 
these groups and individuals, but they illustrate the Argentine police’s discomfort, 
wariness, and acute interest in Chilean-Argentine leftist solidarity and the growth of the 
transnational left in the country. 
Predictably, SIPBA took a particular interest in COMACHI’s university-based 
activities. As previously discussed, the COMACHI records document the close 
collaboration between university student groups and the Chilean-Argentine solidarity 
movement, so it follows that the police would closely monitor these events. On 
September 12, 1973, for example, SIPBA sent officers to “investigate” and “control” a 
meeting in the gardens of a La Plata university (name unspecified) that was organized to 
discuss the previous day’s military coup in Chile. Several groups were in attendance: the 
Partido Comunista-Maoísta, Partido Comunista Revolucionario, Partido Obrero-
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Trotskista, Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, Juventud Socialista de Avanzada, ERP, 
Grupo Revolucionario de Base, Centro de Estudiantes Peruanos, and Agrupación 
Reformista Peruana. The meeting culminated in a “protest march through the central 
streets of the city [La Plata].”299 SIPBA documented a similar protest at the Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata on September 11 (the same day as the coup), at which a “Profesor 
Agoglia” made public the university’s position “against the events in Chile, repudiating 
the coup.”300 Three months later, on December 11, the UCRI, the Unión de Estudiantes 
Secundarios and the Partido Socialista Unidos de Azul all met in a secondary school in 
Azul (a city in the Buenos Aires province) to “issue statements repudiating the military 
coup in Chile.”301 On the same day in the La Plata University gardens, the Partido 
Comunista Revolucionario handed out pamphlets titled “A new aggression of el 
imperialismo yanqui: the victim: the Chilean people,” which the reporting SIPBA officer 
described as responsible for “producing chaos” in the university cafeteria.302 There are 
records of comparable activities—protests, speeches, meetings and gatherings, pamphlet 
distribution—taking place at in law, medical, and journalism schools across Buenos Aires 
province in Mar del Plata, Bahía Blanca, Tres Arroyos, San Nicolas, Tigre and Quilmes. 
These reports make clear that Chilean exiles quickly regained their political voice upon 
resettlement, and that SIPBA was carefully monitoring COMACHI’s influence on the 
Argentine left.  
In addition to documenting COMACHI activities, SIPBA also kept records of 
individuals associated with the organization and its adherentes (or followers). On 
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February 15, 1974, the “Oficial Principal” José Héctor Ramos received “strictly 
confidential and secret” instructions from SIPBA’s “Jefe Superior” to create a report 
“Referencia 16612,” to spy on a group of 50 political asylees who had arrived in Bahía 
Blanca via the Argentine Embassy in Santiago on January 18 of the same year. Although 
this was only ten percent of the 500 Chileans granted asylum in Argentina after the coup, 
the decision to investigate refugees living in Bahía Blanca—the headquarters of 
COMACHI—is consistent with methods of surveillance throughout the country. 
The memo contains information on the activities of these 50 exiles—forty 
Chileans, five Uruguayans, three Bolivians, one Spaniard, and one Argentine—from the 
date of their arrival (or, in the case of the one Argentine woman, her re-entry) into 
Argentina through early February. For each exile, the SIPBA officer conducting the 
investigation was ordered to find information on their personal background, date of entry, 
current profession, employment history, “general activities,” any contacts they had forged 
in Argentina, and “any other facts of interest.” The officer wrote one single-spaced page 
on each person, finding that five of the Bahía Blanca exiles in question left Argentina for 
Cuba within the first month, while the majority stayed in Argentina. Typical was the case 
of Arturo Segundo Álvarez Saavedra, a twenty five-year-old Chilean: Arturo was born 
and raised in Valparaíso, Chile where he worked as a technical electrician until he 
applied for political asylum and moved to Bahía Blanca on January 22, 1974 after being 
tortured and detained in November 1973 for “sympathizing with the politics of Dr. 
Allende.” The memo focuses on a meeting that Arturo had at the beginning of February 
1974 in his home with four other asylees. The investigator, apparently watching from 
outside Arturo’s house, noted that the meeting began at 5:30 PM on February 4, but that 
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he could not tell exactly what took place during the meeting because “the door and 
window blinds were closed.”303  
Despite the SIPBA officer’s portrayal of the asylees’ actions as “suspicious 
political activity”, the case of Humberto Enrique Jeria González demonstrates that most 
of the Bahía Blanca exiles were not political militants or radicals. Humberto was born on 
January 11, 1938 in Santiago, Chile, where he worked as a pediatrician. At the time of the 
investigation, he was still living in Bahía Blanca and working as a doctor. The SIPBA 
official noted that Humberto “was not active in any political or militant group,” but that 
he “was a sympathizer…of Dr. Allende.”304 This conviction—“sympathizing” with the 
Allende government—is the most common claim asserted in these memos. However, as 
Humberto’s case demonstrates, it was typical for no reasons to be given, other than 
previous membership in a workers union, a law school, an undergraduate university or a 
leftist press, or travels to known communist countries such as Cuba or Soviet Bloc 
nations.  
Following instructions given by SIPBA’s Jefe Superior, the findings of this Bahía 
Blanca investigation were forwarded to various Argentine military and political agencies 
and, even more significantly, to the Pinochet regime.305 It is important to note here that in 
1975 DINA requested copies of all documents kept by the Argentine military regarding 
Chilean immigration to Argentina.306 But as early as February 1974 the cross-border 
sharing of intelligence predates by eighteen months Condor’s inception.  
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Although the memo’s stated justification was to “document and observe” these 
immigrants, the actual purpose was more complex: earlier Argentine Embassy records 
from September 1973 also contain information on 47 out of the 50 people listed in the 
February 1974 memo. Because information sharing between the Argentine Embassy and 
SIPBA was common during this period, the fact that relatively detailed personal 
information—individuals’ birthplace, last known address, parents’ names, criminal pasts, 
“ideological crimes,” employment history, relevant previous immigration history—
existed suggests that the purpose of the investigation was not simply to make a record of 
who had immigrated to Argentine from Chile, but to ascertain what they were doing after 
they got there.  
Finally, these memos make clear that even a low threshold of political activity 
warranted a SIPBA investigator’s interest, suggesting the relatively peaceful character of 
this exile activity and the police’s anxiety about leftists independent of their actual 
political undertakings.  It is unlikely a coincidence that SIPBA chose to conduct such a 
thorough investigation near COMACHI’s headquarters. Moreover, that SIPBA felt the 
need to investigate these exiles just one month after their personal information had 
already been gathered—and later share this information with the DINA—demonstrates 
how concerned Southern Cone militaries were with the cross-border movements of this 
relatively small group of transnational exiles.  
Another instance of surveillance occurs in September 1974, when authorities 
tracked the movement of a group of eleven Chileans who sought political asylum in the 
Argentine Embassy in Santiago. This is a brief memo, but documents that after being 
granted refuge alongside approximately sixty immigrants bound for Buenos Aires in late 
 147 
September 1973, eleven of these Chileans were rerouted to Argentine Patagonia and then 
immediately arrested and detained by the Gendarmería Nacional of Chubut (a province in 
Argentine Patagonia). The memo does not reveal for how many days—or weeks or 
months—the Chileans were detained. Six of the Chileans on the list were recorded as 
departing for Cuba after being released; all left for Cuba on January 11, 1974. There is no 
record of what happened to the other five prisoners.307  
A 1996 exposé by noted Argentine journalist Horacio Verbitsky who interviewed 
a group of navy officers that had participated in flights of political prisoners in the mid-
1970s and were then tossed out of planes to their deaths in the South Atlantic. Although 
these disappearances became more widespread after the military took power in March 
1976, Verbitsky’s interviews reveal that the first flights began well before the coup and 
soon after Perón had died. His interview with Lieutenant Commander Adolfo Francisco 
Scilingo documents how prisoners were told they were being transferred from Buenos 
Aires to southern Argentina, but were actually given strong sedatives in the form of 
vaccinations. They were “carried out like zombies and loaded onto the airplane,” stripped 
naked and shackled with heavy chains, and then thrown one-by-one, unconscious, in the 
ocean by the dozen.308 Although Scilingo’s sensational testimony focuses on the navy’s 
treatment of Argentine political prisoners, he intimates that nationality was not a 
discriminating factor. “If the order had been to go out and kill Chileans or subversives, it 
would have been accepted in the same way. Superior orders are not open to 
discussion.”309 At another point in his testimony, the lieutenant added, “the identity of the 
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prisoners…wasn’t discussed. It was something supreme that was done for the sake of the 
country.”310 Though this testimony does not directly address the treatment of foreign 
political prisoners, it reveals the almost indiscriminate attitude of these officers. 
Additionally, it reinforces how boundaries of citizenship were blurred and Communist 
subversion was considered a transnational problem.  
 
Changing Tactics: The First Condor Attack 
Brazen political assassinations sent an unmistakably harrowing message to 
political exiles. The example of Prats is arguably the earliest and best-known example of 
the “transnational arm of the Chilean dictatorship” and Pinochet’s ability to collaborate 
with right-wing regimes and organizations across the Southern Cone.311 A 
constitutionalist general who had served in Allende’s cabinet and opposed the coup 
plotting within the Chilean military, Prats accepted Perón’s offer of protection and went 
into exile after the golpe de estado. Domestic or international, “No military rival was as 
threatening to Pinochet:” even in exile, Prats remained vocal in his opposition to Pinochet 
and the Chilean armed forces.312 Although he made few comments regarding his feelings 
for the new Chilean leader in public, among the Chilean and Argentine military officers 
who frequently visited his Buenos Aires home, “Prats made no secret of his disgust with 
the brutality and antidemocratic character of Pinochet’s regime.” The general also had 
brought his private papers with him in exile and used them to write a memoir 
documenting the “day-by-day” internal activities of the Chilean military in the months 
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leading up to the coup. By September 20, 1974, he had written 100,000 words and had 
finished the book.313 As Dinges describes, Prats “conducted himself as a proud military 
man who had served his country while in office and had nothing to fear or hide in 
retirement.”314   
On September 30, 1974, General Prats and his wife were killed in a radio-
controlled car bomb attack outside their apartment in Buenos Aires. The plot to 
assassinate Prats began in June 1974, around the same time that Perón, who had offered 
Prats protection in Argentina, died and was replaced by his “ineffectual widow.”315 
Although responsibility for the assassination was not determined until 1999316—a time 
lapse due in large part to Operation Colombo, which began in the summer of 1975 to 
“cover up [the Argentine and Chilean governments’] incriminating activities” in the 
Prats’ assassination—when compelling evidence was found to attribute the two murders 
to Pinochet’s secret police and several key actors.317 One of these assassins was Townley, 
who was also implicated in the 1976 Letelier assassination. A second operative was 
Enrique Arancibia Clavel, a Chilean associated with the right-wing paramilitary group 
that had assassinated Schneider in a botched kidnapping in Santiago 1970. Arancibia had 
left Chile to take up unofficial exile in Buenos Aires following Schneider’s murder. After 
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Pinochet’s rise to power, he then acted as a liaison between DINA and the Argentine 
secret police.318 Arancibia’s odyssey is an interesting one on its own, as it demonstrates 
the relative ease of political asylum and transnational movement throughout the Southern 
Cone for those on the right.  
Most importantly, DINA’s orchestration of the murder of one of its citizens living 
in Argentina, committed by a transnational group of exiles and expatriates, illustrates the 
cooperation early on between the Pinochet regime and the Argentine state, and the extent 
to which exiles’ political activity prompted intergovernmental collaboration. Prats’ 
murder, I argue, was the first high-profile example of targeted political assassination 
abroad, something that would become a recurrent feature of Operation Condor. This case 
also demonstrates that if a powerful political figure with significant support from the 
transnational left was not safe in Argentina, neither were grassroots supporters. As exile 
scholars Thomas Wright and Rody Oñate recognize: “The Chilean junta could easily 
infiltrate and harass the exile community in Argentina; the September 1974 assassination 
of…Carlos Prats and his wife…in Buenos Aires was a clear warning that exiles in 
Argentina were not beyond the [Chilean] regime’s reach.”319 
Following Perón’s death, the Argentine military’s determination and ability to 
eradicate leftist subversion—public figures and grassroots activists alike—increased 
significantly: the Prats’ assassination is just one example of this, and clearly speaks to the 
blurring of national boundaries and the intergovernmental collaboration to target and 
eliminate left-wing dissidents that began prior to the Dirty War. Indeed, this period was 
characterized by covert, less visible attacks on everyday members of the exile 
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community. Sanhueza describes the growing danger of exile in Argentina following 
Perón’s death. “After Perón’s death in July 1974, both government and paramilitary 
anticommunist forces made life increasingly difficult for Chileans as well as for 
Uruguayan and Brazilian political refugees who had fled dictatorships in their own 
countries.” Sanhueza would leave Argentina after six months in residence.320  
But less public attacks also traumatized the exile community. Jakšić recounts the 
terror he felt when he heard the “shocking news” of his friend John’s arrest by the La 
Plata police:  
[John] did not need to say much for me to realize that there was trouble. My own 
roommates were restless because a few days earlier a group of unknown but 
presumed leftist radicals burned the state capitol building in La Plata, causing 
increased surveillance and harassment of foreigners. The city was occupied. 
Military patrols combed the streets while unmarked civilian cars drove slowly by. 
Gunfire pierced the air. Distant shouts could be heard. John confirmed what I 
most feared: we were not safe; we should try to leave as soon as we could. 
Argentina was collapsing. [John] had seen a frenzy of blood and death in the eyes 
and behavior of his captors.321 
 
This testimony demonstrates that the Argentine state perceived foreigners to be an 
existential threat; and they acted on this fear as early as 1974. Like Sanhueza, Jakšić 
notes “By 1975, conditions for Chileans in Argentina had deteriorated to the point that, 
ironically, [I] returned to Chile for [my] safety.”322  
Although a Puerto Montt newspaper, El Llanquihue, from October 1, 1974 tried 
to use the Prats’ murder as justification for increasing “national security” at home and 
abroad, the murders produced intense fear in the exile community abroad as well as for 
those in “internal exile” in Chile. As the article stipulated: “The premeditated murder of 
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former General Prats and his wife, and the climate of fear that extremism creates 
internationally, justify the measures to maintain security and order that the Gobierno de la 
República [the Junta Militar] has adopted and will continue to adopt for [the sake of] 
tranquility and the protection of life for all of the inhabitants of Chile.”323 Indeed, Stern 
argues that Prats was purposefully assassinated in a public and bloody manner so that the 
exile community would take notice.324 Jakšić recounts how a “sense of impending 
disaster” hung in the air for the exile community: there were police raids of cheap 
downtown Buenos Aires hotels, then disappearances and bodies found “riddled with 
bullets.” He remembers the intense fear felt by the transnational left in September 1974 
after the assassination: “we knew it was the DINA that was responsible…. We asked 
ourselves: Where to go? What to do?” as the “situation of the country [Argentina], as 
well as our own, began to unravel.”325 Sanhueza also discussed his fear of the Chilean 
military, even after he had reached Argentina. Though he first arrived in Mendoza, he 
chose to only spend four days there and then moved to the capital. He recalled his reasons 
for reconnecting with his Chilean and Argentine compatriots:  “to not be with the mass of 
refugees because we knew that the dictatorship had sent many people—military—to 
infiltrate the refugees to know what they were doing in exile… The assassination of Prats 
had a great impact on people.”326 Sanhueza added: 
I had the impression that we were being watched, in spite of our efforts to mix 
with Argentines. I remember that one time I was detained because I made a 
statement in defense of the Chilean journalists who were imprisoned…they took 
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us to the police station and they explained to us that this was interference in 
Argentine politics and was not allowed.327 
 
Despite the profound implications of Prats’ murder for the exile community in 
Argentina, as the next chapter will show, the Chilean general’s assassination was just the 
beginning of a larger string of attacks that Southern Cone militaries would carry out 
against their exiles in the coming years. Following the institutionalization of Operation 
Condor and the start to the Dirty War, safe haven in Argentina would become an 
increasingly unlikely option. 
 
Conclusions 
As this chapter demonstrates, Pinochet’s harsh use of banishment and exile of 
both nationals and foreigners living within Chilean borders at the time of the coup had 
several unintended consequences: though it helped to silence the Junta’s internal 
opposition, it also exported the problem abroad and prompted collaboration with activist 
exiles in Argentina. It would not be surprising to learn of the existence of like-minded 
groups of exiles in other Latin American, North American, and European nations as well. 
Exile abroad allowed Chileans to carry out active political lives and, in this case, to forge 
links with sympathetic groups and individuals on the Argentine left. It is clear that 
COMACHI and similar organizations posed a recognizable threat to Argentine security 
forces, which took steps to inhibit the spread of an “ideological frontier.” 
In addition to the repercussions of this mobilization for the military governments, 
the coalescence of the transnational left in Argentina also has implications for our 
understanding of the left itself. Though the South American truth commissions and the 
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vast majority of the secondary scholarship have painted the left in broad strokes and have 
focused on their victimization, as this chapter has shown, the left was actually gaining 
strength—in numbers, regional and global allies, institutional support, and visibility—
before Perón’s death and Prats’ assassination.  
Moreover, the left was never homogeneous. In part, this is because exile had 
different implications for each individual, and each refugee responded to his or her 
situation in different ways. Yet there were also different collectives of leftists with 
disparate goals or tactics. While COMACHI was a non-violent organization, there were 
multiple armed guerrilla groups operating in Argentina.. Indeed, there were thousands of 
militant leftists who are also partially responsible (though, it should be emphasized, to a 
lesser degree than the Argentine junta) for the high death tolls during this period.  
The historiography of the Dirty War is likely partially responsible for this 
oversimplification and victimization of the left. For obvious reasons, most accounts of the 
1970s in Argentina are drawn to this recognized period of conflict and therefore focus 
their attention on what transpired after March 1976. Due in part to this periodization, the 
story they present is of intense right-wing repression and the eradication of the left. The 
scholarship, with some notable exceptions, has failed to capture the first half of the 1970s 
when the left was gaining strength. The profoundly disproportionate use of violence 
during the Dirty War understandably has overshadowed the left’s actions and evolution 
during this earlier period.  
A second important finding of this chapter pertains to the Argentine state’s role 
before Operation Condor. As early as September 1973, authorities were determined to 
closely monitor this relatively small group of generally peaceful activists and foreclose 
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the possibility of any linkages to domestic guerrilla groups, such as the Montoneros and 
the ERP. While the Prats’ assassination remains the best-known example of the 
transgressing of borders to eliminate political opponents prior to Condor, its sensational 
character has so captivated the secondary scholarship on Operation Condor that it has 
obscured other methods of surveillance and collaboration among Southern Cone 
militaries. Indeed, little attention has been paid in the literature to the political activities 
of these transnational exiles. I contend that the surveillance of groups like COMACHI is 
indicative of a growing concern felt by both the Chilean and Argentine governments.  
The next chapter complements this discussion of leftist exile in Argentina with the 
subsequent discussion of the transnational right. In the face of ongoing leftist growth, I 
examine the increasingly repressive and public manner in which the Chilean and 
Argentine militaries utilized the information gathered on the exile communities before 
(and after) Prats’ death to lash out against their enemies.  
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Chapter Three:  
A War Without Borders 
Subversion…does not recognize borders or countries, and its infiltration is penetrating 
every level of national life. Subversion has developed a leadership structure that is 
intercontinental, continental, regional, and subregional…. In contrast, the countries that 
are being attacked on the military, economic and political front (from both inside and 
outside their borders) are fighting back at most only with bilateral understandings or 
simple “gentlemen’s agreements.”328 
 
     Colonel Manuel Contreras, November 1975 
 
During the week of November 26, 1975, military dictators from Chile, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay sent delegations to the First Inter-American Meeting of 
National Intelligence at DINA’s Santiago headquarters. Organized and hosted by 
Pinochet and DINA director Contreras, the meeting was “upbeat,” and allotted one and a 
half hours to each representative to report on “their intelligence organization, the current 
situation of subversion and how it is being combatted.” 
But this meeting had greater aims than just information sharing.  As the week 
progressed, these delegations established a plan to systematically and collaboratively 
eliminate the threat posed by “persons and organizations connected directly or indirectly 
with Marxism” at home and abroad.329 With high-tech assistance from the CIA and FBI 
“similar to that which Interpol has in Paris,” Condor signatories would create a digital 
databank, to be housed in Santiago, on leftist exiles. In addition, the militaries shared 
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contacts and utilized each other’s military and police personnel to track exiliados and 
extradite them for interrogation. In fact, some of those extradited were then imprisoned, 
tortured and killed after their return home. Later joined by Brazil, and, in secondary roles, 
Ecuador and Peru, this historic meeting of Southern Cone militaries represented the first 
official gathering of the principal orchestrators of Operation Condor.330  
As the Argentine and Chilean military regimes virtually eradicated the leftist 
threat from within their borders, both dictatorships turned their attention abroad to 
subversives who had fled and who, they feared, were intent on mounting resistance 
against their regimes. Unlike the less overt repression utilized by these militaries in the 
years preceding their ascent to power, after Condor’s institutionalization the region’s 
dictatorships operated with total impunity—not just against militants and high-profile 
politicians such as Prats, but against sympathizers as well. Under Condor, these regimes 
adopted targeted assassination as a modus operandi, selectively eliminating the remaining 
public faces of leftist resistance in the Southern Cone, the United States, and Europe. 
And, with the help of a servile media, they publically boasted of their accomplishments, 
going so far as to provide graphic footage of car bombings and bloody corpses for an 
international audience. These publicized murders instilled so much fear within the exile 
community that they precipitated another wave of hurried migrations as refugees sought 
safe haven elsewhere.  
In part, Condor tactics reflected business as usual: as we have seen, the Argentine 
and Chilean militaries made use of foreign contacts to assassinate Prats, as well as 
monitor and harass refugees at least two years before Condor came into being. But 
Condor also signaled a major shift in Chilean-Argentine relations for both the military 
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and exile community in that it was an official, overtly violent demonstration of inter-
military collaboration that undermined the well-established principle of political asylum. 
After Condor’s institutionalization, the militaries not only monitored the exile 
community, but they also detained, tortured, and killed suspected subversives with 
impunity. 
To analyze Operation Condor between 1974 and 1977, this chapter opens with a 
discussion of the Argentine and Chilean body politic during this three-year period, a brief 
comparison of the repressive militaries, and a discussion of the operation’s main 
“phases.” Three case studies of targeted assassination on three continents follow, to 
demonstrate the militaries’ “transnational arm,” the relative impunity with which they 
operated, and the continuities between pre- and post-institutionalization.331 Then, using 
newspaper articles, testimonies, oral histories, and quantitative migration data, Condor’s 
impact on dissidents and exile communities is addressed. A range of emotional and 
physical responses—often in the form of flight, relocation, or hiding—will be considered. 
The chapter concludes with an assessment of how Operation Condor altered military 
relations and how it transformed the exile experience and the system of exile in the 
Southern Cone and abroad during the mid-1970s. 
 
A Military Junta Consolidates Power 
The weeks following Pinochet’s rise to power were bloody and repressive, soon 
disabusing Chileans of the Junta’s claim that it would quickly restore civilian rule. On the 
one-month anniversary of the coup, Pinochet announced to the nation that the state of 
siege would continue indefinitely, due to the “gravity,” of the nation’s problems and the 
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“ongoing threat,” of the “armed extremist groups, that wound or kill in the dark.” 
Claiming to be a provisional government, the Junta announced that the nation “must be 
reborn purified of vices and bad habits,” and that civilian rule could return only after the 
military restored security, morality, and economic order.332 As the next section makes 
clear, this is eerily similar to the language that its Argentine counterpart would employ to 
justify its own coup two and a half years later. 
In the first six weeks after the coup, 1,500 citizens were murdered and an 
additional 13,500 were rounded up through raids and mass arrests aimed at UP leaders, 
activists, labor unions, factory workers, and shantytown dwellers. The Junta’s prisoners 
were held at approximately twenty detention facilities across the country, only several of 
which, the CIA reported in late 1973, were “known to the general public.”333 Between 
September 11 and December 20, 1973, the Junta recorded that 7,612 prisoners were 
processed through the Estadio Nacional alone.334  
Though the military first focused on gaining control of the capital, where half of 
the country’s population is concentrated, it soon expanded its focus to the rural provinces 
as well. Immediately after the coup, local officers in the provinces met little resistance 
and organized “a relatively soft repression—imprisonment, house arrests, job 
dismissals—of former Unidad Popular leaders and activists.”335 In October, this changed: 
under Pinochet’s order, the notorious “Caravan of Death,” led by nefarious army general 
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Sergio Arellano Stark and other future leaders of Pinochet’s secret police, flew by 
helicopter to intervene in the provinces and assume power from regional officers. The 
Caravan’s quick visits “left a trail of suddenly murdered and disappeared political 
prisoners—at least six dozen” in their wake. Although these deaths were justified as 
necessary shootings during attempted prisoner escapes, their indiscriminate character sent 
a clear message to leftist chilenos and foreign exiles alike: no Allende supporters were 
safe.336 
Although Pinochet informally organized his secret intelligence and police force 
two months after the coup, on June 14, 1974 he publically announced the creation of 
DINA and gave it carte blanche to root out subversion. As Kornbluh points out, DINA, in 
some respects, represented the “institutionalization of the Caravan [of Death]—a roving 
instrument of repression, accountable only to Pinochet, intended to eliminate enemies of 
the state, circumvent civil, legal norms, and strike fear into the populace and less 
aggressive military services.” Pinochet appointed Contreras as DINA’s director and 
Colonel Pedro Espinoza as deputy director, responsible for repressive operations both 
within Chile and acts of “international terrorism” abroad.337 DINA’s extensive power and 
purview also fueled Pinochet’s “inside game—the ongoing state-of-war mentality that 
justified DINA surveillance and pressure as a kind of shadow power within 
ministries.”338 As an intelligence officer famously testified in February 1974: “There are 
three sources of power in Chile: Pinochet, God, and DINA.”339  
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The Junta’s eradication of its internal enemy was chillingly effective. From March 
to September 1974, the number of prisoners publically acknowledged to be in 
concentration camps dropped from 10,000 to 7,000. The month-by-month reports of the 
arrests, disappearances, executions, and prison population prepared by the Catholic 
Church’s Comité Pro Paz (Pro-Peace Committee), a group sympathetic to the leftist 
victims of the dictatorship, noted “a remarkable decline in deaths—to a low point of one 
disappeared in February [1974].”340 
Although public displays of repression became more sporadic in 1974, “optimists 
were misled by the calm.” The junta continued to utilize other, less overt methods to 
target and attack dissidents.341 In addition to the thousands of people who were arrested 
in home or workplace raids (often as a result of arbitrary searches and seizures or the 
anonymous denunciation of neighbors or friends), an estimated 100,000 leftists—
approximately fifteen percent of the industrial work force—were purged from their jobs 
because of their politics and then blacklisted.342 As historian Peter Winn argues, although 
Pinochet’s repression affected “Chileans of all classes and vocations,” workers “suffered 
most” as factories were taken over by soldiers, national and regional trade unions were 
banned, and leftist union leaders were assassinated, forced into hiding, or banished from 
the country.343 
Even as the internal subversive threat to the regime was effectively eradicated, the 
Junta continued to scapegoat the left to justify the government’s own use of violence. 
Throughout 1974 and 1975, as public demonstrations of repression became less frequent, 
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military leaders and right-wing media sources alike continued to promote stories of 
violent extremists who “lurked just beneath the surface” and who needed to be subdued 
by military might.344 Pinochet’s minions went so far as to fabricate, with the help of 
sympathetic or coerced press agencies, stories of purported assassination attempts against 
the dictator. The most elaborate of these was “Plan Boomerang Rojo” (Red Boomerang 
Plan), an imagined invasion of 14,000 guerrillas from Argentina, allegedly training in 
southern Chile’s Lakes Region, who were planning to assassinate Pinochet.345 Even 
though the left had been effectively decimated within months of the coup, the country 
remained in an “ongoing war environment” both literally and psychologically.346  
Excepting several noteworthy, albeit small, pockets of resistance that remained at 
large until 1975, the regime had effectively rid the country of any visible, organized 
opposition within two years of the coup. As Dinges relates, “By late 1975, the new tactics 
[DINA and the Caravan of Death] had achieved almost total victory inside Chile, and 
Pinochet and his intelligence chief turned their attention abroad.”347 Indeed, the Junta 
would next look for support abroad to tackle the one threat still remaining: a reconfigured 
transnational exile population that Pinochet’s policy of forced expulsion had created. 
Argentina, Chile’s historic rival, would become one of Pinochet’s most important allies 
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A Dirty War 
In Argentina, violence spiked as the military plotted to overthrow the Peronist 
government. The volatile year-and-a-half-year period between Perón’s death in July 1974 
and Isabel’s overthrow in March 1976 was characterized by mounting chaos, 
hyperinflation, and violence on the part of the right and the left.348 Indeed, political 
conflict skyrocketed from 1973 to 1976: between May 1973 and April 1974, there were 
1,760 armed actions and 754 associated deaths. May 1974 to April 1975 saw 2,425 armed 
actions and 608 deaths. In the last 10-month period before the Dirty War, 4,324 armed 
actions resulted in 1,612 killings. It is important to note that, on average, 66 percent of 
these deaths were of leftist militants.349  
By early 1976, a weary public was nearly unanimous in support of Isabel’s 
overthrow. Indeed, even the ERP-PRT initially “rejoiced,” at the prospect of a coup, 
interpreting it as a sign of the military’s “desperation.”350 Similar to the coup in Chile, 
Isabelita’s downfall was predicted weeks, if not months, before it was carried out. Even 
as Defense Minister José Deheza tried to bargain for more time with military leaders the 
day before the coup, already “there were large troop movements taking place around the 
country.351  
In the early hours of March 24, the military leaders of the new junta, General 
Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier Orlando Agosti, announced to the nation 
that to ensure law and order, it would act quickly to eliminate subversion. General 
Luciano Benjamín Menéndez warned, “We are going to have to kill 50,000 people: 
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25,000 subversives, 20,000 ideologues, and we will make 5,000 mistakes.”352 Echoing 
measures taken by Pinochet, the military forbade Argentines from congregating in public 
places; suspended all air, sea, and river transportation, dissolved Congress, placed 
factories under military control, froze all bank accounts; closed schools and universities, 
shut down cinemas and theaters; and imposed a midnight curfew. The junta also 
demanded that citizens turn in their weapons within eight hours after the coup, and 
decreed that acts of violence against government forces were “punishable by death.”353 
Armed soldiers took over the federal ministries, the provincial and municipal 
governments, and the labor unions. The constitutional right of Argentines to freely leave 
or enter to their country was blocked.354 Leading Peronists, including Isabel and all of her 
cabinet ministers who had not already fled the country, were arrested. The Peronist era 
had summarily ended.355  
Noticeably similar to Pinochet’s justification for ongoing military rule several 
years prior, the Argentine junta also adopted a moralizing mission, claiming that harsh 
means were necessary to rid Argentina of its vices: the nation would be restored “through 
order, work, the full observance of ethical and moral principles, justice, the complete 
realization of man, and through the respect of his rights and dignity.”356 But as Robben 
wryly observes, the “interim” government “failed to inform the Argentine people about 
the cost of this cultural construct.”357  
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Ironically, although the junta appeared to exercise complete control, it was 
actually quite limited in its ability to exercise this power. Though it could set general 
governmental policy and appoint personnel, the conduct of the “war against subversion” 
was vested in regional officials. Though decentralization allowed the military “to 
penetrate every corner of the country…in order to root out subversion,” this structure also 
spread power thin in “a tangled, overlapping network that led upwards, not to a single 
national authority, but to three separate authorities [the heads of the army, navy, and air 
force].”358 Ultimately, “[t]his decentralization and autonomy…meant enormous power in 
the hands of very junior officers, each secure in the knowledge that no one could really 
tell under whose instructions he was acting.”359 Moreover, the military takeover would 
precipitate institutional breakdown, economic chaos, and corruption.360  
Atrocities were frequent with such a loose chain of command.361 Even before the 
coup, “a growing network of secret prisons,” had been established following the 
military’s take-over of the “anti-subversive war” in October 1975. As Dinges states, 
“With almost no public notice, the military had kidnapped and disappeared at least 522 
people in the five and a half months leading up to the coup.” By late 1975, the number of 
people detained in these 340 “secret prisons,” grew: “85 percent…were executed and 
their bodies secretly disposed.” In the remaining months of 1976, “the disappearances 
more than tripled to a steady rate of 350 per month.”362 As the number of bodies grew, 
the junta dumped its prisoners into unmarked mass graves or into the Atlantic Ocean: 
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The hooded, shackled prisoners were called out by their case numbers, formed 
into a single file, and taken to ESMA’s [Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada or 
Navy Mechanics School in Buenos Aires] basement, where a nurse gave them an 
injection that knocked them out. Still alive, they were then hauled intro trucks, 
driven out to a military airport, and dumped into transport planes…. Far out of 
sight of land, the prisoners were then thrown out [over the South Atlantic].363  
 
Scilingo would confess to throwing approximately thirty people into the Atlantic in these 
“death flights,” and estimated that ESMA killed between 1,500 and 2,000 in this 
manner.364  
The Argentine truth commission CONADEP (Comisión Nacional de 
Desaparición de Personas—National Commission on the Disappeared), created after the 
restoration to civilian rule in 1983, corroborated this spike in disappearances between 
1975 and 1976. It cited seventeen disappearances in 1973, an additional forty-two in 
1974, 326 in 1975, 3,792 in 1976, 2,979 in 1977, 958 in 1978, and 975 disappearances 
from 1979-1983. The number of deaths—excluding disappearances—was estimated at 
1,100 for 1975.365  
Through such repression the Junta aimed to ensure that the enemy “was not to be 
merely defeated but exterminated, so that no future civilian government could release the 
guerrillas to fight again…. the guerrillas’ front organizations and clandestine support 
networks were to be wiped out, root and branch.”366 Yet despite mounting violence and 
the military’s aim to eradicate the guerrillas, the Argentine leftist force had not been 
totally decimated by 1975. Although estimates of guerrilla membership vary drastically 
and “their actual number is a matter of guesswork,” in the spring of 1975 the Montoneros 
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could boast around 250,000 members, of which 25,000 bore arms. The ERP had 
approximately 60,000 members, but only 5,000 active combatants.”367 As Lewis 
surmises, “Whether one accepts the higher or lower estimates, Argentina’s guerrilla 
organizations, backed by multimillion dollar war chests, were formidable—and lethal. 
Sustained…by a favorable public opinion, they grew in numbers, organizational 
sophistication, and fire power.”368 
Most importantly, the increase in leftist violence was met head on by military 
repression.369 The numbers of disappearances alone went from 326 in 1975 to 3,792 the 
following year.370 Ironically, the perception that Argentina was a safe haven for leftists 
prior to the coup precipitated a spike in the arrival of leftist exiles from neighboring 
dictatorships. This occurred at precisely the same time that the Argentine military sought 
to eradicate leftist militants. To confront the growing transnational threat, the military 
would turn to Pinochet. 
 
Differences in Tactics  
Although the Chilean and Argentine regimes collaborated during this period and 
their justification for the repression was nearly identical, they utilized different methods, 
and their respective roles in the political life of their nations were quite distinct. The 
Argentine military had governed the country intermittently since 1930. In fact, the coup 
that launched the Dirty War must have appeared initially to many citizens as nothing out 
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of the ordinary; in the past, ephemeral military governments would remain in power for a 
few years before power was returned to civilians. In Chile, however, the military’s ascent 
to power in September 1973 represented a profound break with its deeply rooted 
democratic tradition.   
The Argentine military imagined itself as the historic defenders of the nation, 
believing they had the “right and the obligation,” to reorganize the country “as they saw 
fit,” after Peronism’s demise “because they had stood at its birth.” As Robben describes, 
the military took pride in its critical roles in the liberation of Argentina from Spanish 
colonial rule in 1816, their conquest of the Patagonian desert during the 1870s in its war 
against the indigenous population, and the foundation it had laid for the country’s 
agricultural export economy. Moreover, several eminent presidents, Bartolomé Mitre, 
Domingo Sarmiento, and Julio Roca, responsible for the country’s economic success, had 
served in the national army. “The 1976 commanders must have seen themselves mirrored 
in their illustrious predecessors.”371 
In contrast, Pinochet’s rise to power in Chile was almost unprecedented. 
Democratic rule had been a hallmark of Chilean political culture since independence. 
Although called on at times by civilian governments to repress dissidents and to crush 
strikes, with some brief exceptions, the Chilean military confined itself to the barracks.372   
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 Although the respective regimes collaborated and shared information, they also 
benefitted from each other’s past mistakes. Based on its historic role and its future vision 
for the nation, the Argentine military “wanted to avoid a personalistic dictatorship like 
the one in Chile under General…Pinochet.” It wished to avoid the concentration of 
authority in the hands of any one individual, and, through its loose web of command, 
tried to prevent “any individual junta member expanding his power.”373 Moreover, the 
Argentine junta believed that completely eradicating their subversive population—while 
still within their borders—was necessary “to avoid the international protests and 
pressures that Pinochet’s government had faced after the coup in Chile.”374  
 
Operation Condor  
The summit of Southern Cone militaries convened by Contreras in November 
1975 in some respects formalized and enhanced existing bilateral partnerships among 
these dictatorships. But its multilateral nature set it apart. As one scholar related: “In the 
underground world of competition and mutual suspicion, the Santiago meeting was a 
unique and unprecedented event, a summit of historic importance.”375 Although largely a 
regionally autonomous operation, the role of the United States in Condor’s founding and 
execution cannot be overlooked. Even though no North American delegate was present at 
the convention, the operation’s founding document was, in Dinges’ words, a “thinly 
veiled reference to the expected interaction with the American CIA and FBI.” It read: 
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“We recommend the utilization of liaison resources outside the countries of the System, 
especially those that are outside the continent, to obtain information on Subversion” 
(capitalized in the original; emphasis added). Years later, Contreras would categorically 
state that both the CIA and the FBI were aware of Condor’s data bank, “contributed to 
it,” and “sought information from it.”376 The United States undeniably played an 
important logistical role, providing technology, money, and military training at the 
School of the Americas, and offered consultation to Contreras and other Condor 
signatories on multiple occasions.377 Since scholarship on Condor has focused almost 
entirely on the North American role, I will examine the ways in which South American 
militaries cooperated with each other after November 1975. 
At the November meeting, each group shared information on the leftist threat 
posed to them by citizens and foreigners, as well as the measures they had already taken 
to counter the threat. According to Dinges, “The bottom line was that domestically the 
leftist organizations had been decimated in every country but Argentina,” the last to fall 
to military rule, and that “security agencies’ main concern was now outside their own 
borders.”378 In short, to effectively rid South America of communism, Condor leaders 
were convinced they needed to organize collectively. Under its auspices, local security 
forces would kidnap dissidents, interrogate them, and transfer them to secret detention 
centers in their country of origin. Even dissidents who were refugees with legal 
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residency, some under the protection of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), were not safe.379 
The first summit identified three means of collaboration. First a central data bank 
was established “to which all countries would contribute intelligence.”380 Although 
located in the headquarters’ Coordinating Center in Chile, it would be accessible to all 
members via computer. Inspired by the Interpol system of international police 
communication, the data bank was designed to contain “in one place the best information 
from each country, and from countries outside the system, about ‘people…organizations 
and other activities, directly or indirectly connected with subversion.’”381 Second, Condor 
designed an information center (called Condortel) with special communication channels, 
cryptography capability, telephones with scrambling mechanisms, and message systems. 
Third, in addition to virtual technological communication, Condor leaders agreed to hold 
“permanent working meetings” where they could report and share intelligence every 
several months.382  
In a demonstration of its blatant disregard for international law and the safety of 
exile, Point 5c of Condor’s November 28, 1975 charter advocated “rapid and immediate 
contact when an individual was expelled from a country or when a suspect traveled in 
order to alert the Intelligence Services” of Condor countries, and Point 5g recommended 
the installation of intelligence operatives in each country’s embassy to better monitor the 
movement of the exile community.383 As political scientist Martin Edwin Andersen 
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describes, Operation Condor gave these countries’ security forces “an almost continent-
wide hunting license.”384 
Although late November 1975 marks Condor’s founding, as we have seen, 
operations began unofficially at least two years prior with cross-border military 
collaboration in rounding up and interrogating Chileans and exiles after the September 
1973 coup, and with the targeted assassination of Prats and his wife in September 1974. 
Nonetheless, the first meeting was decisive for both national and regional reasons. First, 
it occurred at a crucial moment; Argentina was the only signatory government not under 
military rule at a time when the civilian government was ineffectual. Second, for the 
dictatorships already in power—Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay—Condor 
provided access to information about many of the exiles they had, in Pinochet’s word, so 
“generously” banished.385 Third, Condor was pivotal because it solidified, expanded, and 
institutionalized such military collaboration. Selective assassination used first on Prats 
would become standardized after Condor’s inception. Especially after the Argentine 
coup, Southern Cone dictatorships operated without restraint.   
 
Targeted Assassinations Against Prominent Leftists Exiles 
Condor is infamous for several high-profile assassination plots, most of which 
also involved torture to acquire intelligence about other leftist leaders. In addition to the 
murders of Prats and his wife, Condor operations targeted the Argentine Communist 
Amílcar Santucho and the Chilean MIRista Jorge Fuentes in Asunción, Paraguay in May 
1975, and Bernardo Leighton, an exiled Chilean Christian Democrat and a former Vice 
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President, and his wife Anita Fresno in Rome in October 1975. Although the latter attack 
proved unsuccessful, it left Fresno permanently disabled. Other known victims included: 
Andrés Pascal Allende, the head of a Chilean leftist solidarity group, in Malloco, Chile in 
October 1974; Roberto Santucho, an underground ERP leader, and an exiled Chilean 
MIRista Edgardo Enríquez, both eliminated in Buenos Aires several days after 
Argentina’s coup. Finally, Condor’s reach extended to Washington, D.C. when Orlando 
Letelier and his assistant Ronni Moffitt were killed in a car bombing in Sheridan Circle in 
September 1976.  
Additional targets (some assassination victims and some the victims of 
assassination attempts) were alleged to have been carried out during Pinochet’s 1998 trial 
in Spain, though questions still remain. The list of notable political leaders suspected of 
being Condor targets is astonishing in its diversity: Chilean Socialist Party leader Carlos 
Altamirano, who lived out most of his exile in Paris; João Goulart, former Brazilian 
president deposed by the military in 1964, who sought exile in Montevideo, Uruguay; 
Edward Koch, U.S. congressman and later Mayor of New York; former Bolivian 
president Juan José Torres; and Uruguayan deputies Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and Zelmar 
Michelini.386 
A comparative analysis of the assassination attempts against Leighton and Fresno, 
Letelier and Moffitt, and Santucho and Enríquez reveals the diversity of Condor’s targets 
and it reach. These three cases alone demonstrate that exiles in Europe, South America 
and North America were well within Condor’s grasp. The targeted assassinations 
underline Condor’s modus operandi: the high degree of impunity with which it operated, 
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effectively independent of its target’s location or date, and the support its founders 
received from sympathetic right-wing militants, governments, and operators in dozens of 
nations across the world.  
Leighton and his wife fled Chile in December 1973 and settled in Rome. As Stern 
described, Leighton was “highly respected…; constituted the moral heart of Chile’s 
founding generation of Christian Democrats; a person popular for his lack of pretension 
and his gift for building bridges; and a leader who had…immediately rejected the coup.” 
Still active in exile, within Europe he was a key figure in the leftist solidarity movement 
against Pinochet.387 According to documents found in the Paraguayan Archives of Terror, 
Leighton was one of Pinochet’s top targets after he came to power.388  
On October 6, 1975, an assassination attempt was carried out against Leighton 
and Fresno. As McSherry related, “they left the couple for dead after gunning them down 
in the street. The couple was severely wounded, but survived.” Responsibility for the 
attempt was not uncovered until twenty years later, in Townley’s testimony in the 1995 
Letelier trial (discussed below). DINA “contracted” several neofascist organizations in 
Italy, including the Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazional, a terrorist organization of 
neofascist and known Condor henchman Stefano delle Chiaie, to carry out the 
executions.389 Given the timeline of the attack, Brazil’s involvement in the event is also 
possible.390 This assassination attempt, carried out on another continent, speaks to the 
dispersed nature of Chile’s exile community and the junta militar’s linkages with right-
wing paramilitary organizations abroad.  
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Condor’s most audacious attack occurred in September 1976 in Washington, D.C. 
against one of Allende’s cabinet ministers. Imprisoned shortly after the coup, Letelier had 
been living in the U.S. capital since his release, where he worked with a liberal think 
tank, the Institute for Policy Studies, and remained an advocate for the return to 
democracy in Chile. Letelier had recently appeared on one television panel accusing the 
Chilean military “of instituting a reign of terror.” He added that the coup had brought 
about “…widespread negative publicity for the U.S. government which resulted in further 
anti-Agency [CIA] propaganda’ in the United States and abroad.”391  
Like Leighton, Letelier was an early target of the junta. “Letelier was the most 
typical victim—targeted as a dangerous democrat rather than a violent terrorist, a man 
who worked against Pinochet not in secret but in public corridors of power in the United 
States and Europe.”392 In July 1976, DINA operations chief Pedro Espinoza sought out 
Townley and the Chilean Armando Fernández Larios to plan the assassination. Townley 
was a member of the Chilean right-wing party Patria y Libertad, and had connections 
with extremist right-wing Cuban exiles in the U.S. One of Condor’s top operators abroad, 
he was also involved in the assassination plots against Leighton, Prats, Altamirano, and 
others. Fernández Larios, also suspected of playing a role in Prats’ murder, conducted 
surveillance of Letelier prior to the assassination. He had been trained by the CIA at the 
School of the Americas (class of 1970), and participated in the Caravan of Death. He was 
described by witnesses as “a particularly savage and sadistic torturer,” and “a psychopath 
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and the biggest murderer in Chile.” Both men reached out to several reactionary members 
of the Cuban exile community in south Florida to help carry out the attack.393 
 On September 21, 1976, Letelier and Moffitt were killed in a car bomb explosion 
in Sheridan Circle on Embassy Row. DINA and the CIA both alleged that leftist forces 
had committed the attack “to embarrass the Pinochet regime,” and denied the Chilean 
junta’s involvement.394 The Letelier assassination also marks a turning point in the 
United States’ role in Condor, an issue to be discussed in the Epilogue.  
Yet Condor’s “transnational arm” did not mean that leftists at home were spared. 
Several months after the attempt against Leighton, the Argentine military’s formal 
seizure of power gave it virtually unlimited powers in rooting out subversion at home as 
well. One of the first transnational attacks carried out by DINA in collaboration with one 
of Argentina’s top secret intelligence services, the 601 Intelligence Battalion, came 
against a group of leftist guerrillas who went underground in Buenos Aires after the 
Argentine coup. Santucho and Enríquez were two of their principal targets. Days after the 
coup, on March 29 Santucho held a secret meeting of his central committee and several 
exiled Chilean guerrilla sympathizers, including Enríquez. For two days, Enríquez and 
Santucho debated what actions the group should take following the coup. Santucho, like 
other militants, “saw the coup as an opportunity,” to seize power, but Enríquez advocated 
a “strategic retreat,” similar to the path taken by the MIR after the Chilean coup.395 
As the group took a midday siesta, shooting broke out in the walled garden 
surrounding the house. Approximately a dozen military men attacked the compound, 
“apparently unaware that there was a superior guerrilla force inside.” ERP leaders “easily 
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held off the attackers,” allowing their comrades to leave. Santucho and Enríquez were the 
first to flee, Enríquez was forced to hide in an irrigation ditch for two days. Twelve 
guerrilla leaders, however, were killed in the shootout, including the ERP intelligence 
chief. “The guerrillas’ underground network was fatally compromised.” Although 
Enríquez escaped, he was seized on April 10 with a Brazilian woman, Regina Marcondes, 
when leaving another safe house. According to the Chilean truth commission, utilizing 
the new Condor telex system, Battalion Intelligence 601 had notified DINA of their 
capture and sent the prisoners to Chile, where they were interrogated, tortured, and then 
murdered.396 Though Santucho had escaped, he, too, was killed alongside other top ERP 
leaders in a shootout in mid-July.  
Raids on safe houses targeting guerrilla leadership, rather than individuals, were 
common in Chile and Argentina. Whereas exiled politicians Leighton, Prats, and Letelier, 
were well known, visible, and could be individually targeted, Condor’s use of force was 
as much strategic as it was symbolic.  
The Malloco Raid, which took place in October 1974 on a vegetable farm several 
miles west of Santiago where Andrés Pascal Allende and other MIR leaders had been in 
hiding since the coup, was comparable to the ERP attack. On the night of October 15, a 
DINA squad attacked the farmhouse, resulting in a “fierce gun battle.” Dogoberto Pérez, 
the MIR military chief, was killed and Pascal and five other MIR leaders “retreated on 
foot through fields at the back.” To cover their escape, they set an arsenal in an 
outbuilding on fire, causing an enormous explosion that severely wounded the leaders. 
After remaining underground for several weeks, Pascal, his wife, and a North America 
priest rode a motorcycle to a hiding place in a monastery in the Santiago foothills; a few 
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days later, they were smuggled into the Costa Rican embassy and granted asylum. The 
neutralization of their leadership, however, was “a near-mortal wound to MIR’s 
operations within Chile.”397 
Although Operation Condor launched its most visible, public attacks against high-
profile figures, well-known politicians and guerrilla leaders were by no means the only 
targets or victims of this multilateral partnership. In total, more than two hundred people 
were disappeared or killed by Condor. This includes 132 Uruguayans (127 assassinated 
in Argentina, three in Chile, and two in Peru) 119 Chileans, seventy-two Bolivians 
(thirty-six in Argentina and thirty-six in Chile) fifty-one Paraguayans (all in Argentina) 
sixteen Brazilians (nine in Argentina and seven in Chile) and at least twelve Argentines 
(in Brazil).398 These numbers may appear relatively small for an operation that required 
an unprecedented degree of regional collaboration, money, and violence. But these 
figures also testify to Condor’s staggering success and impunity. Moreover, it is 
important to emphasize the palpable fear that these assassinations engendered within the 
exile community. Fear dissuades and disincentives action. I now examine how the 
military governments, with the aid of the media, trumpeted their operations, in ways 
expressly designed to inspire fear among at home and abroad. 
 
Media Complicity 
Condor had three main purposes: to forestall the left’s ability to regroup in exile; 
to sow fear in the transnational exile community; and to frame the violence as a result of 
left wing subversion so that they could argue that they were “saving” their countries from 
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terrorism.399 As Stern perceptively notes, while “the myth of imminent war propagated 
since 1973 had been the anchor of legitimacy for dictatorial control backed by secret 
police in the mid-1970s,” several years later “it had moved to self-fulfilling prophecy.”400 
The media would play an instrumental role in “fulfilling” this message.  Newspapers and 
journals sympathetic to the dictatorships presented a unified message, as they reprinted 
each other’s stories and propaganda.  
Even though guerrilla leadership had been virtually annihilated in Argentina 
within months of the coup, the junta maintained that an iron fist was necessary to counter 
what remained “just beneath the surface.”401 As the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio 
explained in reference to the Argentine military’s actions, “The disdain for human beings 
and the insolence with which the [Argentine] terrorists keep acting…show to what degree 
Chile would today be immersed in a bloodbath if the armed forces had not taken the 
direction of the country into their hands.”402 In addition to providing an explanation for 
the growing death toll abroad, the “image of crazed terrorists—especially a cannibalistic 
Left capable of devouring its own to gain total power—provided a cover story.”403 The 
most sensational of these fabricated stories was Operation Colombo or The Case of the 
119. 
By July 1975, 119 MIRistas had been disappeared, 115 of them named in habeas 
corpus petitions. On July 12, Chile’s three main newspapers, La Tercera, La Segunda, 
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and El Mercurio, all reported the discovery of two dead MIRistas, Luis Alberto 
Guendelman Wisniak and Jaime Eugenio Robotham Bravo, supposedly found in a car in 
Argentina. A message had been left next to their corpses: “Discharged by the MIR. Black 
Brigade.” The government also “discovered” information reporting that many Chilean 
leftists who it claimed had moved to Argentina for guerrilla training and “organized 
simulated detentions by supposed Chilean security personnel—a cruel cover story in 
which the leftists were allegedly shown to have deceived their own relatives.”404 Over the 
following two weeks, the Chilean and Argentine media conspired to report similar cases 
of uncovered bodies with tags claiming leftist responsibility. Argentina’s newspaper Lea 
reported sixty Chilean extremists “killed by their own comrades in struggle.” A Brazilian 
newspaper, Novo O Dia, cited an additional fifty-nine intra-left deaths between July 24 
and 25.405 As Stern wryly describes, the MIRistas in these Operation Colombo cover 
stories presumably died “as a result of their own crazed mentality[:] intra-Left 
cannibalism killed off sixty; another fifty-nine died in shoot-outs with Argentine security 
forces.”406 Fascinatingly, an addendum to the Valech Report that was excluded at 
publication questioned the authenticity of both Lea and Novo O Dia, noting that “both 
publications only circulated a single edition, did not come into existence before 
Operation Colombo,…and…were both financed by the Chilean state.”407 
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Operation Colombo, as this two-week press cover-up came to be known, sought 
to defuse growing international human rights pressure against Pinochet and DINA by 
claiming that the violence was actually attributable to the Left. Years later, secret DINA 
files were found in the Buenos Aires office and the home of Arancibia Clavel, a DINA 
agent ultimately convicted of playing a major role in Prats’ murder, which included lists 
of Colombo’s 119 disappeared Chileans. The documents included a report discussing 
Colombo’s orchestration proving that the 119 desaparecidos were actually the 
responsibility of DINA and the Triple A, who had collaborated to create false stories and 
fictitious identities for their victims.408 The unpublished Valech addendum also cites the 
collaboration of Argentine and Brazilian intelligence services, “under the mark of 
Operation Condor.”409 
Colombo was not the only time that a slavish media played an instrumental role in 
manipulating public opinion. As Stern describes: 
Killer ambushes against prominent Chileans on foreign soil were sensational 
events. Part of their purpose, no doubt, was to provoke fear. The junta made no 
effort to bury the news. The killing of Prats and…Cuthbert, for example, was 
front-page news with strong imagery. The most dramatic picture, on the front 
page of El Mercurio and La Tercera, presented the body and head of Prats, 
bloody and mutilated yet recognizable, in the foreground. Nearby, the mangled 
wreckage of the couple’s car demonstrated the dramatic force of the bomb.410 
 
Utilizing the media in this way was part and parcel of the Southern Cone 
militaries’ shifting target and changing message during 1975-1976. As Robben 
elaborates, “The military were aware that this sweeping enemy definition implied a 
considerable adjustment of public opinion which still viewed war as the confrontation of 
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armed combatants.”411 In the following sections, I examine the effectiveness of the 
militaries’ campaign against the region’s guerrilla groups in 1975, and then analyze how 
Condor expanded to target not just militants following the coup, a strategy that would 
precipitate an exodus of political refugees out of Argentina.  
 
A Decimated Militant Left 
By 1974 and 1975 the situation confronting leftist guerrilla movements was 
“stark” in Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. In Chile by 1975, PS and MIR leadership had 
been captured, executed, or forced into exile. The Chilean Communist Party faced the 
same fate the following year. Against all odds, the MIR continued their underground 
campaign against Pinochet, both from within Chile and in exile. Perhaps the most 
publicized example of this is Operación Retorno (Operation Return). As late as 1978, the 
MIR planned “to slip across the Argentine border to mount a military campaign more 
well prepared than adventure fantasies of the early MIR.”412 Despite the major amount of 
planning and organization that went into launching Operation Return, DINA obtained 
intelligence about the attack, allegedly through a French Condor operative, and killed the 
militants.413 Even though pockets of the MIR and other leftist groups continued to exist in 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Colombia (the four remaining democratic states in 
late 1976), by 1975-1976, DINA had eliminated any possibility that the exiled left could 
launch a successful attack from outside of the country.414 
                                                
411 Robben, Political Violence, 186. 
412 Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 202. 
413 Marie-Monique Robin, “L'exportation de la Torture,” L'Humanité 30 (Aug. 2003). 
414 Wright and Oñate, “Chilean Political Exile” (2012), 152; and Wright and Oñate, Flight from 
Chile, 92. 
 183 
With the exception of the Bolivian ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—
National Liberation Army), the Uruguayan and Bolivian guerrilla movements fared even 
worse than the MIR. The Uruguayan Tupamaros “ceased to exist” in May 1974 after the 
Uruguayan police discovered their safe houses as they were preparing to launch an 
ambitious counteroffensive prison break and kidnappings. In Bolivia, the ELN had 
reorganized by late 1974 and expanded their membership to mining unions, peasant 
organizations, and other supporters of the recently assassinated former president Juan 
José Torres (whose death is often attributed to Condor). But President Hugo Banzer, 
fearing an “international threat,” after the uprising, began to seek out intelligence on 
“terrorist activity beyond Bolivia’s borders” and the ELN would have to act with greater 
caution.415 The guerrillas who had resisted for years, forming underground and on-the-
streets resistance movements, now sought exile in hundreds of countries around the 
world, and spent millions of dollars. Despite these exceptional cases of reorganization, 
Condor proved remarkably successful in paralyzing the militant left. 
Through 1975, Argentine guerrilla groups had fared better than their regional 
counterparts and, in the face of increased paramilitary activity, their numbers had actually 
grown between 1973 and 1975.416 The military and the guerrillas were growing 
simultaneously, but disproportionately, encouraging each other’s growth until the 
military seized power and those guerrillas who were not eliminated were driven abroad. 
The left’s incremental growth is the one exception to otherwise unqualified military 
success. It also gave the military a justification for repression. “In the international mood 
of the times…urban guerrilla warfare was embraced as the tit-for-tat killings with the 
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right-wing death squads increased at an eerie pace.”417 As historian Greg Grandin 
extrapolates, “The more a state engages in surgical, almost microscopic surveillance of its 
citizens—which, one would think, would limit the amount of actual violence that is 
needed to maintain control—the more likely it is to perpetuate indiscriminate, scattershot 
mass terror.”418 This is a description of the paradox of military-guerrilla relations in the 
Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996), a conflict even bloodier than Argentina’s Guerra 
Sucia, but it pertains to the latter as well. In both cases, violence is perpetrated by the 
right and the left, as each justifies its own use of brutality as a defensive and necessary 
response to the other’s.  
Just as Pinochet inflated his domestic leftist threat to explain the military’s 
“counteroffensive,” the Argentine military also capitalized on the left’s growth to defend 
its use of repression. Through its surveillance of the MIR and its “own network abroad,” 
DINA’s November 1974 bulletin reported the presence of a 40,000-strong urban guerrilla 
force and 400,000 sympathizers in Argentina. Contreras supplied these numbers to the 
Argentine military, which later adopted these figures as their official estimates.419 
Without question these numbers were a gross exaggeration of leftist strength, but they 
intimate the militaries’ concern that indigenous guerrillas could swim in a sea of 
supportive exiles and civilians. 
A more realistic estimate of guerrilla strength in late 1975 is roughly 5,000 active 
militants, primarily from working-class neighborhoods, factories, and universities. The 
PRT-ERP had connections in over 400 “of the most important,” factories in Buenos Aires 
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province, “had established a presence,” in Tucumán, Jujuy, and Santiago del Estero, was 
“one of the major forces” among Córdoba’s proletariat, and was organizing cells in 
Rosario’s metal and meat-packing industries and Patagonia’s oil sector. Moreover, it had 
successfully organized secondary and university students, peasants, white-collar workers, 
and teachers. Even given the militaries’ overinflated estimates, guerrilla organizations 
were not inconsiderable on the eve of the coup and admittedly the military had legitimate 
cause for concern.420 
But the combination of the coup and Condor’s inception gave the military 
resources and latitude, which it had never had before. “When the generals took power in 
March 1976, the military threat from leftist guerrillas had been effectively broken, their 
operational capacity limited to random, if sometimes spectacular, acts of terrorism…. At 
no time [after the coup] did the insurgents pose a real threat to the state.”421 The junta’s 
rise to power changed the guerrillas’ situation in several key respects. On the one hand, it 
forced groups underground or into exile, and diminished the possibility that the military 
would restore civilian rule in the near future or that there would be any leftist leaders 
remaining able to launch a successful insurgency. Indeed, by the end of 1976, more than 
4,000 people had been disappeared into the military network of secret torture camps. 
Another 1,000 people were killed in military actions in which bodies were left behind and 
could not be identified.”422  
The year following the coup saw “a rapid downfall” in numbers and activity. By 
mid-1976, the PRT-ERP “had been completely subdued.”423 Not only was the ERP 
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“eliminated as a guerrilla force,” but the “Montoneros were fleeing the country.424 By the 
end of the year, the Montoneros had lost 80 percent of their combatants and much of their 
leadership within the Southern Cone.425 After Santucho’s capture in July 1976 and the 
assassination of several other key leftist leaders that summer, “Argentine guerrillas 
reemerged in other countries—either as political exiles or combatants.”426  
ERP had “ceased to function” in the Southern Cone after mid-1977, but the 
Montoneros lasted until late 1979, albeit a shadow of their former selves. In December 
1979, the Montoneros launched a last gasp “strategic counteroffensive” in Argentina that 
was easily crushed by the regime.427 In response, the military “hunted down” and 
murdered over 500 of the guerrillas’ combatants, including their commander Horacio 
Mendizábal. As one scholar notes: “…[t]he dreadful toll taken on the faithful comrades 
back home had split the exile organization, leaving only a shell called the Movimiento 
Peronista Montonero.”428  
Up until the coup, guerrilla combatants and leftist activists were Condor’s 
principal enemy. Since the guerrilla insurgency was by and large neutralized within the 
first year, the military turned its attention to ideologues and sympathizers. As General 
Acdel Vilas, the Bahía Blanca province army commander (one of the primary 
destinations for Chilean exiles in Argentina after September 1973, and the COMACHI 
headquarters), noted in August 1976: “The fight against subversion in subzone 51 [Bahía 
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Blanca] has been carried on until now against the visible head, the subversive delinquent, 
but not against the ideologue who generates, forms, and molds this new class of 
delinquents.”429 General Domingo Bussi, one of Videla’s army officers, echoed this 
statement on a national level in late 1975: “On those ideologues who instruct and 
encourage delinquency…corrupting and encouraging corruption, justifying, facilitating, 
or favoring subversion in all aspects—on them, sooner or later, we will make the power 
of our arms and the force of our cause fault, regardless of how deeply they have 
burrowed.”430 
Not surprisingly, this shift in targets precipitated changes within the exile 
community. The following section focuses on Argentina, where the largest number of 
transnational leftists remained, because it was the last country in the Southern Cone to 
establish military rule.  But there is little doubt that what transpired there was comparable 
to what other exiles experienced throughout the continent.   
 
In Search of Safe Haven, Again 
The fear felt by exiles upon learning of attacks on their top leaders, guerrillas, and 
countrymen across the world was palpable. As Dinges describes, “an entire generation of 
political exiles [was] forced to look over their shoulder wherever they were in the 
world.”431 Individual testimonies reveal the profound impact that Condor activities had 
on the exile community—in South America and abroad. As Sanhueza describes: 
During the six months that I was there [Argentina], the harassment of Chileans 
wasn’t very strong yet. At this time, the Chileans weren’t very important within 
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the Argentine political panorama. After the [March 1976] coup, yes. They were 
killing the Uruguayans especially. I was greatly impacted by the death of some 
members of Congress who were exiled, who were murdered in cold blood by the 
Uruguayan military acting in Buenos Aires.432 
 
The high-profile assassination sent an unmistakable message to the exile 
community. As Dinges describes, “Even more so than killing a leftist bogeyman like 
[Carlos] Altamirano, the death of a revered figure like Leighton would strike terror in the 
hearts of exiles everywhere and demonstrate not only DINA’s international power but its 
utter ruthlessness.”433 For the exile community in the United States, the Letelier 
assassination evoked a similar response. Jakšić, who had just relocated to the U.S. capital, 
Letelier’s assassination was especially disquieting:  
In the United States, the memories of repression continued to burden me while 
new anxieties were added. Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the 
United States, was assassinated in Washington barely a week after my arrival. The 
DINA acquired an almost mythical proportion in my eyes. Clearly, Chileans were 
not safe, even in the United States.434 
 
If high-profile assassinations did not send enough of a message, direct targeting of 
everyday activists and ideologues did. In early April 1976, for example, a squad of 
Chilean, Uruguayan, and Argentine security forces raided a Buenos Aires church office 
where UNHCR officials kept paperwork documenting the Chilean, Argentine, and 
Uruguayan exile community, and “carted off UNHCR records stored there.” Two days 
later, twenty-four Chilean and Uruguayan refugees, whose addresses were in the stolen 
files, “were arrested, tortured, and interrogated by officers from their own countries.”435 
Between July and October 1976, Condor’s harassment of foreign leftist groups in 
Argentina “reached its greatest intensity.” The interrogation, detention, disappearance, 
                                                
432 Wright and Oñate, Flight from Chile, 67. 
433 Dinges, The Condor Years, 131. 
434 Jakšić, “In Search of Safe Haven,” 25. 
435 Dinges, The Condor Years, 143-144. 
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and murder of civilian non-combatants significantly increased with the widespread use of 
tactics previously reserved for suspected militants. 
Indeed, no one—regardless of nationality, location, or age—could be sure of his 
or her safety. When the junta came to power, Carla Rutila Artés, “one of the littlest 
victims of the ‘dirty war’,” was living with her mother, the Argentine Graciela Rutila 
Artés, in Oruro, Bolivia. Her father, the Uruguayan Enrique Lucas López, was a member 
of the Bolivian MIR. One week after the coup the Argentine military raided Rutila’s 
home in Oruro, “wrenching the nine-month-old Carla from her crib.” Carla’s mother was 
“beaten mercilessly and forced to watch as the invaders held the infant, stripped naked, 
by the heels and whipped her.” Rutila was then sent to La Paz, where she was 
interrogated and tortured by the Bolivian Departamento de Orden Político: she was 
subjected to electric torture, beaten with clubs and whips, burned with cigarettes, and 
“nearly drowned in soapy water.” In July, the Argentine Federal Police came to La Paz to 
bring Rutila back to Argentina. Although Carla had been placed in an orphanage in April, 
she was reunited with her mother in August in Buenos Aires, only to be orphaned for a 
second time when Rutila was killed several months later. Within weeks of his wife’s 
death, Lucas López was arrested in Cochabamba, Bolivia and “tortured to death” 
alongside the secretary of the populist Bolivian president Juan José Torres. Like hundreds 
of other children, Carla was placed in the hands of Eduardo Ruffo, the second-in-
command to SIDE (Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado—Ministry of State 
Information) chief Otto Paladino. Carla was given a “phony birth certificate and a new 
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identity, that of Gina Amanda Ruffo,” in October 1977. “[O]fficially, Carla…did not 
exist for eight years.”436 
Three months after the coup, SIDE converted a battered automobile repair shop, 
Automotores Orletti, into its headquarters and one of an estimated 300 detention centers 
in the country. Of the hundreds of prisoners who passed through Orletti, it was infamous 
because only “a handful” walked out alive. One of these rare survivors, José Luis 
Bertazzo, “a nineteen-year-old bank clerk who by all accounts had no connections with 
guerrilla activity,” spent almost two months in detention after being arrested on August 
23, 1976. Suggestive of the almost indiscriminate way in which the militaries regarded 
leftists independent of nationality or militancy, Bertazzo was put in the same room as two 
of the MIR’s leaders, Patricio Biedma and another he knew only as “Mauro,” and treated 
to the same type of interrogation and torture as they.437 
Bertazzo testified that he was able to identify Chileans, Uruguayans, Paraguayans, 
and Bolivians among the prisoners. These exiles told him, “they were being interrogated 
by security officers from their own countries.” In fact, the number of foreign military 
operators in Argentina significantly increased around the time of the coup. In March 
1976, a team of Uruguayan SID (Servicio de Información y Defensa—Information and 
Defense Service) officials also “began operating in Argentina [and]…resulted in the 
largest group of disappearances carried out by Operation Condor. Indeed, more 
Uruguayans disappeared and were assassinated in Argentina—135—than in Uruguay 
itself as a result of security police operations.” The vast majority were not MLN-T 
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guerrillas, but political refugees driven into exile after the Uruguayan military seized 
power.438  
Gerardo Gatti Acuña, a Uruguayan labor leader, was one of those who did not 
survive his detention in Orletti. A founder of Uruguay’s largest labor group, the leftist 
Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers Confederation—CNT), Gatti 
Acuña went into exile in Argentina after “a valiant but unsuccessful,” CNT-led effort to 
“paralyze the country with a general strike.” In Argentina, Gatti Acuña helped to 
organize the underground Resistencia Obrero-Estudiantil (Worker-Student Resistance—
ROE). Between May and October 1976, “at least sixty” ROE affiliates were seized and 
detained in Buenos Aires, including Gatti who was arrested on June 8. Five days later, 
unidentified Uruguayan army personnel broke into the Buenos Aires apartment of 
Washington Pérez, an Uruguayan union leader. He was taken to “an unidentified 
building, where it was explained that his captors wanted him to serve as a contact 
between them and the ROE.” The Uruguayan soldiers brought Pérez into a room “where 
Gatti lay in agony on a bed. He had been so badly tortured with electric shock around the 
eyes that he was nearly blind.” The Uruguayan kidnappers demanded that Pérez contact 
the Uruguayan resistance group and offer them Gatti and nine other ROE activists in 
exchange for $2 million. “The money, they suggested, could be obtained from various 
human rights groups and Uruguay ‘solidarity’ committees in Europe.” Pérez was 
kidnapped five times alone during the negotiations. After finding that the ROE could not 
meet the ransom, he fled to Sweden. Gatti remains a desaparecido.439 
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When Argentina became too unsafe, many leftists, like Pérez, were forced to seek 
exile elsewhere. For some, it was their first experience seeking safe haven abroad, but for 
many, this was their second, third, or even fourth attempt at finding safety.  
Although the exile exodus from Argentina first began after Perón’s death, “the 
flow of exiles significantly widened” after the coup.440 As a result of the heightened 
repression, “the number of those who went into exile increased notoriously…greatly 
add[ing] to the Argentinean diaspora both in Latin America and on other continents, 
particularly in Europe.”441 Contrary to earlier refugee diasporas, which were “composed 
of small groups of persecuted individuals,” the increased political violence that began in 
1974 “dramatically transformed this trend by causing thousands of people to flee 
abroad.” Although the military allegedly targeted only subversives, this later diaspora 
included “friends and relatives of the detained or ‘disappeared’ people; activists opposing 
the government; leftist intellectuals; teachers and university students professionals in the 
social sciences; journalists; and people connected to the world of culture and the arts.”442 
As Armony surmises, “From 1977 on, Argentine paramilitary groups stalked, kidnapped, 
and assassinated Argentine political refugees throughout Latin America and Europe.” 
Indeed, the Argentine military sent “hit teams,” to “track down exiled dissidents” in 
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, 
and Belgium, among others.443 
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Argentine nationals were not the only ones targeted by the new regime. As 
Roniger and Sznajder explain, “Equally, if not more, vulnerable was the situation of Latin 
American refugees who had settled in Argentina and were left without legal protection 
and could fall prey to repression.”444 One report estimated that there were approximately 
100,000 Latin Americans living in Argentina in 1976; only 300 of these had been granted 
formal refugee asylum and another 1,100 had been accepted as “de facto refugees” by the 
UNHCR. After the coup, the UNHCR moved 5,500 of these refugees out of Argentina.445 
As Yankelevich notes, it is challenging, if not impossible, to quantify with certainty the 
size of this migration due to the large number of people who fled illegally as formal exit 
strategies became more dangerous.446  
In addition, hundreds of thousands of Argentines fled their homeland. 
Yankelevich estimates that between 300,000 and 500,000 left for political, economic, or 
personal reasons between 1960 and 1980.447 According to a 2003 report, 334,126 
Argentineans left the country between 1975 and 1984 alone—a staggering figure which 
“represents about half of all nationals [world-wide] who emigrated between 1950 and 
2000.”448 Arriving at more precise data is hampered by foreign embassies’ traditionally 
unreliable documentation of individuals’ nationality during this period of hasty 
migrations. For instance, the Argentine embassy’s immigration records of Chile-to-
Argentina movement from September 1973 to 1975 reveal that the documentation of 
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citizenship was rather arbitrary: while some officers were diligent in accurately recording 
an exile’s nationality, others simply wrote down their most recent country of residency or 
travel. In addition, many exiles lacked official identification cards so they had the 
prerogative to choose their own nationality for the purpose of embassy records. The result 
was that various immigration lists composed by different officers in the same file would 
identify an individual as “Chilean” in one list, “Uruguayan” in a second, and “Argentine” 
in a third.449  
Although some of the region’s military regimes agreed to take in refugees, for 
compelling reasons this was not an attractive alternative: “These [right-wing] regimes 
actively discouraged Chileans from settling or, if they tolerated exiles, closely watched 
them and restricted their political activities.”450 In Europe and North America in the late 
1970s and 1980s, “natural political affinities,” influenced the migratory flows: the USSR 
and its Eastern European supporters “felt a special obligation toward members of the 
Communist Party, as did the government of Cuba.” The same governments also 
welcomed Chilean Socialists and MIRistas. The Socialist Party and Unidad Popular both 
established new headquarters in Berlin, while the Chilean Communist Party settled in 
Moscow and the MIR relocated to Paris and Havana. Christian Democrats tended to 
migrate to nations “where their coreligionists were powerful,” including West Germany, 
Venezuela, and Italy (where Leighton resettled).451  
Indeed, some leftist leaders pragmatically elected to go into exile after the 
Argentine coup in order to gain international support for their plight. In March 1976, for 
example, Santucho urged his guerrilla organization’s artists, writers, and union activists 
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“…to go into exile,” where they would “carry out a laudable task of organizing protests 
against human rights violations and propagandizing the Argentine people’s struggle.”452 
Montonero exiles, among them the celebrated poet Juan Gelman, “used their literary 
connections in Europe” with such prominent exile writers as Julio Cortázar “to mobilize 
opinion against the proceso [Argentine junta].”453 Activists from across the world 
organized solidarity concerts, events, and rallies in support of the Chilean people, 
condemning the junta. Indeed, today in Santiago, Chile a museum exists to exhibit the 
2,650 pieces of art donated to Chile by artists from across the world.454 Many of the 500 
paintings, drawings, video recordings, sculptures, tapestries, and photographs donated 
between 1971 and 1973 laud Allende, while those donated after the coup condemn 
Pinochet and military repression, or portray the socialist president as a martyr.455 The 
generosity of the international art community in this regard speaks to the profound level 
of external awareness of the dictatorship attributable in part to the formidable presence 
and solidarity work of the Chilean exile community. Santiago’s Museo de la Memoria 
houses an equally impressive digital collection of hundreds of posters, stickers, and fliers 
from Denmark, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, Milan, Germany, 
Norway, Iraq, Cuba, the United States, Canada, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, and elsewhere.456 As Figures 3:1-3:22 illustrate, visually arresting, polemical 
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poster art from Latin American, European, Middle Eastern and North American solidarity 




Symposium in Solidarity with Chilean Exiles and Their “Right to Return,” 
Concert hall in Amsterdam. Netherlands, 1986457  
                                                
457 Comisión Pro-Retorno Holanda (Holland’s Commission for Return), “Simposio internacional 
sobre el retorno de los exiliados chilenos,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Amsterdam, 21 
Nov. 1986; republished in Santiago, Chile: MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), accessed 11 
Jan. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:2 
Solidarity with the People Under Dictatorship in South America 
Denmark458 
  
                                                
458 Comité de Solidaridad Salvador Allende de Dinamarca (Salvador Allende Solidarity 
Committee of Denmark), “Solidaridad con los países en dictaduras de América Latina,” 
Iconografía. (Originally printed in Denmark; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), 
accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:3 
Unity and Struggle for Democracy in Chile 
Denmark459 
                                                
459 Comité Salvador Allende—Dinamarca (Salvador Allende Committee—Denmark), “Unidad y 
lucha por la democracia,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Denmark; reprinted by MMDH: 
CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:4 
The Right to Live in My Country 
Amsterdam, 1980s460 
 
                                                
460 Comité Pro-Retorno de Exiliados (Committee for Exiles’ Right to Return), “El derecho de 
vivir en mi tierra,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Amsterdam, 1980s; republished in Santiago, 




International Youth Encuentro in Support of Chile 
Milan, 1977461 
                                                
461 Brigada Muralista Salvador Allende—Milán (Salvador Allende Muralist Brigade—Milan), 
“Encuentro por Chile,” Iconografía. (Originally printed in Milan, 1977; reprinted by MMDH: 




Freedom for Luis Corvalán and the Other Political Prisoners in Chile 
United States462 
                                                
462 Communist Party U.S.A., “Free Luis Corvalán—Libertad a Luis Corvalán,” Iconografía. 
(Originally printed in Washington, D.C.; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca Nacional), 
accessed 10 Jan. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:7 
Drawing of a Fist Raised in the Style of the Muralista Brigades 
Copenhagen463 
                                                
463 Comité Salvador Allende de Solidaridad con Chile de Copenhague (Copenhagen’s Salvador 
Allende Committee of Solidarity with Chile), “Dibujo de un puño levantado al estilo de las 
brigadas muralistas,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Copenhagen; reprinted by MMDH: 
CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:8 
A French University Campaign in Solidarity with the Chilean Cause 
France464 
                                                
464 Université Populaire du Cercle Laïque (Popular University of Cercle Laïque), “Chile, La 
Solidaridad–Testimonio,” Iconografía (Originally printed in France; reprinted by MMDH: 




Meeting of Italian and Chilean Children 
Italy, 1976465
                                                
465 Díaz Caro Víctor, “Incontri Bambini Italiani-Cileni,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Italy, 




Solidarity Concert in Norway in Support of Chile 
Norway, 1988466 
 
                                                
466 Embajada de Noruega (Norwegian Embassy), “Concierto Solidario,” Iconografía. (Originally 
printed in Norway, 9 Sept. 1988; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), accessed 30 
Mar. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:11 
Night of Solidarity: Théâtre Rutebeuf Presents an Act of Solidarity with Chile and the 
Chilean Musical Group Quilapayún 
Clichy, France, 1974467 
                                                
467 Théâtre Rutebeuf and la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, “Soirée de Solidarité (Night of 
Solidarity),” (Originally printed in France, 1974; republished by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca 
















                                                
468 Comité Salvador Allende de Solidaridad con Chile de Copenhague, “Dibujo de un campo de 
concentración,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Copenhagen; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC 
Biblioteca Digital), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
469 Partido Comunista Iraquí (Iraqi Communist Party), “Solidaridad: Líbano, Palestina,” 
Iconografía (Originally printed in Palestine, republished by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca 
Nacional), accessed 10 Jan. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:14 
Fight Against the Military Dictatorship and Support the Chilean Resistance Movement 
Denmark470 
  
                                                
470 Embajada de Dinamarca (Danish Embassy), “Autoadhesivo. Lucha contra la dictadura militar 
y apoyo a la resistencia en Chile,” Autoadhesiva (sticker) (Originally printed in Denmark; 





Panamanian Committee in Solidarity with Chile 
Panama, 1981471 
                                                
471 Comité Panameño de Solidaridad con Chile (Panamanian Committee of Solidarity with Chile), 
“Jornada de solidaridad con Chile,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Panama, 1981; reprinted by 






Activity in Solidarity with Chile at the Centre Georges Pompidou 
France, 1983472 
                                                                                                                                            
de la Solidaridad), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
472 Association d'action solidaire—Centre Georges Pompidou (Organization of Solidarity 
Action—Georges Pompidou Center), “Actividad de solidaridad con Chile realizada en el Centre 
Georges Pompidou,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Paris, 1983; reprinted by MMDH: 
CEDOC Biblioteca Nacional), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, 
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Figure 3:17 
International Isolation of the Chilean Junta: Repression Provoked by the Junta Militar 
Denmark473 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
473 Comité de Solidaridad Salvador Allende de Dinamarca, “Aislamiento internacional de la 
Junta,” Iconografía (Originally printed in Denmark; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca 
Nacional), accessed 20 Apr. 2014, http://www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Figure 3:18 
Chile will Prevail: Drawing of People Holding Hands with the Chilean Flag 
Denmark, 1972474 
                                                
474 Embajada de Dinamarca, “Chile will overcome,” Postcard, (Originally printed in Denmark, 
1972; reprinted by MMDH: CEDOC Biblioteca Digital), accessed 23 Apr. 2014, 
www.bibliotecamuseodelamemoria.cl/. 
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Spain, 1971475  
                                                
475 Equipo crónica, “Sin título,” oil on canvas, 201 x 201 cm (Originally printed in Spain, 1971; 
reprinted in Chile: MSSA), accessed 21 Apr. 2014, www.mssa.cl. 
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Figure 3:20 
Un Petit Avatar 
France, 1973476  
                                                
476 Iván Messac, “Un petit avatar,” acrylic on canvas, 147 x 114 cm (Originally published in 






                                                
477 José Guinovart, “Operación Retorno (Operation Return),” painted wood relief, 220 x 185 cm, 








                                                
478 Eduardo Vilches, “La constante amenaza (The Constant Threat),” silkscreen, 109.7 x 75.3 cm 
(Chile: MSSA, 1973), accessed 21 Apr. 2014, www.mssa.cl.  
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These prints and posters capture two significant features of the South American 
diaspora: first, the Chilean left’s relocation abroad brought their plight to an international 
audience. At the same time as Southern Cone militaries were banding together under 
Condor, so, too, were leftist refugees forging a new transnational support network. 
Second, this leftist reformation (and expansion) had significant ramifications for their 
compatriots left behind in the Southern Cone. As a result of international criticism of the 
Chilean dictatorship, the Argentine generals placed special emphasis on subversive 
support networks precisely “to avoid the international protests and pressures that 
Pinochet’s government had faced after the coup in Chile.” To this end, the Argentine 
junta conducted the Dirty War “through small, local operations,” and a “decentralized 
apparatus.”479 Although Videla sought to assure “both domestic and foreign opinion of 
his government’s good intentions,” the junta also received international condemnation, 
though to a lesser degree than Pinochet.   
Indeed, although Argentine exiles initially found that Europeans “applauded the 
military for throwing out the ‘fascist’ Peronists,” by late June 1976, Le Monde issued a 
manifesto, signed by many of Europe’s “most prominent Social Democrats,” denouncing 
the junta’s repression. Soon after, the UN passed a resolution condemning Argentina for 
violating international refugee laws. Across Europe but especially in Paris, “hundreds of 
protesters…constantly surrounded,” the Argentine embassy, and there were “frequent” 
public petitions from French intellectuals demanding the release of Argentine leftists 
from prison.480 The 1985 film “Tangos, l'exil de Gardel,” by a noted Argentine leftist 
filmmaker Fernando Solanas, emphasizes the thousand-strong protests that took place in 
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the streets of Paris in solidarity with the Argentine exile community during the Dirty 
War.481 Examples like this remind us that exiles were not just passive victims; many 
remained active abroad and were successful in enlisting international support for their 
cause. I would argue that this groundswell of opposition contributed to putting the 
militaries on the defensive. Whether this had a significant impact on the repression itself 
is difficult to discern, because by 1977 the left had been effectively eliminated as a threat 
in Chile and it was a shell of its former self in Argentina. Indeed, “escalating 
international criticism for [the Argentina junta’s] human rights record,” was one of 
“many factors [that] weakened military rule.”482  
But as these testimonies make clear, the nature of exile profoundly changed 
during this period, especially after the Argentine “military” domino had fallen. As noted, 
both the right and the left had long embraced the “right” of political asylum. Although the 
safety that exile could realistically provide for refugees waned after Allende’s overthrow, 
it was a dead letter after the Argentine coup. To be sure, individuals continued to make 
use of exile because they had few other realistic options. But they did so with few 
illusions.   
  
Conclusions 
The period after the Chilean coup and Perón’s death was characterized by the 
consolidation of political power by Southern Cone military regimes. Even before 
Operation Condor became a reality, these militaries operated with impunity in targeting 
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leftists within their borders and abroad. Through their collaborative efforts, military 
dictatorships had the ability to eliminate the left’s leadership in exile and instill fear in the 
exile community as a whole. Their actions ultimately demonstrated the end to the sanctity 
of exile and precipitated a further wave of migrations as asylees, especially in Argentina, 
recognized their vulnerability and sought refuge elsewhere. In sum, Operation Condor 
profoundly altered civilian-military and Chilean-Argentine relations and shattered the 
illusion of a safe haven in exile. 
But Condor also bears several noteworthy similarities to the period before 
November 1975, an issue that will be addressed in greater detail in the conclusions. As 
the assassinations of Prats (September 1974), Leighton (October 1975), and Letelier  
(September 1976), the Malloco Raid (October 1974), and the Buenos Aires safe house 
invasion that killed Enríquez and Santucho (March 1976) demonstrate, pre- and post-
Condor operations are comparable in location target, methods and audacity. Militaries 
were not averse to operating abroad well before November 1975. 
Even though the left was defeated in the dirty wars of the 1970s, they were never 
passive victims. Though they never had the firepower, organization, and technical and 
logistical support which Southern Cone militaries could boast, leftist guerrillas, especially 
in Argentina, continued to commit kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations, while a 
displaced transnational exile community consistently reconstituted itself, forging ties with 
human rights organizations and leftist groups in their new homes.   
Indeed, I would argue that a multifaceted “transnationality” came to define 
civilian-military, paramilitary-military, and left-right relations during this era. Most 
accounts of Condor focus exclusively on right-wing cross-border collaboration; however, 
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guerrillas and their sympathizers also made use of international support networks. The 
ripple effects of the Prats’ killings or the Leighton assassination attempt on the South 
American and European exile communities were profound. Conversely, the little-
recognized impact of exile solidarity movements internationally on Southern Cone 
militaries demonstrates how committed leftist militants were despite being uprooted time 
and again.  
Condor, a right-wing transnational organization, cannot be studied in isolation. It 
must be understood alongside its leftist transnational counterpart. Each repeatedly 
influenced and fueled responses form the other.   
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Epilogue and Conclusions 
The Letelier bombing in Sheridan Circle prompted a media firestorm. One report 
called it “the most egregious act of foreign-inspired terrorism ever committed in the U.S. 
capital.”483 As the press pointed fingers at Pinochet and DINA, relations between the 
United States and Condor signatories worsened, in part because several months prior 
DINA had targeted U.S. Representative Ed Koch.484 It was one thing to murder a Chilean 
diplomat; it was another to assassinate a congressman. International criticism forced 
Condor leaders to abort assassination schemes already underway in Paris, Lisbon, 
London, and Madrid.485 Although Southern Cone governments continued to share 
intelligence for several more years, by the end of 1976, Condor’s operations outside of 
Latin America “were dismantled entirely.”486 As Dinges notes, the audacity of the crime 
“was aggravated by the fact that it was organized and carried out not by an enemy of the 
United States but by a government that was a firm ally, and by a security force trained 
and with intimate ties to the U.S. military and to the CIA.”487 
Until the Letelier assassination, Condor leaders had effectively received a green 
light—if not direct support—from sympathetic governments that turned a blind eye to the 
killings. But as the scope of the targeted assassinations became public knowledge 
throughout the United States and Western Europe, they were widely perceived as a direct 
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affront to national sovereignty, and could no longer be condoned by these regions’ 
governments.488 
Similar to the United States’ reaction to the Letelier plot, European intelligence 
services responded with indignation to attacks set to take place within their own borders. 
When a CIA officer informed French and Portuguese services that assassinations were 
being planned in their cities, these former Condor allies “did not dither or hesitate or 
debate the diplomatic implications;” they went to their Chilean, Argentine, and 
Uruguayan contacts and “told them bluntly to stop the operations.”489 After a second 
failed attempt at killing Altamirano in Madrid and exiled Uruguayan senator Wilson 
Ferreira in London, the six Condor security forces assembled in Buenos Aires in October 
1976 to assess the damage. This would be the final meeting at which all original 
signatories were present. Although another meeting was scheduled in Asunción for early 
1977, it was cancelled after Paraguay dropped out of the operation. There would be no 
more successful Condor assassinations outside of Latin America after December 1976.490 
Though scholars have highlighted loss of international support as the chief factor 
that precipitated Condor’s dissolution, internal Southern Cone disputes also played a part 
in the operation’s demise. As noted, Argentina and Chile have shared a thorny history, 
and their cooperation against Communist subversion marked a rare period of 
collaboration. But Condor cooperation was not so much a definitive break with the past 
as it was a pausing of past antagonism. By early 1977, the two nations “were on the verge 
of war” over ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel, a passage in Tierra del 
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Fuego.491 International arbitration gave the disputed land to Chile in February, and 
though Argentina rejected the decision, it decided not to protest because it was hosting 
the World Cup soccer championship matches in May and June, “which would certainly 
be cancelled in the event of fighting.” Instead, the Argentine junta turned its efforts 
toward constructing airports, television networks, and stadiums. After the World Cup, 
Argentine hard-liners again geared up for battle with Chile, spending around $13 billion 
on armaments “in the biggest military buildup in the country’s history,” but ultimately 
stood down as cooler heads prevailed.492  
On August 13, 1977, the international “shadow cast over Chile’s military” forced 
Pinochet to formally dissolve DINA.493 Yet on the same day that Pinochet issued the 
order to disband the intelligence service, a second decree established CNI (Centro 
Nacional de Información—National Center for Information). Although CNI was not 
granted the same powers of arrest and detention and would report to the Ministry of 
Interior instead of directly to Pinochet, Contreras remained in place as director, “meaning 
that this change in the structure of the secret police was in name only.”494 From August to 
November 1977, CNI orchestrated a series of bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and 
murders, all of which were blamed on “extremists.” Despite growing criticism from 
abroad, Contreras continued to claim that leftists remained a threat to domestic 
security.495 
In early November, a group of high-ranking military officers demanded that 
Pinochet remove Contreras from his post, arguing that the nation’s international image on 
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human rights “would never improve as long as he remained.” Following their suggestion, 
on November 4, Pinochet demoted Contreras to brigadier general at the Army 
Engineering School, and appointed General Odlanier Mena, a known DINA critic, as the 
new CNI director. A November 9 report noted Pinochet’s realization that “as long as the 
leadership of the CNI remains basically the same as its predecessor organization, DINA, 
many critics of the Chilean government will insist that no real change has taken place.”496 
One source compared Contreras, once the most feared individual in Chile, to “a 
cuckolded husband who is the last to realize his wife was being unfaithful.”497 
Despite Contreras’ demotion, CNI was “qualitatively, if not quantitatively, as 
repressive as its predecessor.” The numbers of political killings decreased from 1978 to 
1980, but as organized protests against the junta escalated, so too did CNI’s use of 
repression. In the truth commissions that followed the return to democracy, CNI agents 
would be charged with several of the dictatorship’s worst atrocities, including the killing 
of trade union leader Tucapel Jiménez in February 1985 and the decapitation murders of 
three professors in March 1985. One hundred and sixty political murders have been 
documented for the 1978-1985 period, “most of…[which] were attributed to the CNI.”498 
Although selective political violence continued until Pinochet left power in 1989, the 
degree of repression never approached what had transpired during the 1973-1976 
period.499 
In Argentina, SIPBA was formally dissolved on January 1, 1977 and restructured 
as the Dirección General de Informaciones (General Directorate of Information—DGI). 
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Several years later, the Argentine intelligence service returned to its original name, 
DIPBA. DIPBA lived on until April 30, 1998, when the Ministry of Security and Justice 
dissolved the intelligence service for good.500  
Regional military cooperation outlived Condor. In early November 1977, the 
infamous Orletti interrogation center in Buenos Aires, where SIDE conducted many of its 
torture sessions, had to be shut down after two prisoners escaped. The Orletti Taskforce 
18 team had just started another covert operation with Bolivia, and that prison would add 
several Bolivian captives to the Uruguayan prisoners already detained there. The 
publicizing of Orletti’s location, in the middle of a quiet neighborhood, provoked 
criticism from international human rights groups and Argentines alike. SIDE continued to 
share information about members of their exile communities with Condor signatories 
until the transition to democracy. But after the Letelier assassination, intelligence sharing 
and assassination plots were scaled back and limited to targets in Latin America.501  
Although economic and political instability would continue to plague Argentina 
for the next several years, by 1980 the military “had so thoroughly uprooted the guerrillas 
and their supporters that even isolated acts of terrorism seldom disturbed the peace 
anymore.”502 International condemnation of the junta, albeit never to the same degree as 
Pinochet received, also encouraged the military to reign in its use of force. Argentina’s 
generals returned the country to civilian rule in 1983 and Pinochet would step down 
seven years later.503 
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The damage done in human terms by these dictatorships was considerable. For 
Argentina, the number of recorded deaths and disappearances is near 9,000; for Chile, it 
is slightly over 40,000. The Argentine Nunca Más report cites 8,961 documented 
desaparecidos between 1976-1983 and an additional 1,300 victims seen alive in 
clandestine detention centers. Most sources believe the actual figure is much higher.504 
But whatever the true number may be, political scientist Daniel Lutzky is correct in 
saying that the Dirty War was “the most terrible repression ever known in Argentina in 
its entire history.”505 In Chile, the Valech Report puts the total number of deaths, 
disappearances, kidnappings, torture and abuse that occurred between September 11, 
1973 and 1990 at 40,018.506 Both countries’ truth commissions have since recognized 
that these figures are likely to grow as more testimonies and police records are 
uncovered.  
But, as noted, assassination was not the only way the militaries dispensed with 
opposition at home. According to a 2003 study, 334,126 Argentines fled the country from 
1975-1984, a staggering figure that speaks to the size of the exile community that had 
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relocated there.507 Estimates of the number of Chileans who fled during the Pinochet 
dictatorship for political, economic, and personal reasons range significantly—from 
several hundred thousands to nearly two million—but most accounts cite the figure of 
approximately 700,000.508  
Beyond the sheer numbers of the diaspora and the disappeared, in what ways did 
Condor precipitate change? In the next section, I go beyond the traditional narrative of 
victimization to consider how individuals and groups challenge and alter our perceptions 
of Condor, paying particular attention to how the status, power, and mobility of each of 




Although scholars have dwelled on the role that the U.S. played in Operation 
Condor, my thesis has focused on the origins of Southern Cone military collaboration, 
how the creation of Condor amplified those collaborative partnerships, and the impact 
this had on the transnational left in Argentina and Chile.  
Prior to the September 1973 coup, Chile by and large had been ruled by 
democratically elected governments and experienced political stability relative to its 
regional neighbors. Pinochet’s violent overthrow of Allende flagrantly disrupted this 
tradition of civilian administration. The junta utilized several tactics to justify its 
methods. First, overt repression was employed to eradicate the “subversive threat” within 
Chilean borders. Starting on the day of the coup, the junta rounded up thousands of 
suspected Allende sympathizers and leftist militants, raided homes, and conducted mass 
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executions in Santiago’s main sports arenas. It also dissolved Congress, banned political 
parties and labor unions, enforced strict censorship, burned texts it considered subversive, 
and established a curfew and martial law. From September 11, 1973 through 1989, there 
was never any real question of who was in charge or to what lengths the junta would go 
to remain in control. 
The second strategy was a more covert form of repression: as the rivers and 
streets of Santiago filled with a mounting number of corpses, Pinochet cultivated a state 
of terror and fear. With the support of Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Bolivian military, 
Pinochet established a network of secret interrogation centers and concentration camps 
across Chile. At the peak of repression in 1974, over 10,000 Chileans were detained at 
these sites.509 
The psychological effects of such repression were profound. Most citizens, 
especially in Santiago, knew what was happening, but were powerless to resist. However, 
several leftist political parties such as the PC and PS, and armed guerrilla groups like the 
MIR, were exceptions. As Chapters Two and Three illustrate, these militant groups 
successfully formed transnational coalitions to fight the dictatorships from bases 
throughout the Southern Cone. These groups are typically ignored in Condor, Dirty War, 
and dictatorship histories because they were more active in the months and years 
preceding the conflicts’ respective inception dates, but they were significant to the 
evolution of contemporary politics and civilian-military relations. 
The third and perhaps most important strategy utilized by Pinochet to maintain 
control was to deal an overwhelming blow to the left—both inside and outside of the 
country. Even as the junta appeared to have obliterated its opposition domestically, 
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Pinochet maintained that a powerful group of subversives “lurked just beneath the 
surface” and needed to be subdued.510 By fabricating elaborate assassination plots against 
the junta leaders and blaming these murders on the Popular Unity coalition and militants, 
the junta justified its repressive methods. When its actions precipitated a response from 
militant leftists, it only served to corroborate junta claims of the existence of a Marxist 
threat. In short, by inciting the left to act out, Pinochet lent credence to his claim that the 
military could not responsibly return the reins of government to civilians.  
Moreover, as my thesis documents, the military insisted that the leftist threat was 
not confined to Chile. Pinochet harped on the danger posed by an international 
community of leftists in exile to justify the need for extreme measures at home and 
abroad. In this sense, Pinochet’s domestic policies cannot be disentangled from his 
international ambitions. His actions at home were based on an external threat, and the 
strategic relations he formed abroad were grounded in his relentless determination to 
excise the Marxist threat within Chile. 
In sum, Operation Condor and the multinational military collaboration that 
preceded it coincided with Pinochet’s most repressive years in power. This partnership 
not only contributed in no small measure to disrupting the nation’s longstanding 
democratic tradition, but it also helped facilitate and prolong the junta’s reign of terror. 
Repression at home and abroad achieved the goal of eliminating both moderate and 
militant leftists.  
While Chilean domestic politics during the Condor years marked an abrupt 
change in orientation, the same was not the case for Argentina. Although Argentina’s 
international relations (especially with Chile and other Condor signatories) were altered 
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during the 1970s, the state’s domestic politics and civilian-military relations remained 
effectively the same. The military continued to recycle moralizing rhetoric to justify the 
coup, and explained their rationale for staying in power as a necessary stopgap against 
leftist unrest. Throughout 1974 and 1975, violence on the right and the left continued 
unabated. It has been said that the creation of Operation Condor coincided with the end of 
Peronism, but even that proved untrue. Despite Perón’s death in July 1974 and Isabel’s 
overthrow in March 1976, the Peronist party has demonstrated remarkable staying power. 
The last two presidents of the nation, Nelson Kirchner and his wife, María Fernández de 
Kirchner, were (and are) Peronists.  
So what did the Dirty War change? Why have we clung to the 1976-1983 
timeframe when the violence clearly began years, if not decades, prior to Isabel Perón’s 
ousting? Indeed, the “most intense repression” took place within the first year of the 
“war;” in fact, violence significantly decreased from 1977-1979 because the left had been 
essentially exterminated within Argentina.511 I posit several reasons for the scholarship’s 
and the international community’s emphasis on the 1976-1983 period. First, these dates 
fit within the regional and the Cold War context, and therefore lend themselves easily to 
transnational and comparative world histories, especially those written by North 
Americans and Europeans more familiar with their own histories than Latin America’s. 
Analyzed within this context, these dates require less explanation as well as less local and 
domestic examination. They cast Latin America actors as little more than proxies for 
Washington and Moscow.  
Second, the March 1976 inception date is particularly problematic. At first glance, 
this date appears logical because it coincides with the Argentine military’s seizure of 
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power. But, as Lewis and Robben document, this was not the start of violence. By 
emphasizing this date, scholars focus on the most straightforward period, when the 
military was clearly the perpetrator and civilians clearly the victim. This lends itself 
readily to historical accounts, to the truth commissions, and offers simplistic tropes of 
victim and violator. To begin a discussion earlier—in 1973, 1974, or 1975, for 
example—complicates this picture considerably and raises questions about who and 
where to place the blame. Nunca Más would read very differently if it had begun 
investigating the violence waged after Perón’s death in July 1974, for example. 
Considering the left’s growth prior to its eventual decimation in the late 1970s, the 
narrative would not have been as straightforward.  
Yet it is undeniable that the degree of violence changed dramatically after the 
coup. Although interrogation, surveillance, torture and disappearances all had been 
employed selectively by the military prior to the Dirty War, what transpired afterwards, 
especially the twin emphases on torture and disappearances, was something never before 
experienced in Argentina. In their minds the militaries were responding to an existential 
threat to national security and viewed their actions as justifiable. Indeed, my thesis 
illustrates that the regional dictatorships acted on their fear of Communism more than on 
United States direction. The coalescence of the transnational left in Allende’s Chile had 
profound implications for Southern Cone governments even before Operation Condor 
was set in motion.  
 The transnational left that found a home in Allende’s Chile would face a 
tumultuous odyssey from 1970 until Condor’s dissolution in 1977. Pinochet’s rise to 
power forced massive relocations to Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Europe, and 
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elsewhere. In the case of Argentina, many members of the transnational left forged ties 
with sympathetic leftists, and some, but not all, remained politically active. By and large, 
Argentina acted as a safe haven for exiles prior to Perón’s death in July 1974. After this 
point, however, they were targeted by a government that, only several months prior, had 
offered them refuge. Right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the AAA acted 
aggressively, putting Argentine leftist activists and exiles sympathetic to their cause at 
risk. By 1976, the left had been decimated, and the vast majority of the guerrilla forces 
had been killed, forced underground, or made to relocate abroad.  
Since Condor began less than four months before the Argentine military initiated 
the Dirty War, it is impossible to tease out how much credit it “deserves” for eliminating 
leftist subversion there. Yet there is little doubt that the unprecedented nature of the 
collaboration among the Southern Cone dictatorships contributed to the “success” of the 
Guerra Sucia.  
Leftist exiles who were fortunate enough to escape reconstituted themselves into 
like-minded collectivities abroad. Years spent in exile gave them ample opportunity to 
reflect on their national and political identities. As Sznajder and Roniger note, on a 
theoretical level, the exile experience represents “an ongoing tension” inherent in an 
individual’s identification with his or her homeland and political affiliations:  
There is a latent but distinct dimension of collective identity submerged in 
citizenship, necessarily recognized while in exile. Accordingly, it has been abroad 
that many of the displaced nationals discovered, rediscovered, or rather invented 
the ‘collective soul’ of their countries in primordial or spiritual terms. Whereas 
some migrants and sojourners became transnational and deterritorialized, many 
others sought to reconstruct their bonds of solidarity in terms of the home 
collective identity.512 
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The uncertain and tenuous character of political exile and the sense of displacement the 
refugees experienced, all the while living under constant fear, took a severe psychological 
toll. This was one of Condor’s most powerful legacies. Its reach abroad and the ways in 
which it acted with impunity to eliminate high profile targets as far away as Rome and as 
near as Paraguay meant that no refugee was beyond its grasp.  
But I have attempted to move beyond the study of exile as an individual, 
emotional experience. For most political refugees, exile had personal, economic, and 
psychological ramifications.513 Furthermore, individuals responded to the political 
violence in diverse ways, and were at different times victims, instigators, and perpetrators 
of violence. 
As this thesis demonstrates, the transnational left underwent a radical evolution 
from 1970 to 1977. After first coalescing in Chile from 1970 to 1973—a space that had 
allowed them to prosper under the umbrella of Allende’s socialist politics, establish ties 
to Chilean leftists, and publically and privately criticize their own country’s dictatorship 
from afar—the fall of the Chilean domino again forced their relocation. As Pinochet, the 
Caravan of Death, and DINA worked quickly to eradicate the leftist presence from within 
their borders, many of these leftists sought political asylum. Many relocated to Argentina.  
Although most scholars have focused on the inactivity and fearfulness of these exiles in 
their new home, what occurred was far more complicated. From September 1973 through 
Perón’s death in July 1974, the exile community gained strength openly collaborating 
with Argentine leftists, Peronist workers, and an increasingly vocal student movement. 
COMACHI was a major transnational leftist actor that brought together individuals and 
groups from nearly every Latin American nation, in solidarity with the Chilean cause. 
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The military did begin to track COMACHI’s relationship to national organizations before 
Perón’s death, but, for the most part, it did not act on the information it collected until 
July 1974. COMACHI took to the streets of Buenos Aires and La Plata, campaigned in 
Argentine universities, and publically organized alongside labor unions, women’s groups, 
and professors. Up until the coup, a sizeable portion of the exile community was 
politically active.  
But Isabelita’s rise to power, under the manipulative guidance of AAA Director 
López Rega, significantly weakened the left. Although pockets of armed leftist resistance 
remained in Argentina through 1976, increasing paramilitary and military repression 
forced the majority of leftist ideologues and sympathizers to flee the country and seek 
haven elsewhere.  
While some members of the transnational left stayed within Latin America 
(Venezuela and Mexico received the most refugees during the Dirty War), the majority of 
exiles recognized the limited potential for security in a region dominated by dictatorships, 
and instead chose to relocate to the United States or Europe. Although the activity and 
solidarity campaigns of leftists in Europe and the U.S. following Videla’s rise to power is 
beyond the scope of this project, it is important to underscore that the battle between 
South American exiles and dictatorships also played out in the streets of Paris, 
Stockholm, Brussels, and Madrid. Exile was more than an individual experience for these 
refugees; it was also a collective one, as they formed solidarity networks and campaigned 
to pressure western governments to withdraw support for Southern Cone military 
regimes. In short, although these refugees were victimized, they were not just passive 
victims.  
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Since so much of the scholarly literature on Condor has focused on the United 
States’ role in the operation, I have instead emphasized the other principal actors. But 
there is little doubt that the U.S. played a pivotal role in assisting the South American 
militaries in their successful dismantling of leftist opposition. I contend that the attention 
given to the U.S. role in the literature, especially by North American scholars and 
journalists, invariably casts Washington as Condor’s principal orchestrator. This has 
obscured the critical role played by militaries in the Southern Cone. Regional 
collaboration existed before Condor and it would continue after its demise.  
Still, the U.S. role was significant in several respects. It is undeniable that the 
United States provided crucial economic and technological support to Condor signatories. 
Its military had trained South American military leaders at the School of the Americas 
and at the Southern Zone Command in Panama since the inception of the Cold War, it 
provided technological assistance to develop the Condor telex system, it shared contacts 
and intelligence, and it supplied millions of dollars to signatories in their anti-communist 
crusade. In early April 1976, for example, the U.S. Congress approved Kissinger’s 
request to provide 50 million dollars in “security assistance” to the Argentine junta. At 
the end of the same year, Congress offered an additional 30 million dollars in military 
aid, and Kissinger recommended that Congress increase the “aid package” to 
$63,500,000 the following year.514 While it denounced authoritarian regimes rhetorically, 
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the Carter administration continued to supply assistance, training, and weapons to the 
Videla regime during the Dirty War. In 1977 and 1978 alone the U.S. sold over 120 
million dollars worth of military spare parts to Argentina, and in 1977 the Department of 
Defense received $700,000 in funding to train 217 Argentine military officers.515 When 
military aid to Argentina was officially halted in September 1987 under section 502B of 
the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States had spent $1,115,000 on training Argentine 
troops since 1976.516 It is highly unlikely that Condor could have carried out as many 
high-profile assassinations as it did without North American funding. 
In addition to economic and military assistance, equipment, intelligence and 
training, the United States played an equally significant consulting role. While there is 
little trace of Kissinger’s visits to South America during this period, there is ample 
documentation of Southern Cone military leaders traveling to Washington, either to lobby 
for additional support from Congress or to consult with the Secretary of State and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.517 Dinges in particular notes 
several occasions in which Contreras consulted with Kissinger.518  
But funding and consulting should not be construed as orchestration. Southern 
Cone military regimes and the United States did not share the same objectives. Nor was 
Condor an asymmetrical partnership. Indeed, no North American delegation, official or 
otherwise, was present at Condor’s creation in late November 1975. This does not 
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preclude the possibility that the United States knew about the meeting and simply 
abstained from attending, but it shows that South American militaries were autonomously 
committed to collaborating with each other to defeat the left. Even critics like Ernesto 
López admitted, “The [Argentine] military are not instruments of the Pentagon, nor of the 
Oligarchy, nor of the State, regardless of how it is constituted…. The military are social 
and political actors and not instruments.”519 In addition, as Lewis notes with regard to the 
United States’ impact on the Dirty War, “military aid and training could not have had an 
effect [on the Argentine military] unless it had corresponded to local military 
demands.”520 
Even after the United States began to offer aid and technological assistance to 
Condor, assassination targets remained the same: the location, individual profile, and 
methods did not vary before and after November 1975. The Letelier assassination marks 
a third illustration of South American autonomy. According to Dinges, when the CIA 
caught wind of the plan to target Letelier within their borders, they demanded that the 
Chilean government immediately halt the operation.521 Though the U.S. was powerless to 
stop the plot, DINA paid the price for ignoring the CIA and executing a public figure in 
such a prominent place as Sheridan Circle. The international outcry in response to the 
attack forced Pinochet to dissolve DINA and Contreras was removed from his post 
several months later. The U.S. continued to “keep tabs” on Condor after September 1976, 
but it scaled back its aid.522 In further demonstration of the fallout from the case, there 
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were no more (known) Condor assassinations outside of Latin America after December 
1976.523  
Many scholars have read Condor’s decline as the result of declining U.S. support. 
But a stronger case could be made that Condor and the Dirty War had already 
accomplished their objectives. As noted, by 1976 the guerrilla threat within the Southern 
Cone had been eradicated. Even after Washington drastically scaled back its funding and 
assistance, South American militaries continued to share information and target known 
leftist leaders within their borders. Paraguay, for example, continued to track other 
Condor nations’ enemies living within its borders after 1976. On March 29, 1977, the 
Paraguayan intelligence service captured two Uruguayans and three Argentines “on 
suspicion of subversive activity against their home countries,” promptly notified the 
Uruguayan and Argentine intelligence chiefs, and participated alongside them in 
interrogating their citizens in Asunción. On May 16, two Argentine SIDE officials took 
the five suspects (the Argentines as well as the Uruguayans) to Argentina, where they 
were soon disappeared.524 In addition, as late as June 1980, an Argentine 601 Battalion 
squad traveled to Peru to find a group of Montoneros. Peruvian officers assisted the 
Argentine force in the attack, and they successfully captured all of the suspects in a house 
raid. The captives were “savagely tortured inside a Peruvian military installation” and 
then transported to Bolivia with the intention of transporting them back to Argentina. 
This was the last transnational operation that clearly bears the telltale mark of Condor.525 
                                                
523 Ibid., 218-219 and 222; and Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 171-173. 
524 Dinges, The Condor Years, 225. 
525 Ibid., 228. 
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Still, Condor signatories continued to utilize the telex communication system after this 
date.526  
Condor also undermined the sanctity of political asylum throughout the region. 
With some exceptions, up until the 1970s political refugees on the right and the left 
enjoyed the protection that asylum offered, no matter the ideological orientation of their 
new home. Even the most reprehensible heads of state knew they could find safe haven in 
neighboring Latin American countries when they were pushed out of power. Ironically, 
during the mid-1970s, just as the need to find places to flee was increasing exponentially, 
the right of asylum came under attack. With the advent of each new dictatorship, a newly 
reconstituted population of leftists was forced to uproot itself and reestablish itself 
elsewhere. This process created diasporic leftist communities that gained new 
membership in each country of resettlement, yet which never truly found a permanent 
home until the end of the Cold War. In addition to fundamentally altering one of Latin 
America’s most respected historic institutions, Condor also led to profound personal loss 
and hardship, the separation of families, and, for many, an unshakable sense of 
displacement and anxiety.  
One of the most overlooked aspects of Condor was a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the Chilean and Argentine militaries. As noted, the two nations have 
shared a prickly past, warring over boundary disputes, trade relations, national identities, 
natural resources, and politics. The sudden turnaround after 1973, the military 
collaboration, and the leadership role they shared in the region up until the early 1980s 
was as surprising as it was unprecedented. Of course, the quick evolution of this 
relationship in late 1973-1974 speaks less to the states’ intent to remedy past disputes and 
                                                
526 Ibid., 225; and Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 172. 
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more to their need to confront a shared enemy. Argentine-Chilean collaboration before 
and during Condor is testament to the military’s wariness of Communism and the 
transnational left. In their minds, since the enemy was international in scope, the solution 
would need to be as well. I am confident that the recently opened Paraguayan archives 
will offer comparable evidence for that nation’s involvement prior to November 1975, as 
well as the collaboration of Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay.  
Interviews conducted by several exile scholars have already confirmed the 
participation of these last three nations’ military officers in Pinochet’s initial rounding up 
and interrogation of subversives following the Chilean coup. But if this pre-1975 right-
wing collaboration were the case, then what difference did the formal creation of Condor 
make? Certainly high-profile targeted assassinations were a principal goal from the 
outset. As noted, the assassination plots against Prats, Santucho, Fuentes, and Leighton 
were all pre-Condor and bore no marked difference from later plots.  
Yet Condor scholars have clung to this date for two important reasons. Except for 
the United States, it brought together all of the principals in one location and it reflected a 
previously unimagined degree of transnational military coordination and integration. In 
addition, the November 1975 meeting led to the establishment of several key strategic 
enhancements that facilitated Condor’s successes: the data bank, the “Condortel” telex 
system, and the committed support of each nation’s local police and intelligence services 
to a war that extended far beyond their national borders. The United States—namely the 
CIA, the FBI, and Henry Kissinger—offered crucial support and guidance in this regard. 
Moreover, the dictatorships’ relationship with its exiled citizens as well as the 
security and activity of the transnational left in Argentina and Chile were altered in 
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several respects. Before November 1975, the Argentine military predominately confined 
itself to policing large-scale university protests, rare household raids, targeted 
surveillance, and the carefully recorded documentation of leftist activities. After 
Condor’s inception, the Chilean and Argentine militaries utilized the intelligence they 
had collected since Allende’s overthrow, if not earlier, to move aggressively against these 
activists with impunity. In this sense, November 1975 marks a radical shift in what the 
militaries were not only capable of, but willing to do.  
Condor’s inception was significant for three other reasons. First, although 
assassination plots against public leaders in exile did not significantly change, the ways in 
which the media and militaries publicized their actions did. The increasingly harrowing 
and bloody accounts of murder in the streets of global metropolitan centers sent a clear 
message to the exile community that no one was safe. Second, as Condor successfully 
eradicated the opposition’s key leaders in exile, they began to focus on attacking, 
interrogating, and instilling fear among grassroots activists. From 1975-1977, Condor’s 
targets were diversified to include ideologues, students, and professionals, as well as 
guerrillas. Third, Operation Condor also destroyed any remaining hope that the left had 
of finding safety within Argentina. As we have seen, under a nominally democratic 
regime, a vocal, activist, transnational coalition of exiles and Argentine nationals 
organized in solidarity to protest the region’s military dictatorships. When the last 
domino fell, exiles had little choice but to relocate far away from the Southern Cone. This 
meant much greater dispersal abroad and correspondingly less of an opportunity to 
continue the fight to overturn military rule in the region. A case in point was COMACHI, 
which had such success in promoting solidarity between transnational exiles and 
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Argentine leftists. Although the date of COMACHI’s dissolution is difficult to determine 
with precision, it disappears from SIPBA records in late 1975. Whether this is a result of 
COMACHI’s eradication or its relocation abroad, it is apparent that there is a shift in 
focus to armed militant groups who were gaining strength within Argentina during this 
period. But, whether as a result of the resettlement of COMACHI affiliates abroad or not, 
what is certain is that the transnational left did indeed re-form itself in Europe and 
elsewhere.  
November 1975 also remains important for its symbolism. It represented a 
calculated, systematic, and institutionalized disregard for exile and the existence of a war 
without borders that extended well beyond the Southern Cone. Condor’s 
operationalization also speaks to the regimes’ fervent conviction that they were on the 
“right” side of history. At its core, the operation represented a flagrant and violent 
disregard for democracy, the principle of political asylum, and human rights. Whether the 
threat its signatories fought to eradicate was more real or imagined, its regional campaign 
inspired fear among exile communities and clearly sent the message that no corner of the 
world could escape the dictatorships’ long arms.  
This thesis has sought to reconsider how the Cold War played out in Latin 
America. Too many histories, even the most recent, have been dominated by the 
perception of U.S.-USSR proxy wars. Cold War ideologies and politics influenced Latin 
America, but there were factors on the ground that also impacted the intense cycle of 
dictatorship and revolution that defined regional politics during this period. United 
States- and Soviet-centric accounts minimize the complexity of this dynamic and deprive 
South American actors of agency. By incorporating South American voices and archival 
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documents, as well as North American primary and secondary scholarship, I show how 
Latin American leaders and grassroots movements also directly and indirectly affected 
North American foreign policy.  
A final issue that this thesis implicitly problematizes is the elusive question of 
blame. Specifically, how much blame should the left shoulder for the atrocities it 
committed during this period? On the one hand, I have sought to move beyond the truth 
commissions’ simplistic identification of culpability, acknowledging hundreds of killings 
by the left (especially in Argentina). More importantly, by altering the traditional 
chronology and examining in succession the coalescence of the left in Chile, Pinochet’s 
disproportionate military “response,” a re-forming of the transnational left in Argentina, 
and then the Argentine militaries’ brutal repression, we can better understand what 
transpired across the region between 1970 and 1977.  
Ultimately, I do not seek to undermine the findings of the various truth 
commissions. The numbers of casualties speak for themselves and make clear that the 
atrocities the military dictatorships perpetrated were considerably greater than the 
damage inflicted by the left. But by focusing on what happened to the transnational left, I 
have tried to complicate what up to now has been a rather monochromatic narrative to 
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